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Abstract 
In the United Kingdom (UK) food law and its enforcement are currently governed by European 
and domestic law through a regulatory framework that seeks to provide a high level of public 
health protection to ensure food is safe for human consumption. Government reports recommend 
the need for alternative enforcement tools for those responsible for enforcing food law so that they 
can properly address any failures within a food business thus preventing foodborne incidents from 
recurring. It is important to know whether there are challenges enforcers face when dealing with 
breaches of the law that may be difficult to identify hidden problems. This study aims to analyse 
the views reflected by Environmental Health Practitioners (EHPs) currently working in food law 
enforcement in Local Authorities (LAs) across the North West of England. The study focuses on 
food inspections and current enforcement strategies. This study builds on existing literature to 
examine EHP perceptions of the effectiveness of tools available to them in the area of food 
inspections and enforcement. This study fills the gap in the literature by conducting a qualitative 
methodology of the perceptions and views of EHPs to gain knowledge about the successes and 
failures of inspection practices including the practicality of the food hygiene rating scheme and 
how other forms of enforcement measures would affect enforcement practices in England. In lieu 
of the current economic climate, it was also important to gauge the opinions of enforcement 
officers on the future of environmental health and more specifically food law enforcement. 
Twenty-one Environmental Health Practitioners (EHPs) from seventeen Local Authorities in the 
North West of England took part in this study. All the participants were either directly involved in 
the enforcement of food law or managed a team of enforcement officers. Data was collected using 
semi-structured interviews via Skype. All participants were asked the same questions.  
A number of important findings were obtained from the data. The results showed that there is 
gender and race disparity when it comes to the use of certain regulatory interventions and 
enforcement tools. In addition, an EHPs level of experience and if they had previously worked in 
other areas of environmental health are also significant factors of perceptions towards food law 
enforcement. This has implications as to whether the demographics of a local authority has a 
bearing on enforcement decisions and perceptions of how the law is interpreted. This is an essential 
insight which the literature does not discuss. The study also reinforced support for mandatory 
disclosure of the inspection results of food businesses but revealed that the use of the FHRS may 
not be the best way to assess food business compliance since it does not provide the desired 
accuracy to assess compliance. The implications of such findings make it essential to provide a 
sound framework for enforcement so that high standards of food safety are maintained. 
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Appendix 1: List of Local Authorities in the North West of England 
 Allerdale 
 Borough of Barrow-in-Furness 
 Blackburn with Darwen 
 Blackpool 
 Metropolitan Borough of Bolton 
 Borough of Burnley 
 Metropolitan Borough of Bury 
 City of Carlisle 
 Cheshire East 
 Cheshire West and Chester 
 Borough of Chorley 
 Borough of Copeland 
 Eden District 
 Borough of Fylde 
 Borough of Halton 
 Hyndburn 
 Metropolitan Borough of Knowsley 
 City of Lancaster 
 Liverpool 
 Manchester 
 Metropolitan Borough of Oldham 
 Pendle 
 City of Preston, Lancashire 
 Ribble Valley 
 Metropolitan Borough of Rochdale 
 Rossendale 
 City of Salford 
 Metropolitan Borough of Sefton 
 South Lakeland 
 South Ribble 
 Metropolitan Borough of St Helens 
 Metropolitan Borough of Stockport 
 Tameside 
 Trafford 
 Warrington 
 West Lancashire 
 Metropolitan Borough of Wigan 
 Metropolitan Borough of Wirral 
 Wyre 
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Appendix 2. Consent Form 
 
 
 
 
                                                        Consent Form 
 
Research Project Title: THE CHALLENGES OF FOOD LAW ENFORCEMENT: PERCEPTIONS OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH PRACTITIONERS IN THE NORTHWEST OF ENGLAND 
Name of the researcher:  
Nicola Assan 
Name of the supervisor: 
Julie Adshead 
                                                                                      Please tick the appropriate boxes  
Yes 
 
No 
   
1. I have read and understood the project information sheet dated DD/MM/YYYY.    
2. I have been given the opportunity to ask questions regarding the above research project.  
3. I agree to take part in the project.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Taking part in the project will include being interviewed and audio recorded. 
5. I agree to the use of my statements as anonymous quotes in publication 
 
 
 
 
6. I understand that my taking part is voluntary; I can withdraw from the study at any time and I do not 
have to give any reasons for why I no longer want to take part. 
  
 
________________________              _____________________ ________  
Name of participant [printed]              Signature                 Date 
 
_______________________              __________________      ________  
Researcher  [printed]  Signature                Date 
 
E-mail address: n.assan@edu.salford.ac.uk 
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Appendix 3: The Main Study Letter 
 
The Main Study Letter 
To whom it may concern, 
 
Research Title: THE CHALLENGES OF FOOD LAW ENFORCEMENT: PERCEPTIONS OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH PRACTITIONERS IN THE NORTHWEST OF ENGLAND 
Researcher: Nicola Assan 
PhD student  
University of Salford  
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
  
I am an Environmental Health Officer with Liverpool City Council and also a part-time PhD 
student at the University of Salford. As part of my course I am undertaking research study titled: 
The challenges of food law enforcement: perceptions of environmental health practitioners in the 
North West of England. The purpose of the study is to investigate the practices of environmental 
healh practitioners (EHPs) and how they operate within the current legislative framework. The 
study will also attempt to raise the debate on the quality and content of food safety legislation and 
recommend possible modifications that could be made to facilitate the enforcement of food law 
in England. 
  
Prior to undertaking the study I need your agreement and consent to approach officers that are 
responsible for enforcing food safety legislation so that they can complete a telephone interview 
that will assist me in my study. 
  
I can assure you that the data collected will remain confidential. I have received ethical approval 
for the study from the University of Salford, College of Arts and Social Sciences. The research is 
being supervised by Julie Adshead, Associate Dean of the College. 
  
Please Note: 
1) The questionnaire is for Local Authourites in the North West of England only 
(i.e. Cheshire,Cumbria, Greater Manchester, Lancashire and Merseyside – see attached). 
2) Only the Team Leaders/Managers of all food teams please respond to this email rather than 
individual officers. 
3) It is hoped that the interviews take place at a time convenient to the enforcement officers 
  
Many thanks, 
Nicola Assan 
Environmental Health Officer/PhD student 
nicky.assan@liverpool.gov.uk 
n.assan@edu.salford.ac.uk 
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Confidentiality and data protection:  The consent of the interviewee will be sought and obtained 
before the interview will be conducted. In addition, their consent will be obtained before the 
interview is recorded. At the outset, interviewees will be made to understand that they have right 
to withdraw from the interview at any point and any recording relating to the interview will be 
deleted. The recoded interview will be handled with confidentiality; only the researcher will have 
access to it. If any confidential information is inadvertently revealed by the interviewees, it will be 
deleted from the recording. All data obtained from the study will be used strictly for the study and 
securely stored so that no unauthorised person will have access to it. 
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Appendix 4 
Semi-Structured Interview Schedule 
 
 
Section One: Personal Details 
1. Gender:                      Male (    )               Female (    ) 
2. Age range:  21-30yrs (    )   31-40yrs (    )    41-50yrs (    )    51-60yrs (  )     61yrs+ (    ) 
3.  What is the name of your Local Authority (LA)?   
4. How long have you worked for this LA? 
5. How many years have you been fully qualified as an Environmental Health Practitioner?  
6. How many years have you been enforcing food law? 
7. How many food officers (including yourself) are in the team?  
[Make a note of ethnicity] 
Section Two: Regulatory Interventions 
 What are your views on the current regulatory interventions? (Official controls: 
inspections; monitoring; surveillance; verification; audit; sampling. Non-official controls: 
education/advice; information and intelligence gathering; sampling). Answer how often 
you use these controls: always, sometimes or never. 
 Are they effective in improving and sustaining compliance and in dealing with repeated 
breaches of the legislation? 
 Practicability – do they work in practice? Why or why not? 
 Pros and cons of each regulatory intervention.                                                                        
 
Section Three: Enforcement 
(A) Food Hygiene Inspections 
 
 Do you think food hygiene inspections are effective in capturing food hygiene 
contraventions?  
 On average, how long does it take you to conduct a food hygiene inspection? (less than 
half an hour; 30-45 mins; 45mins – 1 hour; 1 - 1½ hours; 1½-2 hours; more than 2 hours 
 What do you consider sufficient time to conduct a food hygiene inspection?  
 Do you think there are areas on food hygiene inspections that could be modified to improve 
its effectiveness?  
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 In your opinion, do you consider announced inspections better at achieving compliance 
than unannounced inspections?  
 What do you consider the optimum inspection frequency for food businesses? 
 Does your local authority use inspection reports to record details of the food hygiene 
inspection? If not, how is information about the inspection recorded?  
 Do you think the inspection reports are useful? 
 Do you leave a copy of the inspection report at the food business? 
 Are there any challenges you encounter during an inspection? 
 
(B) Food Hygiene Rating Scheme 
 
 How do you assess the overall impact of the Food Hygiene Rating Scheme (FHRS) in 
assisting EHPs with their work - do you think the FHRS has a positive or negative effect? 
 Have you encountered any challenges with the FHRS during the course of your inspection 
duties?  
 Do you think the components (criteria) of the FHRS (i.e. type of food/handling; method of 
processing; consumers at risk; vulnerable groups; compliance with food hygiene, 
confidence in management) and their corresponding scores capture the food safety and 
hygiene performance within food businesses?  
 
 Do you have anything else to add? Are there any components/elements that should be 
excluded or included in the FHRS?  
 Can you offer any suggestions? 
 
 Do you feel mandatory display of inspection scores at food businesses is a good approach 
to food businesses improving and sustaining compliance with food legislation?  
 
 Do you think the six point rating scale adequately indicates/communicates the level of 
compliance of food businesses?   
 Do you know of any other rating systems in other countries? If yes, which countries? And 
do you feel that system better assesses food hygiene performance of food businesses 
compared to that used in England?   
 
 
(C) Enforcement Toolkit 
What are your views on the current enforcement toolkit provided under the Food Code of 
Practice?  
 Warning Letters 
 Hygiene Improvement Notices 
 Emergency Prohibition Notices 
 Cautions 
 Prosecution 
 Seizure and Detention 
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 Remedial Action Notices 
 How many times have you taken a case to court in the last 5 years (2006 to date)?  
None (  )  1-5 ( )  6-10 (   )  1-15 (   )   >15 (   ) 
 What is your opinion on the fines imposed by the courts (from your experience and in 
general)? For example, do you think the fines provide an effective deterrence to 
businesses? Do you think the fines provide a way of improving compliance with 
regulations? Do the penalties reflect the severity of the offence? 
 In your opinion are magistrates in your area fully appreciative of the seriousness of the 
food safety offences?   
 Do you think a specialised court, investigatory board or administrative tribunal should be 
set up to handle environmental health cases in place of the criminal court?  
 What would help to improve the effectiveness of enforcement activity? Why do you say 
that? What needs to take place for this to happen? 
 
(D) Alternative Enforcement Toolkit 
How do you think these civil penalties will work for food offences?  
 
 
Section Four:  
 
 What is your highest level of academic achievement/qualification? 
 What other training have you acquired? 
 Is the current economic climate affecting your environmental health department and the 
work of EHPs as a whole? 
 How do you see the future of environmental health? 
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Appendix 5: Example of a transcript from EHP11 LA4 
Salford Law School, University of Salford 
 
LOCAL AUTHORITY INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
I = interviewer 
EHP = respondent Environmental Health Practitioner 
Section One: Personal Details 
Good afternoon and thank you for willing to take part in this research. I am going to ask you a 
series of questions relating to the way in which you enforce food law. The questions are divided 
into 3 sections. The first section asks for personal details. The questions in sections 2 and 3 relate 
to regulatory interventions and enforcement respectively. 
I: So to begin, can you give me your name, gender and age. 
EHP: My name is XXXX, female, and age 45 
 
I: What is the name of your Local Authority and how long have you worked for this local authority? 
EHP: XXXX and I have worked for this local authority for 14 years 
I: How many years have you been fully qualified as an Environmental Health Practitioner which I 
will shorten to EHP during the course of our converstion? 
EHP: I have been fully qualified for about erm, 14 years and been on the food unit for 12 years. 
I: Right. That was my next question about the number of years you have been enforcing food law, 
so that’s great! By the way did you work on other units of environmental health? 
EHP: Yes. I spent about 2 years or so on other units – housing then health and safety unit.  
I: OK. I will ask you a bit more about that later on. 
 
I: How many food officers (including yourself) are in the team?  
EHP: There are now 7 food officers. There used to be a lot more but with budget cuts and 
everything, many officers have left. They had worked for the local authority for ages anyway but 
decided to leave because the council were offering a redundancy/early retirement package which 
worked in their favour so………..It’s very difficult to keep up with the workload. 
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Section Two: Regulatory Interventions 
What are your views on the current regulatory interventions?  
Effectiveness in improving and sustaining compliance and in dealing with repeated breaches of 
the legislation 
Practicability – do they work in practice? Why? 
Pros and cons                                                                        
 
Section Three: Enforcement 
(E) Food Hygiene Inspections 
On average, how long does it take you to conduct a food hygiene inspection? 
What do you consider the challenges and burdens caused by inspections?  
Do you think food hygiene inspections are effective in identifying foodborne illness risk factors?  
What do you consider the optimum inspection frequency for food businesses?  
Does your local authority use inspection reports to record details of the food hygiene inspection?  
Do you think there are areas on food hygiene inspections that could be modified to improve its 
effectiveness?  
 
 
(F) Food Hygiene Rating Scheme 
 
How do you assess the overall impact of the Food Hygiene Rating Scheme (FHRS) in assisting 
EHPs with their work - do you think the FHRS has a positive or negative effect? Please explain 
your answer. 
 
Have you encountered any challenges with the FHRS during the course of your inspection duties?  
 
Do you think the components of the FHRS identifies all the possible risks within a food business?  
 
Is there any other components that should be included in the FHRS?  
 
Do you think the scoring system of the FHRS represents the risks associated with the food 
businesses that you inspect?   
 
Do you feel mandatory display of inspection scores at food businesses is effective in improving 
food safety and increasing compliance? 
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Do you know of any other rating systems in other countries? What are your thoughts? 
 
Would you suggest alternative(s) to the FHRS?  
If yes what would you suggest? 
 
 
(G) Enforcement Toolkit 
What are your views on the current enforcement toolkit provided under the Food Code of 
Practice?  
 Warning Letters 
 Hygiene Improvement Notices 
 Emergency Prohibition Notices 
 Cautions 
 Prosecution 
How many times have you taken a case to court in the last 5 years (2006 to date)?  
                         None (   )     1-5 (   )      6-10 (   )       11-15 (   )      >15 (   ) 
 
What is your opinion on the fines imposed by the courts (from your experience and in general)? 
For example, do you think the fines provide an effective deterrence to businesses? Do you think 
the fines provide a way of improving compliance with regulations? Do the penalties reflect the 
sevity of the offence? 
In your opinion are magistrates in your area fully appreciative of the seriousness of the food safety 
offences?   
Do you think a specialised court, investigatory board or administrative tribunal should be set up to 
handle environmental health cases in place of the criminal court?  
 
 Seizure and Detention 
 Remedial Action Notices  
 Detention Notices 
What would help to improve the effectiveness of enforcement activity? Why do you say that? 
What needs to take place for this to happen? 
(H) Alternative Enforcement Toolkit 
How do you think these civil penalties will work for food offences? 
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Section Two: Regulatory Interventions  
1. What are your views on the current regulatory interventions? You can make comments 
about its effectiveness in improving and sustaining compliance and in dealing with repeated 
breaches of the legislation; practicability; pros and cons. How effective are the current range of 
interventions in securing compliance and tackling repeated compliance breaches?  
Official Controls: Inspection (full/partial); Monitoring; Surveillance; Verification; Audit; 
Sampling; Advice  
Non-Official Controls: Advice; Education/Training; Intelligence Gathering; Sampling 
I: So first of all, what do you think about inspection (full and partial) as an intervention in securing 
compliance? 
 
EHP: Erm. I think that’s the best way to find out whether or not a food business is breaking the 
law. Full inspection I mean. I don’t think I’ve ever done a partial inspection. I can’t see how you 
can partially inspect a food business!! I’m not sure why it is included as an intervention really. 
I: What about the other official controls – monitoring, surveillance, verification, audit, sampling 
and advice? Let’s start with monitoring. 
EHP: Well, I would group monitoring, surveillance and verification together because I don’t really 
see their purpose. I mean, when I am carrying out an inspection, I kind of do all these things, audit 
included so again I’m not sure why all these controls are treated as separate categories since they 
are all part of a full inspection!  
I: But are there times when you do not carry out a full inspection so that these other controls are 
utilised? 
EHP: Erm, no not really. I mean, I always do a full inspection unless I’m revisiting a place to make 
sure they have done all the work I asked them to. If that’s what you mean? 
I: Yes, I understand. Thanks. So what are your views about sampling and advice as official 
controls? 
EHP: Both are interventions that I use; advice more than sampling though. I don’t understand why 
sampling is classed as an official and non-official control. I think it should be one or the other. 
I: Can you elaborate on what you mean by that? 
EHP: I mean, I think sampling is a very important intervention and should be an official control. 
Having it also as a non-official control makes it sound less important. I know sampling is expensive 
which is why I think there should be a larger budget for it.  
I: Thanks for that. What about advice? 
EHP: Well the same again. It’s being considered as an official AND non-official control, I’m not 
sure why? Businesses need to know that we are there to help them and this can be achieved through 
advice and by educating food handlers.  We can achieve a lot by building a good relationship with 
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food businesses. However, food businesses need to understand that we do not have the time to give 
the same level of advice on every visit. 
I: It’s interesting to hear you mention about time. We will discuss that later in the interview. 
What about the other non-official controls?  Advice; Education/Training; Intelligence Gathering; 
Sampling? 
EHP: With regards to education and training, businesses need to know that we are there to help 
them and this can be achieved through advice and by educating food handlers.  We can achieve a 
lot by building a good relationship with food businesses. However, food businesses need to 
understand that we do not have the time to give the same level of advice on every visit. 
Intelligence gathering is not something I’m involved in. It tends to be the Technical Officers or 
students that send out questionnaires to very low risk businesses to find out if they are still trading 
and whether or not their operations have changed. 
Sampling. We have a sampling officer who does all the sampling. 
 
I: Would you like to comment further on anything we have discussed so far: 
EHP:  Like I said before, I don’t think there should be a distinction between official and non-
official controls – they should be called just regulatory intervention controls or something like that. 
As I said it makes one group sound less important than the other, when any intervention is 
important if it involves the safety of the public!! 
I:  Thanks for that. Let’s move on to the next section about enforcement. 
 
Section Three: Enforcement 
(A) Food Hygiene Inspections 
I: Do you think food hygiene inspections are effective in capturing food hygiene contraventions?  
EHP: No I don’t think food hygiene inspections are effective because there is so much non-
compliance! Some businesses don’t learn from their offences. I’m not sure what the solution 
should be other than regular inspections which seems highly unlikely since most environmental 
health departments are experiencing staff shortages and budget cuts etc. 
 
I: On average, how long does it take you to conduct a food hygiene inspection?  
EHP: It depends. A food businesses where there is a lot of things wrong could take me about half 
an hour. Places where everything is fine doesn’t take me that long, maybe around 15 minutes in 
reality if there is not much to look at. But I stay longer to chat with the staff/FBO if they are 
friendly enough because I have to record the time spent on the inspection form!! Otherwise I just 
sit in my car outside the premises and write up my notes.  
 
I: What do you consider sufficient time to conduct a food hygiene inspection?  
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EHP: It’s difficult to say because it depends on the size of the business and I suppose the size of 
the problems!! What I mean by that is, if there a loads of contraventions within the business and 
the person managing it does not have a clue!! In my opinion, I don’t think you can particularly say 
how much time is sufficient. The problem we have is that we have to meet targets so it means not 
spending as much time as we would like because we have to inspect a certain number of premises 
every financial year. 
I: That’s fine. Thank you for your answer. But if you had to pin point a particular time, what would 
it be? 
EHP: Erm. I would say about an hour to an hour and a half. 
I: Right. 
I: In your opinion, do you consider announced inspections better at achieving compliance than 
unannounced inspections?  
EHP: To be honest with you I don’t think it makes a difference. We mainly carry out unannounced 
inspections. The only time I make an announced inspection is for the likes of day nurseries, nursing 
homes or large supermarkets where I need to speak to a manager or whoever is in charge. The likes 
of nurseries and nursing homes accommodate vulnerable people so it is important to call 
beforehand for security purposes. 
I: But if you had to choose? 
EHP: That element of surprise is always better so I would say unannounced, although as I said I 
don’t think compliance is better achieved. 
I: Why do you say that? 
EHP: Because I still find non-compliance in any case, whether I make an appointment with the 
business or not. 
I: What do you consider the optimum inspection frequency for food businesses? 
EHP: The food hygiene rating scheme takes care of this although I don’t think the frequency 
outlined in this scheme is sufficient in reality. But we don’t have enough staff to increase the 
frequency of inspections to say 3 or 4 times a year for high risk premises. 
 
I: Does your local authority use inspection reports to record details of the food hygiene inspection? 
If not, how is information about the inspection recorded?  
EHP: We use inspection reports at XXXX to record food hygiene inspections.  
 
I: Do you think the inspection reports are useful? 
EHP: Yes I think it is useful to write down details of the inspection so everything is recorded. But 
I don’t think the form is designed properly though cos there is never enough space to write 
everything. It’s also can be a lot of writing if there is a lot of things wrong so an inspection can 
take a long time. And we have targets to meet! It would be less time consuming to video record 
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our inspection although it would be just as time consuming to look at the video recording and write 
up in the office. 
 
I: Do you leave a copy of the inspection report at the food business? 
EHP: Yes 
I: Are there any challenges you encounter during an inspection? 
EHP: No not really. I mean apart from time. I sometimes feel I have to rush through an inspection 
because of the targets I have to meet. 
(B) Food Hygiene Rating Scheme 
 
I: Right, thanks. The next set of questions is about the food hygiene rating scheme. 
How do you assess the overall impact of the Food Hygiene Rating Scheme (FHRS) in assisting 
EHPs with their work - do you think the FHRS has a positive or negative effect? 
EHP: Generally positive! Food businesses always want to be rated high so most of them make sure 
they comply with the law. On the other hand, despite having such a scheme in place, there are a 
lot of places that are still awful. I’ve always thought that food businesses should be licensed before 
they are allowed to trade and if they break the law then their licence is revoked. Simple as that! 
I: Have you encountered any challenges with the FHRS during the course of your inspection 
duties?  
EHP: Not really. Other than some food business operators may not be happy with the rating that I 
give them. 
I: Do you think the components (elements) of the FHRS (i.e. type of food/handling; method of 
processing; consumers at risk; vulnerable groups; compliance with food hygiene, confidence in 
management) and their corresponding scores capture the food safety and hygiene performance 
within food businesses?  
 
EHP: Mmm. Erm. I’m not really sure. Not really. I mean, I don’t know how the scores where 
worked out in the first place. I think the components are ok but a bit vague. 
I: What do you mean? Can you please explain? 
EHP: Well, for example, consumers at risk. The business gets a score based on the number of 
consumers per day. In my opinion I don’t see how this matters, whether a business caters for one 
person or one hundred people, if they are not preparing/selling safe food then……. 
 
 
I: Do you have anything else to add? Are there any components/elements that should be excluded 
or included in the FHRS?  
EHP: As I mentioned just now I don’t think the consumers at risk is necessary since I don’t think 
it makes a difference on how many customers are being served etc. And as I said before as well 
I’m not sure how the scoring system came about but it doesn’t seem right to me.  
I: Can you offer any suggestions? 
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EHP: Not off head. Maybe check in with what other countries do? 
 
I: OK. Thanks for that. Moving on. We will come back to that point in a minute. 
Do you feel mandatory display of inspection scores at food businesses is a good approach to food 
businesses improving and sustaining compliance with food legislation?  
EHP: Yes I suppose it is really if the majority of food businesses are striving to get a higher score 
so people will patronise their business. Businesses should have to display their ratings so it will 
keep them on their toes with regards to complying with the law. 
 
I: Do you think the six point rating scale adequately indicates/communicates the level of 
compliance of food businesses?   
EHP: Yes, I think its ok. Although the number score was misleading at first. I mean, you would 
have thought that a score of 1 would be excellent. It was fine when the star rating was used because 
1 star is obviously not a good score compared to say 5 star.   
 
I: Do you know of any other rating systems in other countries?  
EHP: No, not really. 
 
 
(C) Enforcement Toolkit 
I. What are your views on the current enforcement toolkit provided under the Food Code of 
Practice? Let’s start with warning letters. Do you think they are effective in improving and 
sustaining compliance and in dealing with repeated breaches of the legislation? 
EHP: Erm, yes for those food businesses that strive to comply but not for those who couldn’t be 
bothered. 
I: How often do you use this type of enforcement tool? 
EHP: quite often since the food business I have in my district are generally ok. 
I: Do you have anything else to add? 
EHP: No 
I: What about Hygiene Improvement Notices? Do you think they are effective? 
EHP: I haven’t served that many but the two I did serve was effective because the FBOs complied 
within the week of the notice being issued! I think the notices look more legal looking so those 
that try to comply with the law do so immediately. So yes they are effective. 
I: What about Emergency Prohibition Notices? 
EHP: I’ve never served any. Erm. Mmm. I think they are effective though because the next step is 
prosecution. 
I: What about cautions and prosecutions? How many times have you taken a case to court in the 
last 5 years (2006 to date)? None (  ) 1-5 ( ) 6-10 (   )       11-15 (   )      >15 (   ) 
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EHP: None. We only have one officer who works in the same office as us and oversees our legal 
issues but she does not have a legal background so cannot represent us in court. The LA solicitor 
works in another office and does not really get what we do. In an ideal world the LA would 
train/employ an environmental health officer with a legal background that would understand food 
law and be able to represent us in court as well as having an awareness of food law issues. Some 
of our officers have been on the legal training course organised by the Food Standards Agency 
which was good but not really enough in my opinion. If we had a dedicated person who understood 
the issues and prepared the files maybe officers wouldn’t shy away from prosecutions. 
I: What is your opinion on the fines imposed by the courts (from your experience and in general)? 
For example, do you think the fines provide an effective deterrence to businesses? Do you think 
the fines provide a way of improving compliance with regulations? Do the penalties reflect the 
severity of the offence? 
EHP: Although I have no experience in this area it’s disappointing there isn’t a more rigorous 
investigation of the defendants’ financial means. It seems to me the point of attaching a fine to a 
criminal act is to act as a deterrent. If a food business is barely making a profit and receives a fine 
of say £5000 it could be financially detrimental for the business. If a larger company gets the same 
punishment would make little difference to them financially. The thing is, a fine should be relative 
to wealth or income. If that business manages to pay the fine he will obviously try to recoup the 
costs by increasing the prices of his products. Penalties available fall far short of what might be 
expected to make any real impact, particularly on the larger firms. 
I: In your opinion are magistrates in your area fully appreciative of the seriousness of the food 
safety offences?   
EHP: Well having not taken a prosecution, I can’t speak from experience. But just looking at the 
fines given to FBOs, there are some cases where the fine is quite high and others not so much. 
I: What do you mean? Can you please elaborate? 
EHP: I mean I’ve read there are times when the same offence is given a different punishment, 
depending on the local authority or even the magistrate. For example, an EHO in XXX prosecuting 
a food business and the FBO was given a fine of £2,500 plus costs. In XXX the same offence was 
given half of that fine. So I’m not sure what’s going on. That’s why I think if we could have fixed 
penalties then there wouldn’t be that much of a problem. Just need to look up the fine and find the 
associated penalty. Quite simple really… I think!!! 
I: OK thanks. Next question: Do you think a specialised court, investigatory board or 
administrative tribunal should be set up to handle environmental health cases in place of the 
criminal court?  
EHP: Absolutely. That’s a great idea. That would mean having EHOs overseeing food law 
offences which can’t be a bad thing. They should be experienced enough to do that. 
I: Have you been involved in seizing or detaining food?  
EHP: No. 
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I: What about remedial action notices? 
EHP: No, I haven’t issued remedial action notices either. But they are only used for approved 
premises and I don’t have any on my district. However, the way whole protocol goes regarding 
these notices, I think they should also be extended to include premises that don’t require approval. 
I: Why do you say that? 
EHP: Because they require the FBO to take immediate action to rectify whatever contravention so 
it’s easier to implement punishment. 
I: OK thanks. What would help to improve the effectiveness of enforcement activity? What would 
you like to see incorporated into food legislation? 
EHP: There are some instances where the penalty does not reflect the offence which is why food 
offences are not taken seriously. We need some strong and powerful deterrent. I’m not sure what! 
What I can say is that registration of food businesses is a waste of time. Any food business should 
not be allowed to operate until the LA is satisfied that the FBO is competent to run one. So I 
advocate for licences prior to trading. 
(D) Alternative Enforcement Toolkit 
I: How do you think these civil penalties will work for food offences? These are fixed penalty 
notices, variable monetary penalties, enforcement undertakings and stop notices. So first of all 
fixed monetary penalties which are for minor offences. 
EHP: Anything that involves a business parting with money due to non-compliance will work. No 
business wants to cut into their profits so hitting them hard with a monetary fine and/or charging 
for enforcement, for example, if an officer were to serve a warning letter, a business would be 
charged for this. The service of an improvement notice or an emergency prohibition notice would 
constitute a higher charge. I think this would solve the repeated offence problem. 
I: So you don’t think that the others will work? Variable monetary penalties (for more serious 
offences but where prosecution may not be in the public interest); enforcement undertakings 
(agreements made between the regulator and the business to carry out specific actions to remedy 
offences and achieve regulatory compliance); stop notices to stop businesses from carrying out an 
activity that is causing/ or has the potential to cause harm  
EHP: maybe the variable monetary penalties for more serious offences. Anything monetary will 
hurt businesses so they will be more willing to comply with the legislation. They wouldn’t want 
to lose money. I would like to see them introduced into food legislation. 
I: OK right thanks for that. 
 
Section Four:  
Now the final section about academic qualifications, professional career development and training, 
the current economic climate and the future of environmental health 
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I: What qualifications do you have? 
EHP: I have degrees in biology and environmental health. 
I: Do you have a postgraduate qualification? 
EHP: No 
I: Where did you study your environmental health degree and what did you think of the course? 
EHP: I studied at XXXX University. It was a four year course. Fortunately I was employed as a 
student EHO at my local authority so I didn’t have to worry about getting practical experience. 
The course was ok. I thought we could have had guest speakers. I also thought the course could 
have been more practical, I mean organising visits to food manufactures etc. particularly for those 
students who were not connected to any local authority. Also just as I was finishing my degree the 
CIEH decided to change the goalposts regarding being able to register as an EHO. Students now 
had to sit and pass exams as well as having an oral interview and complete a portfolio. Fortunately 
I only had to participate in an oral exam and complete the portfolio but students who were to 
graduate the following year had to do everything. It was terrible. I don’t think it was organised 
properly at the time, not sure about now because our local authority does not have any students. 
 
I: So how do you think this could be improved? 
EHP: As I said I don’t know whether any improvements have been made. But during my time the 
portfolio was a mess! It was confusing to complete. So I think improvements to the portfolio. 
I: So now you are qualified, do you have any thoughts on professional career development and 
training? 
EHP: Many of us are reluctant to take on a prosecution because you’re pretty much left on your 
own and if you don’t have everything in order you could end up looking foolish. I would advocate 
for more practical training in legal issues and probably go as far as an academic course in law to 
make it worthwhile, just something that would give me confidence to prepare a case for court and 
how to conduct myself in a court room. 
I: How has the current economic climate affected food law enforcement? 
EHP: When our unit experienced an inability to achieve our targets, we had to employ EHPs from 
an employment agency to help with the backlog of inspections. It worked but costs us a lot of 
money. I think it would’ve been cheaper to pay us all overtime and/or request exemption from 
having to attain the specified targets.  
I: How do you perceive the future of environmental health? 
EHP: There are times when I do not need to go into the office so I work from home. My home 
computer is linked to the database so I can view my emails as well as inputting data from my 
inspections. This is great for me because it fits into my family life plus I do not have to pay for 
parking since are offices are based in the city centre and we do not have free parking like we used 
to when our offices were based in the suburbs. 
I: Do you have anything else to add regarding anything we have talked about? 
EHP: No not really. Thanks. 
I: Thank you for your time. I will end the interview now. 
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Appendix 6: Examples of inspection forms from LA4, LA7 and LA12 
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Food Safety Section – Checklist A 
 
Inspection/Observation 
 
Wash hand 
basins 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(accessible, h/c water, soap, towels, 
disposable towels, conformance with BS 
Compliance Toilet 
facilities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(intervening space, drainage, ventilation) 
Compliance 
Y M P N Y M P N 
        
 
 
 
Changing 
facilities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(necessary, adequacy, separate) 
Compliance Food 
waste  
 
Name of company: ………………………. 
 
……………………………………………. 
Frequency of Collection 
 
Kitchen bin lidded/open/waste oil/ABP 
 
Compliance 
Y M P N Y M P N 
        
 
 
 
Water 
supply 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(adequacy, potable, tank disinfection) 
Compliance Drainage  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(adequacy, repair, grease traps, grilles) 
Compliance 
Y M P N Y M P N 
        
 
 
 
Washing 
food 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Peeled vegetables, salad, raw meat 
(cross contamination) 
Compliance Washing 
equipment 
 
 
 
 
 
(corrosion resistant, easily cleaned, 
   cross contamination equipment used   
   raw/cooked (butchers/deli counters) 
Compliance 
Y M P N Y M P N 
        
 
 
 
Lighting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Windows, bulbs, fluorescent tubes) 
(adequate natural/artificial, diffusers)  
Compliance Sickness 
policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(procedures, responsibilities, 48 Hr rule) 
Compliance 
Y M P N Y M P N 
        
 
 
 
Complaint 
procedures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(procedures, responsibilities, recent cases) 
Compliance Sampling  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(necessary, recent results) 
Compliance 
Y M P N Y M P N 
        
 
 
 
Ventilation 
 
 
 
(suitable & sufficient, no flow dirty to clean, access for cleaning ) 
Compliance 
Y M P N 
    
 
Personal 
hygiene 
 
 
 
(hand washing (raw/ready to eat foods), jewellery, suitable, clean & where appropriate protective clothing & separate 
clothing for butchery activities) 
Compliance 
Y M P N 
    
 
Training Compliance 
Y M P N 
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(In house training or formal training Level 2/similar) 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step Purchase and receipt 
 
Controls 
and 
monitoring 
in place 
 Y M P N Records Notes 
 
Reputable suppliers used  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Suppliers audited 
 
       
Delivery temperature checked 
 
       
Separation raw/cooked 
 
     
Management supervision 
 
       
List of suppliers        
      
      
Step Storage (excluding chilled display) 
 
Controls 
and 
monitoring 
in place 
 Y M P N Records  Notes 
 
Storage temperatures checked 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Separation raw/cooked 
 
     
Unwrapped food protected 
 
     
Adequate stock rotation 
 
      Day dots                     Number of days given 
  Dated labels                       to high risk foods …………. 
Management supervision 
 
     
 
Additional 
notes – 
high risk  
food 
storage 
Refrigerator/freezer details/ location Temperature readings 
 
Number of fridges: ……….. 
 
Number of freezers: ………. 
 
Monitoring equipment: Gauge, Probe, IR, none. 
 
Probe/IR 
 
 
 
 
 
Step Preparation 
 
Controls 
and 
 Y M P N  Notes 
Appropriate prep time/temp 
 
     
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monitoring 
in place 
Adequate work space 
 
     
Separate areas for raw & cooked 
 
    Physically 
By time 
 
 
Separate equipment for raw & 
cooked (eg meat slicers/vac packers etc) 
 
    Physically  
By time 
 
 
Equipment colour coded 
 
     
Cleaning & disinfection of work 
surfaces & equipment, & correct 
cleaning chemicals.   
 
     
Repair & condition of equipment 
 
     
Sufficient sinks – Food prep and 
wash up 
 
     
Management supervision 
 
     
       
 
 
Step Cooking and reheating 
 
Controls 
and 
monitoring 
in place 
 Y M P N Records Notes 
Time/temperatures checked 
 
                   Equipment used: Pie warmer, microwave, oven, hot plate. 
Validated cooking procedures 
 
                       Core temperature: ……….. 
Handling procedures 
 
     
Management supervision      
 
Step Cooling 
 
Controls 
and 
monitoring 
in place 
 Y M P N Records Notes 
Time/temperatures checked 
 
       Blast chiller   
Shallow tray 
 
 
Adequate protection/separation 
 
     Iced water 
Other 
 
 
Management supervision 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step Display, sale, hot and cold holding 
 
Additional 
notes – 
high risk  
food details 
Baine maries hot/cold displays  Temperature 
readings 
Monitoring 
equipment/calibration 
Hot cupboard 
 
Pie warmer 
 
Bain marie 
 
Chilled bed 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
(Probe/IR/read out) 
(2 hrs hot hold, 4 hrs cold) 
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General Structure 
Layout/design/ 
construction/size 
 
 
 
(Cross contamination, accumulation of dirt) 
Suitability 
 
 
 
 
(appropriate, permits cleaning & disinfection) 
Maintenance  
 
(cleanliness, repair, condition) 
 
Open food rooms:  
Floors 
 
 
 
 
(Altro, lino, quarry tile, stone tile etc) 
 
 
(condition, ease of cleaning, washable, drainage) 
Walls 
 
 
 
 
(Painted plaster, ceramic tile, splash back, plastic clad) 
 
 
(condition, ease of cleaning, washable) 
Ceilings 
 
 
 
 
(Painted plaster, suspended ceiling) 
 
 
(prevent accumulations, reduce condensation) 
Windows 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(prevent accumulations, insect screens) 
Doors  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(ease of cleaning, washable, insect screens) 
Equipment 
surfaces 
 
 
(melamine, stainless steel) 
 
 
 
(condition, ease of cleaning, washable) 
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Food Safety Section – Checklist B 
 
Documentation/Systems 
 
Food safety 
management 
system 
 
 Y M P N Notes 
Documented system 
 
    SFBB caterer/retail/Chinese/Indian/Other 
 
 
 
 
Cross 
contamination 
Y M P N Notes 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cleaning 
 
    
 
Chilling 
 
    
 
Cooking 
 
    
 
Management 
 
    
 
Opening 
checks 
    
 
Closing checks     
 
Suppliers list 
(purchase and 
receipt) 
    
 
Training     
 
Cleaning 
schedule 
    
 
Types of 
chemicals used 
    
 
Outside 
catering 
    
 
Distribution 
from premises 
    
 
Traceability     
 
Prove it 
records 
    
 
Diary 
completed 
    
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Alternative 
record keeping 
file 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Pest Control  
 
    
 
 
 
 
(Proofing, signs of activity, on-going treatment, In-house or contractor - name 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L; 
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Ref No: ............................ 
 
Name:  
 
Address     
……………………………………………   
 
…………………………..Postcode  
………………….. 
 
 Registration Form:  Imported 
Food .............................................    
 
Date of Visit/Report:  .................... Time:  ...........................  
 
Name & Position of Person Seen:  .....................................  
 
 ................................................................................  
 
Areas Inspected :                             First Language:  
 ................................................................................  
 
Type of Business:                        Intervention type: 
 
Documents examined / samples 
taken:
 ..................................................................................................................................................... 
 
Scope…………………………………………Primary Authority 
……………………………………………………….. 
 
ATP Result  
 ..................................................................................................................................................... 
 
Priority actions/improvements necessary 
 
 Score  
Hygiene Compliance    
  
  
Structural Compliance 
   
   
Confidence in Management  
   
   
  
  
   
Food Hygiene Rating      
 
 
 
 
Food Business Operator: 
 ........................................................................................ 
 
Registered Address (if 
Different)
 ........................................................................................ 
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Note for food business operator 
A weblink to information on the Food Hygiene Rating Scheme including template forms for 
requesting a “revisit for re-rating”, “right to reply” or for lodging an appeal is available at 
food.gov.uk/ratings  
 
Summary of action to be taken by Authority  Verbal Advice  Letter   Formal 
Action 
 
Key Points discussed during the visit:…………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………… 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………… 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………… 
 
Signature of Inspecting Office 
Signature of Recipient: ............................................... 
 
Name in Capitals ……………………Contact Details:  ........  
 
Contact details of Senior Officer in case of dispute  ..............................................    .............................................................................................................................  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Law is an interest not only to lawyers but also to scholars of other disciplines as they seek to 
explore and find answers to a particular problem. The reason for doing legal research is to acquire 
an understanding of the legal subject while arguing for a better way of doing things by critiquing 
and commenting on legal doctrine and practices (Singhal and Malik 2012). The focus of this 
research is in determining the current status of the law relating to the enforcement of food safety 
legislation in England. This study seeks to determine the impact of food law on Environmental 
Health Practitioners (EHPs) enforcement responsibilities and aims to highlight any gaps that exist 
between what is written in the legislation and what actually happens in practice. In other words 
are there any factors that prevent the operation of the food law enforcement in terms of its 
implementation. The empirical research in this case will assess how legal processes have shaped 
the enforcement practices of EHPs based on gaps in the literature review. Any perceived problems 
currently affecting the enforcement of food law will be identified. This study will also highlight 
any flaws in the policies underpinning such enforcement and propose recommendations on 
alternative legal and practical approaches to the enforcement of food law.  
This chapter aims to provide an introductory background to the study in addition to the following 
sections: aim and objectives; research questions; methodology; purpose for the study and 
contribution to knowledge; limitations of the study; ethics and structure of the thesis. 
1.2 Background to the Study 
 
Food safety has become an important issue both from a political and consumer perspective. From 
a political standpoint, food safety is an area of political sensitivity because any decisions relating 
to it have an impact on many issues such as the income of farmers, food price and international 
food trade for the free movement of food. From a consumer perspective, governments have a duty 
of care towards their citizens in protecting them from food that is unfit for human consumption 
and thus prevent foodborne illness (Oosterveer 2007; Oosterveer and Sonnenfeld 2012). 
According to Buckley and Reid (2010) food safety issues are an important challenge to the public 
health sector. They point out that the emergence of new pathogens or antibiotic resistance in 
pathogens has contributed to food safety risks. In addition, the increase in the number of foodborne 
illness in the UK can be attributed to the changing eating habits of the population because of people 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
 
2 
 
travelling overseas regularly, and also the influx of migrants resulting in new foods being 
introduced into the country (Havinga and Verbruggen 2017).  Negri (2009) also suggests that this 
globalisation of the food trade has created possible problems with storage, preservation, transport 
and distribution of food thus placing a strain on the food safety system and the threat of widespread 
contamination of food especially from countries that do not have strict food safety and hygiene 
rules and regulations in place.  
The need for laws regulating food has been established for centuries and such laws were designed 
to protect consumers from fraudulent practices in the sale of food (Fortin 2017). Laws and 
standards established at this time were mainly designed to prevent adulteration and to protect 
consumers against fraud. However, these legal statutes were concerned with specific food and 
drink, for example, bread, beer, tea and coffee (Griffiths 2014). The demand for legislation became 
apparent due to pressure from consumers and law-abiding food manufacturers concerned about 
the safety of food produced by dishonest businesses. It was not until the second half of the 19th 
century that the first general food laws were developed resulting in a number of statutes: for 
example the Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1875, Food and Drugs (Adulteration) Act 1928, Food 
and Drugs Act of 1938 and 1955 and the Food Act 1984. Such Acts marked the beginning of 
structured food control systems and was later incorporated into the primary legislation that is used 
in England: Food Safety Act 1990 (Griffiths 2014).  
The Food Safety Act 1990 is the main framework for food legislation in the UK and consists of 
offences that relate to safety, quality and labelling. In the United Kingdom (UK) food law and its 
enforcement are governed by European and domestic legislation through a regulatory framework 
that seeks to provide a high level of public health protection to ensure food is safe for human 
consumption (Amodu and Hutter 2008; FSA 2017). The main legislative provisions relating to 
food safety used by EHPs: The European Union Regulation (EC) No. 178/2002 (The General Food 
Law) outlines the general principles and requirements of food law. Regulation (EC) No. 852/2004 
(The Hygiene of Foodstuffs) which contains the general requirements that food businesses have to 
follow falls under the General Food Law (van der Meulen 2014, Middleton 2017; FSA 2017). 
Food hygiene regulations are developed and implemented from these European regulations make 
amendments to the Food Safety Act 1990 to bring it in line with the European legislation 
(Mortimore and Wallace 2013, 2016).  
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New regulations are continuously being drafted and implemented and any food safety crises 
heightens the need for revisions to food law with the aim of providing better public health 
protection (Fortin 2017; Middleton 2017).  For example, the Food Safety and Hygiene (England) 
Regulations 2013 which came into force in January 2014 includes enforcement provisions for 
sprouts and seeds intended for sprouting following E.coli outbreaks in 2011 in Germany and 
France where sprouts and seeds intended for sprouting were identified as the most likely source 
(FSA 2017). The 2013 regulations consolidated the General Food Regulations 2004 (the national 
law for food safety) and the Food Hygiene (England) Regulations 2006 (the national law for food 
hygiene) into one piece of legislation for England only (Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland have 
their own regulations) (FSA 2017). Furthermore, at the time of writing up this thesis, The Food 
Hygiene (England) (Amendment) Regulations 2016 is the current piece of legislation which was 
introduced to account for minor changes to the specific rules on official controls for Trichinella in 
meat (FSA 2017). 
Food is essential for health and well-being and is a physical need for the body to function.  
Assuring its safety is therefore necessary to prevent consumer illness (da Cunha et al 2016; Moreb 
et al 2017; Marriott et al 2018). The main hazard with food processes is contamination with 
bacteria that cause disease (pathogenic bacteria) such as Campylobacter, Salmonella, Escherichia 
coli (E. coli), Listeria monocytogenes and Clostridium perfringens (Mortimore and Wallace 2013, 
2016; Lund 2015; da Cunha et al 2016).  There have been several high profile cases both nationally 
and globally relating to the adverse effects resulting from food that has not been handled, prepared 
or stored correctly thus causing harm to the consumer. Examples in the UK include the BSE crisis 
and salmonella in eggs in the 1980’s and, E. coli outbreaks in which two large outbreaks occurred 
in 1996 and 2005 (Abels et al 2010; Pennington 2014). The UK’s largest outbreak of E.coli in 
Scotland in 1996 resulted in 17 deaths (Pennington 2014). Another outbreak of the same pathogen 
in Wales in 2005 led to the death of a young child (Pennington 2009). The implications of these 
outbreaks has resulted in the mandatory implementation of food safety management systems such 
as Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) as a way of ensuring safe food and thus 
protecting the consumer (Taylor 2008; Wallace and Mortimore 2014; Green and Kane 2014; 
Wallace et al 2018). HACCP focuses on the identification of potential hazards within a food 
business operation and the introduction of controls to eliminate any food safety hazards. It specifies 
that food businesses must identify any step in their activities which is critical to ensuring food 
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safety and ensure that adequate procedures are identified, implemented, maintained and reviewed 
(Green and Kane 2014; Mortimore and Wallace 2016; Wallace et al 2018;).  
The Food Standards Agency (FSA), the government department responsible for policy issues 
relating to food safety and food hygiene in the UK, introduced a food safety management pack 
called safer food better business (SFBB). This was designed to assist small businesses fulfil the 
mandatory HACCP requirement of the food legislation and comply with food hygiene regulations 
(Battersby 2017; FSA 2017). Although it is not directly a food safety issue, the 2013 horsemeat 
scandal in the UK caused concern. Horsemeat is not harmful to health and is eaten in many 
countries (although not commonly eaten in the UK), but foods advertised as containing beef were 
found to contain undeclared or improperly declared horsemeat (Eliot 2014). This resulted in 
exposing flaws in European control systems on food safety and thus created concerns because the 
meat industry is mainly self-regulated and less funding in this area means fewer government 
inspections (Eliot 2014; Tse et al 2016). Hygiene standards and procedures within the legislation 
have the primary purpose to protect the public from foodborne illness which can come from 
contaminated food or water (da Cunha et al 2016; Moreb et al 2017; Marriott et al 2018). In terms 
of the implications for food law enforcement, the importance of a food safety management system 
is now vital. EHPs need to audit this system and ensure what is being documented is being carried 
out in practice (Mortimore and Wallace 2013, 2016; Green and Kane 2014). 
The role of EHPs has evolved over the years as the importance of food safety becomes fundamental 
to public health.  The majority of environmental health services are provided directly by local 
authorities. The application of regulatory tools are important in the enforcement of food legislation 
(Mensah and Julien 2011). The overall objective of this study is to contribute towards the 
development of a broader theoretical and practical understanding of food law enforcement from 
the perspective of those who are actually involved in enforcing the law.  
1.3 Rationale for the Research 
It is perceived that the enforcement tools currently available to Environmental Health Practitioners 
(EHPs) do not attain the best results in compliance with food regulations (Macrory 2006; 
Pennington 2009). It is also thought that food hygiene inspections are ineffective to assess and 
monitor food safety especially in identifying hidden problems (Pennington 2009). According to 
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Pennington (2009), the E.coli outbreak in South Wales occurred not only because of food hygiene 
failures on the part of the food business implicated in the outbreak, but also because of the poor 
overall enforcement in relation to the regulations. The report that followed the investigation into 
this outbreak criticised “light touch regulation, inspection and enforcement” and stated that 
“enforcement needs to be under constant review and a comprehensive assessment of the entire 
food law enforcement” (Pennington 2009 p328). Pennington (2009) recommended the need for 
alternative enforcement tools for those responsible for enforcing food law so that they can properly 
address any failures within a food business thus preventing such incidents from recurring 
(Pennington 2009). An earlier government report by Macrory (2006) also reported that an 
enforcement toolkit should provide suitable options in order to deal with a variety of businesses in 
terms of their level of compliance with the law.  
However, there has been no empirical evidence on whether these recommendations have had an 
impact on the enforcement of food legislation in England. It is important to know whether there 
are challenges enforcers face when dealing with breaches of the law that may be difficult to identify 
hidden problems. For example, in the 2005 E.coli outbreak in Wales the source of the outbreak 
was traced to a butcher who had falsified records that were an important part of food safety practice 
as well as misleading EHPs who had allowed the butcher to continue trading despite these failures 
(Pennington 2009, 2014).  This therefore raises important questions relating to food safety and 
hygiene in terms of its enforcement and providing a toolkit that will assist EHPs to make the most 
appropriate course of action. This study will investigate whether improvements need to be made 
to the current inspection and enforcement protocols of the food safety legislation. In addition, 
whether anything needs to be done in terms of assisting EHPs in their enforcement duties in order 
for them to accurately detect food hygiene contraventions so that such outbreaks do not occur. The 
focus of this thesis is to present empirical evidence to validate these assumptions and provide 
insight into the current status of food hygiene inspection and enforcement in England through the 
eyes of EHPs. 
1.3.1 Study Area 
At the time of this study there are currently over four hundred (419) Local Authorities (LAs) in 
the UK which vary in size (Office of National Statistics 2016). The research population of this 
study was aimed at the LAs in the North West of England, namely those in Cheshire, Cumbria, 
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Greater Manchester, Lancashire and Merseyside. The North West is the third most populated 
region in the UK (after the South East and Greater London) and so offers diversity in terms of 
being able to select participants for the study (Office of National Statistics 2016). The population 
of the North West of England accounts for about 13% of the overall population of England. Over 
one third (37.86%) of this population resides in the Greater Manchester region, almost one quarter 
reside in each of Lancashire and Merseyside (21.39% and 20.30% respectively). A smaller 
proportion reside in Cheshire and Cumbria, 14.76% and 7.41% respectively (Office of National 
Statistics 2016). In addition, the LAs in this part of England consists of a wide range of areas 
ranging from deprived to affluent neighbourhoods and so provide this study a diverse population. 
Moreover, Tombs (2016) states that Merseyside is one of the most deprived regions in the UK and 
areas like Cheshire are considered affluent. See Appendix 1 for list of LAs in the North West of 
England.   
Each LA has a wide variety of food businesses in its area, although statistics from LA food 
enforcement plans show that some LAs have more food businesses than others ranging from 
around 1,000 to over 4,500. At the time of this study 2,105 EHPs are responsible for enforcing the 
law in 634,584 food establishments (FSA 2015). The types of food businesses (in varying 
proportions) include restaurants, takeaways, schools, nursing homes and mobile units. Some LAs 
will have additional responsibilities such as food manufacturing and the enforcement of imported 
food at airports or shipping ports. 
 
1.3.2 Gap in knowledge 
The intention of this study is contribute to the body of knowledge on the challenges EHPs face 
when enforcing food legislation. The study was conducted with EHPs that are employed in LAs 
across the North West of England which will offer a new perspective into the perceptions of EHPs 
enforcing food law in this part of the UK. Whilst there has been much research interest in the area 
of food law enforcement, much of the attention has been towards food businesses with respect to 
compliance, food hygiene training and incidence of food poisoning (Yapp and Fairman 2005a; 
Burke et al 2011; Jin and Lee 2012; Moreb 2017). Furthermore, other studies have focussed on 
food hygiene training and inspection scores and the impact of inspection scores on consumer 
behaviour (Harris and Murphy 2015; McIntyre et al 2013; Da Cunha et al 2016). There has been 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
 
7 
 
less interest in the perceptions of EHPs with regards to food law enforcement (Bukowski et al 
2012). The aim of food law enforcement is to bring about long-term compliance and reduce the 
incidence of foodborne illness (da Cunha et al 2016; Moreb et al 2017; Marriott et al 2018). Hence 
this study aims to explore whether the EHPs perceive that the inspection regime is capable of 
capturing food hygiene contraventions with particular focus on the food hygiene rating scheme. 
The study will contribute to the existing body of knowledge by offering strategies to improve the 
inspection regime and the food hygiene rating scheme in order to make them more effective for 
food law enforcement. In addition, the study will investigate whether EHPs are of the opinion that 
alternative enforcement tools such as civil sanctions will be beneficial in supplementing the current 
food law enforcement toolkit. This thesis also examines the role of professional training and the 
work environment in which EHPs operate in the context of the current economic climate. The 
study will contribute to the existing body of knowledge by offering suggestions from its empirical 
study to enhance the current food law enforcement toolkit.  
1.3.3 Summary of research relating to food law enforcement 
Much of the research in the arena of food safety and hygiene law has focused on the impact of 
food safety regulation on small and medium sized food businesses, their attitudes towards food 
safety legislation and what motivates them to comply (or not) (Yapp and Fairman 2004, 2006; 
Griffith et al 2010). Earlier studies such as those undertaken by Braithwaite et al (1994), May and 
Winter (2000) and Yapp and Fairman (2005b) focused on the attitudes and behaviour of food 
businesses and provided detailed analysis of enforcement styles and behaviour of officials in order 
to get these businesses to comply with the law.  
More recent studies by Bukowski et al (2012), for example, explored the decision-making of food 
enforcement officers in terms of how they select regulatory interventions and make enforcement 
decisions in order to gain compliance of food businesses. Although this study will be investigating 
the perceptions of EHPs with respect to the different regulatory interventions, the analysis of the 
responses will take into account the level of experience of the participant as well as other factors 
such as gender; level of experience and whether the sampled EHPs had previously been employed 
in other regulatory areas of environmental health such as health and safety, environmental 
protection and housing. It will also include their views regarding alternative enforcement tools 
such as civil sanctions. This investigation has not been covered in current enforcement studies. 
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Other studies relating to food law enforcement have looked at consistency. A quantitative study 
by Lee-Woolf et al (2015) analysed the enforcement data of LAs to determine whether 
inconsistencies exist between LAs and to ascertain the nature and level of such inconsistencies. 
Shah (2015) also embarked on a similar study although qualitative in nature, to gain insight into 
inconsistencies between LAs in England with regards to the ‘confidence in management’ score of 
the food hygiene rating scheme.  
Vegaris (2015) sought to investigate the impact of the food hygiene rating schemes in the UK and 
their effect on LAs, food businesses and consumers. On an international level, studies conducted 
in Canada, the United States (US) and Finland have also examined the efficacy of the food hygiene 
rating scheme. These studies were in relation to their impact on food business compliance, 
consumer behaviour, food hygiene training/knowledge of food handlers and food poisoning 
outbreaks (Burke et al 2011; Murphy et al 2011; Choi et al 2011, 2013; Pizzino and Rupp 2013; 
Morrison and Wong 2014; Laikko-Roto et al 2015; da Cunha et al 2016). However, this study will 
provide in-depth analysis of the experiences and views of EHPs with respect to the food hygiene 
rating scheme looking at the factors used for assessment and whether they capture all the risks 
within a food business. This is not mentioned in previous research and will therefore contribute to 
a body of knowledge on whether the food hygiene rating scheme is an effective risk strategy 
method for food law enforcement. The study will also offer the thoughts of the EHPs with regards 
to whether magistrates are appreciative of food law offences with respect to fines given. A similar 
study was conducted by Moran (2005) but his study looked at environmental legislation. A 
different perspective will therefore be offered by this study. In addition, there has been no research 
carried out exploring the role of civil sanctions in food law enforcement. 
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1.4 Aim & Objectives 
 
Aim 
To critically examine Environmental Health Practitioners (EHPs) perceptions of the relevancy and 
effectiveness of current policies, practices and legislative frameworks as they relate to the 
enforcement of food legislation. 
Objectives 
1. To investigate EHPs perceptions of food hygiene inspections as a regulatory 
intervention for food safety in capturing contraventions of the law. 
2. To investigate EHP perceptions on the impact of the food hygiene rating scheme as a 
risk strategy tool for enforcement. 
3. To critically examine the enforcement sanctions currently available to EHPs and 
whether (in their opinion) alternative enforcement tools would be more appropriate.  
4. To investigate EHPs perception of whether a specialist court would be required to deal 
with food law offences. 
5. To investigate EHP views regarding their level of training and general working 
environment in relation to the current economic climate. 
1.5 Research Questions  
The study developed five research questions. 
 
1. Are food hygiene inspections an effective strategy in food law enforcement: views 
from the environmental health practitioners? 
With the government striving to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of regulations in general, 
it is imperative to identify and expose any weaknesses in regulatory interventions, more 
specifically food hygiene inspections. There is a need to examine the strategies used by EHPs 
during food hygiene inspections and determine whether the inspection regime is effective in 
identifying food hygiene contraventions. This research question will fulfil the aim of the study and 
research objective 1 by evaluating the perceptions of EHPs with regards to their current inspection 
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activities and other regulatory interventions. Factors such as gender and level of experience will 
be analysed to establish any similarities or differences since this has not been discussed in the 
literature. 
2. Do EHPs believe that the Food Hygiene Rating Scheme (FHRS) is a reliable risk based 
method to assess food businesses’ compliance with the law?  
The success of the FHRS scheme is to provide consumers with more information about the hygiene 
standards in food premises as well as improving the hygiene practices among food businesses. The 
study will seek to investigate whether the FHRS is a valuable asset and benefit to EHPs for which 
there is limited qualitative data. This research question will fulfil the aim of the study and research 
objective 2 by evaluating the perceptions of EHPs with regards to the FHRS and provide 
suggestions to improve the format of the FHRS which has not been discussed in previous literature. 
3. Is there a perception that the enforcement role of EHPs will be improved if alternative 
food law enforcement tools were introduced? 
According to Macrory (2006) little has been done to change the enforcement tools of regulatory 
bodies in general. With the revision of food law in 2006 and 2013 this research will establish the 
EHPs perception of whether their enforcement tools are adequate and if alternative options would 
be more suitable, thus fulfilling the aim and research objective 3 of this study. The introduction of 
the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act (RESA) 2008 has primarily been used in other 
regulatory areas such as environmental protection. However, there is no data on how EHPs 
perceive this new legislation and the options of enforcement tools as an alternative regulatory 
enforcement option for EHPs outlined therein has not been discussed in literature.  
 
4. Is a specialist court required to deal with food hygiene offences?  
There is no special procedure for regulatory criminal cases involving food offences and ordinary 
criminal courts may not be equipped to deal with food cases especially when dealing with complex 
scientific issues and complex legislation (Macrory 2006). This research will investigate the views 
of EHPs on whether food hygiene offences are dealt with fairly in magistrate’s courts or if they 
think there should be designated experts and courts to deal solely with food hygiene offences. This 
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will fulfil the aim and research objective 4 of this study. The findings of this study will add to the 
debate on dealing with regulatory offences. 
5. What are the views and needs of EHPs regarding their level of training and the general 
working environment with respect to carrying out their enforcement duties?  
The current economic climate has meant cut backs across several LAs. The study will provide an 
insight into the issues EHPs face in carrying out their enforcement duties in view of budget cuts 
thus fulfilling the aim and research objective 5 of this study. There are no previous studies which 
provides qualitative data on how EHPs in the North West of England view their training regime 
and how this impacts their enforcement activities. 
 
1.6 Methodology 
 
The North West of England was selected for its accessibility as it was not practical or feasible to 
carry out a nationwide study and therefore considered as the best practicable approach for getting 
results. In addition, it is the third most populated region in the UK (after the South East and Greater 
London) and so offers diversity in terms of being able to select participants for the study (Office 
of National Statistics 2016). The study was conducted in an area where there have been limited 
research that explores the enforcement of food legislation and so will offer a new perspective to 
this important area. 
The study employed an inductive approach using an interpretivist, critical realist design based on 
qualitative methods (semi-structured interviews via Skype) to carry out the investigation. A total 
of twenty-one Environmental Health Practitioners (EHPs) from seventeen LAs participated in the 
study. The participants were selected on the basis of their willingness to participate and included 
EHPs with diverse experiences in food law enforcement and environmental health in general. Data 
collected from the interviews were analysed. The methodology will be discussed in more detail in 
chapter 5 of the thesis. 
 
1.7 Contribution to Knowledge: academic and practical 
This project provided an important opportunity to advance the study of food law enforcement and 
offers some important insights into EHPs in terms of gender, level of experience, and whether the 
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respondents had previously been employed in other units of environmental health departments, for 
example, housing, health and safety, significant contributions to knowledge since this has not been 
discussed in the current literature. An additional contribution is the framework for developing an 
inspection and FHRS plan suitable for communicating to businesses and consumers. 
 
Some of the practical contributions include: recommending food hygiene and safety inspection 
processes EHPs could adopt when enforcing food law; recommending alternative or additional 
food law enforcement tools that will assist EHPs in their enforcement duties. The study has 
contributed to knowledge by discussing the civil sanctions as an alternative food law enforcement 
tool and how it would impact on food law enforcement. Therefore, this study makes a major 
contribution to research on food law enforcement so that policymakers such as the Food Standards 
Agency (FSA) can be informed of the issues that affect food law enforcement so they can develop 
appropriate enforcement strategies in line with such issues. 
 
1.8 Limitations 
 
There will be, as with any research, limitations on the fieldwork, data and analysis. Apart from the 
usual limitation of resources and time constraints, the data will only capture those EHPs that are 
employed within LAs and will exclude EHPs working in the private sector or self-employed and 
will cover the North West of England only. It is hoped that this will capture the overall 
perception/views of EHPs in general.  
The limitations of the sample size still made it possible to meet the intended objectives for the 
study.  However, a similar study could be undertaken in other regions of England or a larger 
comparative legal research study on a global scale to obtain empirical data and understanding of 
how the law works in different countries.  
Another evident limitation of the study will be researcher bias leading to unreliable and inaccurate 
data. To prevent this from occurring, the sample were informed that the study was strictly an 
academic exercise, aimed at informing policy and practice and therefore EHPs were encouraged 
to participate willingly and honestly without any undue force or coaxing. However, it was assumed 
that participants will answer truthfully and accurately to the interview questions based on their 
personal experience.  
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1.9 Ethical Approval 
The University of Salford requires that postgraduate students apply for ethical approval prior to 
carrying out research. The researcher applied for ethical approval (see Appendix 1) prior to 
conducting the field study. All participants were given an information letter detailing the nature 
and purpose of the study (Appendix 2). They were also given a consent form stating their 
understanding and rights as participants and were assured by the researcher that their identity and 
responses would remain confidential at all times (Appendix 2). 
1.9 Structure of the Thesis 
To make the contribution of the study clear, the content of the other chapters of the thesis are 
briefly outlined as follows: 
Chapter Two: Regulation 
Chapter Two reviews existing literature on regulation and attempts to open the debate on 
regulation theories and approaches to regulation as a way of explaining policy interventions 
implemented by government. This chapter also presents an overview of the legislative 
development and framework that underpin food law in England and how it dovetails with EU and 
international law.  
Chapter Three: Enforcement 
Chapter Three contains a comprehensive review of the literature relating to the legislative 
framework for food law enforcement, enforcement strategies, current enforcement toolkit and 
options for alternative enforcement tools.  
Chapter Four: Empirical Framework 
Chapter Four is a bridging chapter between the literature and the methodology. A summary of the 
research objectives, interview themes depicted from literature and gaps in the literature is 
presented in tables in this section of the thesis. It provides a justification of how the primary data 
will build on secondary data. 
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Chapter Five: Research Methodology 
This chapter discusses, evaluates and justifies the research design and methodology. It includes 
the chosen research paradigm and philosophy of this study, research approach, research strategy, 
and data collection methods. It also justifies the process of the methodology and the methods of 
data analysis.   
Chapter Six: Findings and Analysis 
This chapter presents the research findings and the data collected from the Skype interviews with 
twenty-one EHPs from seventeen LAs in the North West of England. The findings are analysed to 
discover themes and patterns relevant to the research questions.  
Chapter Seven: Discussion 
This chapter presents an in-depth analysis and discussion of the results. The results are compared, 
where relevant, with the literature, in order to investigate and establish similarities or differences 
with existing theoretical propositions as well as implications for the study.  
Chapter Eight: Conclusions and Recommendations 
This chapter covers the conclusions derived from the findings linking them to the research aim and 
objectives of the study. It also provides recommendations for practitioners, and recommendations 
for further research and research limitations. 
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CHAPTER TWO: REGULATION 
2.1 Introduction 
Regulation exists for most human activities and society is becoming increasingly dependent on 
regulation (Vohs and Baumeister 2016; Carrigan and Coglianese 2016). It applies to industrial 
activities (those relating to, for example, environmental pollution, health and safety) and non-
industrial activities (for example, equal opportunities laws) (den Hertog 2010, 2012). The 
introduction of regulations is one of the strategies that governments use to change behaviour in 
society. Regulations are introduced to discourage unsafe and unhealthy behaviour in organisations 
and therefore has a critical role to play in protecting consumers from dishonest businesses and 
preventing them from doing what they want to (Parker and Nielsen 2011). For example, 
employment laws to protect certain sections of the population, and the regulation of the 
manufacture of certain products to ensure the health and well-being of consumers (Pettinger 2012). 
However, Baldwin et al (2012) argue that businesses should think of regulation as a way of 
enhancing their business in terms of developing and improving their performance in order to gain 
consumer confidence, rather than as a means to restrict their behaviour. Consequently, regulation 
should not necessarily be thought of as a restriction because the intention is to improve quality of 
life (Baldwin et al 2012). Stiglitz (2010) point to some of the ways in which regulations should be 
seen in a positive light. For example, environmental regulations ensure that there is clean air and 
water; food regulations safeguard against food becoming contaminated; health and safety 
regulations protect workers from unsafe working environments (Stiglitz 2010). 
This chapter critically reviews the literature on regulation. It also discusses and evaluates different 
definitions of regulation and addresses the theories of regulation in terms of why governments 
regulate, which according to Walshe et al 2014), an understanding of the theories of regulation is 
an important consideration in recognising whether regulation is necessary. It also gives an 
overview of the types of regulation with specific focus on the legislative framework of food safety 
regulation in England. The chapter finishes with a chapter summary. It must be noted that the study 
of regulation has been around for some time, therefore some of the references used are relatively 
old although care was taken to ensure the majority of the consulted literature was current. 
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2.2 Definitions of Regulation 
Regulation has become a part of human activity and it is therefore essential to understand what is 
meant by the term ‘regulation’. The following section will provide various definitions relating to 
the common perceptions of what regulation means. 
According to Adler (2009) and den Hertog (2010) there is no fixed definition of regulation as it 
can mean different things to different people. Levi-Faur (2010) agrees that regulation is difficult 
to define. He states that regulation can be viewed either as burdensome rules made by government 
as a way of hindering freedom, or as a tool necessary to control behaviour of businesses and 
society. Tombs (2016) also suggests that regulation is often associated with being burdensome, 
one of the reasons why a report by Hampton (2005) was initiated to propose ways to reduce 
regulatory burdens on businesses (this will be further discussed in Chapter 3). 
Regulation is not a term with a single agreed meaning and definitions. Indeed, Jordana and Levi-
Feur (2004 p3) caution that “it would be futile and somewhat nonsensical to offer one authoritative 
definition of the notion of regulation that holds across all divides”. This is because the term 
regulation is used in many different contexts in fields such as law, economics, politics and 
sociology. For example, Baldwin et al (2012 p3) provide a politico-economic definition. They 
present a definition of regulation as “the use of any tool by government to intervene in the 
economy”. This definition implies that government intervention is necessary to promote economic 
fairness and prevent inequalities of, for example, income and wealth. This definition of regulation 
also refers to government intervening to minimise the severe impact of recession and inflation 
(Sinopoli 2011). In sociology and criminology discourses regulation implies behavioural (social) 
control and mechanisms such as fines and penalties are put in place to control the behaviour of 
businesses so that they are compliant with the law (Kagan et al 2011; Black 2014). Early work by 
Black (2002) refers to this as definitional chaos due to the different disciplinary backgrounds and 
the fact that regulation is seen as a multi-way process involving different groups of people. 
Christensen (2010) asserts that regulation is a way of governments setting boundaries of operation. 
In this instance, regulation is mainly considered as a legal instrument for shaping social behaviour 
using sanctions for breaches of the law to deter adverse behaviour (Morgan and Yeung 2007; 
Moosa and Ramiah 2014). Baldwin et al (2012) state that government develops rules to control 
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industry or social behaviour and measures are in place to deal with non-compliance. Baldwin et al 
(2012) also point out that regulation is developed by governments in order to change not only the 
behaviour of industry but also the general public to improve the welfare of the society as a whole. 
They further claim that, although regulation is often thought of as means of restricting behaviour, 
it also prevents undesirable behaviour and ensures things are done so as not to cause chaos. For 
example, if there were no regulation relating to traffic control there could be chaos on the roads. 
Government therefore intervenes and develops regulation in order to bring about a positive change 
in the behaviour of industry or the general public (Stiglitz 2010; Baldwin et al 2012). Regulations 
therefore seek to improve society by changing individual or organisational behaviour in ways that 
generate positive impacts in terms of solving societal and economic problems (Coglianese 2012). 
 Hood et al (2001) uses three primary functions of regulation to give a general definition that would 
apply to all regulatory fields. The first function is standard setting where standards are identified 
and goals or targets are set. The second function is information gathering to determine whether or 
not those being regulated are achieving the standards being set, in other words, ways of detecting 
deviation from the standards. More commonly regulations are enforced through inspections and 
monitoring (enforcement) is designed to assess whether behaviour is in accordance with rules. The 
third function is behaviour modification which is the capacity to modify behaviour in cases where 
there is a deviation from the set standards. Mechanisms for correcting such deviations are 
introduced for those who do not comply with the regulations (Hood et al 2001). In the example of 
food safety and hygiene regulations, food businesses are subject to regular food hygiene 
inspections to ensure compliance with the legal requirements. If the inspection reveal 
contraventions there are a number of enforcement mechanisms to deal with any deviations from 
the regulations, for example, enforcement notices and prosecution (May and Winter 2011). The 
definition offered by Black (2002 p26) summarises the general definition given by Hood et al 
(2001): “Regulation is a process involving the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour 
of others according to defined standards or purposes with the intention of producing a broadly 
identified outcome or outcomes which may involve mechanisms of standard setting, information 
gathering and behaviour modification”.  
This study offers two definitions from the regulatory literature. The first definition views 
regulation as a legal instrument, referred to as secondary, delegated or subordinate legislation 
Chapter 2 Regulation 
 
18 
 
which is legally binding in the same way as Acts (primary legislation) (Carr 2016). Secondary 
legislation is made by an executive authority (or government minister) appointed and authorised 
by government and sets out in detail how an Act of Parliament (primary legislation) is to be 
implemented (Carr 2016). Regulation can add more detail to and support the main (primary) piece 
of legislation without the need for Parliament to pass a new Act (Easton 2012). For example, the 
Food Safety Act 1990 provides law on food safety and statutory obligations that food intended for 
human consumption should be safe to eat (Middleton 2017). The Food Safety and Hygiene 
(England) Regulations 2013, made under the 1990 Act details the requirements (basic hygiene 
principles) that food businesses must follow in order to produce safe food.  
The main difference between primary and secondary legislation is the time in which they come 
into force. Secondary legislation is normally passed more quickly than primary legislation and is 
not subject to full parliamentary scrutiny since the laws are made by civil servants (delegated 
authority) (Syrpis 2015). This is the main reason why delegated legislation is criticised. It is argued 
by Porter (2009) that the delegated authority is given a ‘blank cheque’ to draft secondary 
legislation since any changes to the law are being made by unelected members of society and the 
members of parliament (MPs) that have been elected by the nation are not reviewing legislation 
properly and may result in incomplete or imperfect laws being implemented (Carr 2016). However, 
implementing delegated legislation allows some flexibility in the regulatory process in that it 
permits modification of the law to meet any changing circumstances since it would be impossible 
for parliament to scrutinise vast amount of regulations (Fox and Blackwell 2014; Carr 2016). It 
was initially Ganz (1997) and has been supported by Harlow and Rawlings (2009) that coined the 
phrase “secondary legislation is a necessary evil” because it is always going to be necessary to 
have some form of secondary regulation to provide the details of the law for which there is no time 
to debate and it would be totally unrealistic to abolish secondary legislation because of the criticism 
it receives. Carr (2016) also supports this view and advocates that secondary legislation should not 
been seen as a necessary evil but as legislation that has positive attributes.   
The second definition is based on the assumption that government intervention is necessary to 
control and monitor behaviour of business activity in order to protect the public (Murphy 2017). 
Government sets up regulatory bodies to enforce the law and check compliance through a process 
of inspection, and failure to comply with these rules are punished using sanctions outlined in a 
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regulatory framework (Coglianese 2012, Carrigan and Coglianese 2016). Regulation is therefore 
generally thought of in the legal context to imply government intervention as a way of controlling 
or restricting certain activities in order to comply with specific rules and thus produce a change in 
behaviour which it is assumed would not occur without such intervention (Parker and Nielsen 
2011; Lemaire 2017). There needs to be some form of regulation in society (and industry) because 
people cannot just do what they like and businesses in particular need to be held accountable so 
that, for example, their activities do not pose a risk to human health and welfare. In this way the 
public needs to be assured that government is able to intervene to remedy a particular problem 
(McAllister 2010; Gunningham 2015a). However, poorly designed regulation can impose 
excessive burdens on businesses and therefore inhibit productivity (Tombs 2016). It is essential 
that governments develop and implement regulations that are effective. For example, with respect 
to food hygiene and safety regulations, there have been several high profile food poisoning 
outbreaks which have caused government to intervene and create rules that will prevent these 
incidences from occurring (Griffiths et al 2017). Environmental Health Practitioners (EHPs) are 
employed to enforce these rules and the purpose of this study is to investigate whether or not EHPs 
are equip with an effective and suitable enforcement toolkit so as to implement these regulations. 
Nevertheless, there is a need to find out the reasons why it is necessary for government to intervene 
to address a particular problem or issue, whether in society (community) or industry. Theoretical 
approaches seek to explain the justification for regulation and their underlying rationale and this 
will be discussed in the following section.  
2.3 Why Governments Regulate 
Theories of regulation have been developed by pioneering economists such as Stigler (1971), 
Posner (1974), Becker (1968, 1974) and Peltzman (1976) to try and explain why and how 
regulation is adopted. According to Ogus (2004 p32) these economic theorists suggest that the 
purpose of regulation is to “identify the failure of the market which justifies intervention and select 
the method of intervention which will correct that failure at least cost”. Two distinct theories of 
regulation have been identified to explain why regulation occurs, these are public interest theory 
and private interest theory (Becker 1968; Posner 1974). These theoretical frameworks seek to 
explore the relationship between regulatory laws and those affected by the regulatory process. The 
theories differ with respect to who benefits from the regulation. Public interest theory is presumed 
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to serve the interests of the public by correcting the inefficiencies of market failures (Stiglitz 2017). 
This is when markets underperform and policies are made to correct these imperfections to make 
the economy work more efficiently again (Baldwin et al 2012). The public interest model of 
government has been applied in many settings such as education, health and safety, environmental 
pollution and food hygiene and safety. Conversely, private interest theory is thought to meet the 
interests of those who are subject to the regulation, namely businesses (Ogus 2004; Moosa and 
Ramiah 2014). Examples include, the Association of British Insurers and the Federation of Small 
Businesses. 
2.3.1 Public Interest Theory 
This theory of regulation is based on the assumption that regulation is introduced mainly for the 
public interest in order to protect the public from the risk of poor practices by fraudulent and 
dishonest organisations (Baldwin et al 2012). Economic theorists such as Stigler (1971), Posner 
(1974), Becker (1974) and Peltzman (1976) assumed that markets are inclined to fail if left to their 
own devices and the government is capable of correcting this failure so that these markets start 
operating more efficiently and effectively and produce the desired behaviour that the public want 
to see. From a cynical point of view this can be especially true during an election campaign, for 
example, when policymakers introduce regulation to receive favour from the public. Baldwin et al 
(2012) agree that one of the motives behind government regulation is a means of re-election when 
regulation is directed towards private activities and its implementation appears to be conducive to 
the public interest.  
As mentioned earlier, public interest theory regards market failure as one of the main reasons for 
governments to introduce regulation so that regulation will correct failure in the interests of the 
public (Posner 2011). Ogus (2009 p333) defines market failure “where the market does not operate 
or behave in a way that is efficient and effective” and because of this, Ogus (2009 p333) states that 
“obligations are imposed by public law designed to induce individuals and firms to outcomes 
which they would not voluntarily reach”. This is based on the assumption that markets would fail 
significantly if government did not intervene to make markets function effectively again and so 
protect the public from any harm that may arise from this market failure. There are a range of 
government interventions to correct such market failures. For example, in July 2007, the UK 
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government introduced legislation to ban smoking in public places. Cigarette smoking is 
considered an ‘externality’. Externalities are “a cost (benefit) that a transaction imposes on 
economic agents without the receiver of the externality being compensated (charged)” (Guhl and 
Hughes 2006 p3). Cigarette consumption can be seen as imposing externalities due to the increased 
costs of treating people due to illnesses related to smoking and the effects of second hand smoke. 
Individuals who smoke, create second hand smoke that pollutes the environment and cause health 
problems. If there was no government regulation then those people not directly involved in 
smoking would incur such costs generated by this activity (Ekpu and Brown 2015; Yang and 
Zucchelli 2018). 
Furthermore, the regulation of food safety is no exception and which, according to Yasuda (2010), 
the government can remedy this failure. She says that market failure in terms of food safety 
regulation is a result of the increased incidence of foodborne illnesses which can incur costs to the    
health care system as well as worker productivity in relation to days lost due to illness. Government 
intervention in 2006 meant that it became mandatory for food businesses to implement a food 
safety management system to ensure that the food they prepare and sell is fit for human 
consumption. Furthermore the food hygiene rating scheme was introduced in 2010 by the Food 
Standards Agency (FSA) as a way of improving compliance among food businesses and also as a 
means for consumers to make informed choices about the food they buy and consume (Vegaris 
2015; Nayak and Waterson 2017; Nayak and Taylor 2018). The food hygiene rating scheme is 
used by EHPs to assess compliance and this study will explore whether it is a beneficial 
enforcement strategy for EHPs. These market failures make regulation critical if the public interest 
is to be protected from the adverse negative impacts of such market failures and other harmful 
business behaviours.  
However, the public interest theory of regulation has been subjected to a number of criticisms. The 
first criticism supposes that organisations can correct most market failures without any government 
intervention of regulation, just as neighbours resolve disputes among themselves, without any 
government intervention, because they need to get along with each other (Hutton and Schneider 
2008). Hutton and Schneider (2008) propose that even if there is no regulation markets would 
work efficiently and it is preferable for organisations to solve its own problems rather than rely on 
government intervention. This view is supported by Sinopoli (2011) who questions whether 
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government intervention is necessary when markets fail and that government intervention may not 
be the right answer. They are of the opinion that the economy will continue to grow even if 
government does not intervene because organisations are capable of addressing their own 
problems. For example, a project implemented by the European Union tested the theory that if 
there was no government involvement in the form of regulations, people will adapt and will 
become responsible for their own behaviour. In 2008, a town in Germany removed all traffic lights 
and road signs throughout the town in order to look at the behaviour of drivers if they were not 
told what to. Within a four week period there was no accidents compared with at least one serious 
accident every week when there were traffic lights and road signs. The town also saved around 
£5000 a month because they did not have to replace or repair signs due to normal wear and tear or 
vandalism. The experiment showed that government regulations are not essential in order for 
society to run smoothly with people taking responsibility for themselves and naturally doing what 
they think is right rather than having rules and regulations imposed on them 
(www.dailymail.co.uk). In the UK, the government plans to remove the white markings on roads 
in an effort to make drivers more responsible for the safety of themselves and others (www.the 
guardian.com). Research by Dutch engineer Hans Monderman found that traffic was safest when 
there was an element of self-policing as opposed to a system of control (The Guardian 4/2/16). 
This ‘self-policing’ can also apply to the food industry in the form of self-regulation where 
businesses form an association to set their own standards. The association would discipline itself 
and probably set higher standards because their reputations are at stake since they cannot afford to 
produce unfit food (Baldwin et al 2010). However, Posner (2011) points out, the public interest 
theory of regulation was based on the assumption that markets are fragile and will operate very 
inefficiently if they are left alone. He also also argues that regulation is a necessary feature of a 
market economy and it is a myth that market economies can function effectively without it. This 
implies that government regulation is indeed effective in dealing with market failure. However, 
Black (2014) asserts that regulation is a problem based activity in that society decides that there is 
a problem or a risk of a problem in the future and policy makers and regulators devise ways to 
address that problem.  
Nevertheless, according to Moosa and Ramiah (2014), Hyde (2014) and Lakhani (2017), 
governments introduce regulations without first determining whether the intervention is really 
necessary. Therefore it is often very difficult to identify the exact reasoning which motivate the 
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intervention. Yasuda (2010) also agrees that policymakers often introduce government regulations 
hastily without careful examination of their likely consequences.  She questions whether 
government regulations are really helping. For example, when there is an injury or fatality, 
legislation is usually introduced to prevent the incident from happening again but the incident may 
often be repeated.  It appears that new regulations may be implemented as a knee-jerk reaction to 
such incidents as government wants to be seen as acting in the public interest (Yasuda 2010). Hyde 
(2014) says that regulation regarding banks lending money to customers for a mortgage is a knee-
jerk reaction to the financial crisis of 2008. Under these new regulations lenders need to carry out 
an in-depth interview with customers before they can issue a new mortgage. It is thought that many 
borrowers with good credit history will not qualify and the reliance on computers to filter out risky 
applicants will be detrimental as a solution to prevent a repeat of the financial crisis (Hyde 2014). 
Bleasdale and Dickinson (2016) cite The Dangerous Dogs Act 2014 as a knee-jerk (panic reaction 
to disasters or tragedies) 14 as a prime example due to the fact that well behaved and well trained 
dogs could fall foul of this legislation accidentally. For example, if a dog becomes overexcited, 
jumps up and knocks someone down.  
Finally, den Hertog (2010 p21) also argues that public interest theory of regulation “fails to prove 
how the views of public interest can translate into effective and efficient legislative actions” since 
it appears difficult to translate the views of the public into policies and incorporated into 
legislation. The theory does not indicate how a given view on the public interest translates into 
legislative actions that maximise economic welfare (Moosa and Ramiah 2014). Public 
participation in the regulatory process is rare although not unheard of but this will probably only 
take place when there is a political election when politicians are rallying for votes. It is therefore 
questionable whether regulation serves the public interest or self-interests of private actors 
(Christensen 2010). From a cynical point of view self-interests are usually linked with the need to 
strengthen political gains and support from interest groups whose wealth is affected by the 
regulatory decisions (Stigler, 1971; Becker, 1983; Peltzman, 1976; Dür 2018). Conversely, it may 
be because regulatory agencies fail to protect the public because of lack of adequate financial and 
staff resources so that they are not able to perform their regulatory responsibilities (den Hertog 
2010). This study will explore whether EHPs have adequate and suitable resources in order to 
carry out their enforcement duties. 
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Despite its appeal however, the public interest theory has been theoretically and practically 
discredited for its inability and its failure to explain why regulation often fails to deliver public 
interest outcomes (Baldwin et al 2012). Private interest theory emerged as an alternative to explain 
government intervention. 
2.3.2 Private Interest Theory 
In contrast to the public interest theory of regulation the private interest theory of regulation 
emerged as a response to the perception that regulatory agencies were ineffective in meeting public 
interest goals and is aimed at protecting the producer rather than the consumer (den Hertog 2010, 
2012). Private interest theory is often referred to as: public choice theory; economic theory, 
Chicago theory of regulation; special interest and capture theory. The theory was initially proposed 
by Stigler (1971) in his article ‘Theory of Economic Regulation’ and attempts to explain what 
happens when organisations try to influence the political process to their advantage.  He claimed 
that “regulation is acquired by the industry and designed and operated primarily for its benefit” 
(Stigler 1971 p3). In his empirical work he stated that the main beneficiaries of regulation were 
not consumers but the regulated businesses. Posner (1974) also agreed and wrote “regulation is 
not about the public interest at all, but a process by which interest groups seek to promote their 
own private interest….over time, regulatory agencies come to be dominated by the industries that 
are being regulated” (Posner 1974 p341). It is therefore suggested that politicians and regulators 
end up being “captured” by those being regulated and as a result, laws and regulations do not serve 
the public interest. Regulation exists not because citizens need it, but because the regulated 
industry wants it and therefore do not regard government regulation as a restriction (Carpenter and 
Moss 2013). 
Carpenter and Moss (2013) pointed out that in the case of regulatory capture not only does the 
industry benefit from the regulation but the government also benefits from greater political support 
and favour with these large and wealthy organisations. The capture theory asserts that these 
organisations will use the political process to their private advantage. Regulated organisations can 
be so powerful that they can influence politicians and the regulatory agencies because they (the 
regulated groups) are wealthy enough to donate monies through campaign contributions and votes 
- politicians want public votes but large organisations have the money to aid their campaigns 
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(Schneier 2012; Borges 2017; Browne 2018). The politicians are able put pressure on the regulated 
agencies to act sympathetically towards these regulated organisations and so aid their chances of 
re-election. For regulatory agents, the benefits are the prospect of moving on to more lucrative 
careers outside government within the regulated industry (Schneier 2012; Browne 2918).  An 
example can be seen in the United States of America (USA) where car dealerships in some states 
prevented an electric car company from selling directly to customers and campaigned for 
government to legislate to protect their profits. This is because the electric car company is able to 
cut out the costs of having dealer networks as well as repairs since electric cars do not have spark 
plugs, belts, oil filters, and air filters that need constant replacement, thus many problems can be 
diagnosed remotely. Legislation was implemented so that all cars must be sold via car dealerships 
thereby protecting these large car dealerships from competition (Crane 2016).  Another prime 
example is that of the financial industry which received large amounts of money when the financial 
crisis happened thus saving them from total collapse (Carpenter and Moss 2014).  
Since regulation has a direct impact on the profits of the regulated companies, such organisations 
have a powerful incentive to influence regulation so that it favours their business in a way that it 
would enhance profits. Equally, regulators have an incentive as their actions will typically result 
in greater political support (Baldwin et al 2012). Schneier (2012 p204) states “There’s one 
competing interest that’s unique to enforcing institutions, and that’s the interest of the group the 
institution is supposed to watch over. If a government agency exists only because of the industry, 
then it is in its self-preservation interest to keep that industry flourishing. And unless there’s some 
other career path, pretty much everyone with the expertise necessary to become a regulator will 
be either a former or future employee of the industry with the obvious implicit and explicit 
conflicts. As a result, there is a tendency for institutions delegated with regulating a particular 
industry to start advocating the commercial and special interests of that industry. This is known 
as regulatory capture”. 
As a result, regulation is implemented on private interest grounds. On this basis, capture theory 
sees the regulatory process as a political market, where, at one extreme, the industry demands 
regulation as if it was an economic good, and on the other side, regulators implement regulation 
as an exchange for votes. This has been also termed the conspiracy theory which suggests the 
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existence of regulatory capture in the form of a conspiracy between regulators and regulatees 
against customers (Borges 2017; Browne 2018).  
Croley (2011) suggests that in Berstein’s (1955) life cycle model regulatory agencies become 
sympathetic to the problems of organisations and also become lenient in enforcement. Berstein’s 
1955 lifecycle model suggests that regulatory agencies are dominated over time by the industries 
they regulate even if at first they were driven by the pursuit of the public interest. Berstein’s Model 
of the regulatory cycle and suggests that regulatory agencies have a natural life cycle (Life Cycle 
Theory) that consists of 4 phases, that is, gestation, youth, maturity and old age (Table 2.1). In the 
beginning (gestation and youth phase) the regulatory agency implements and enforces new policies 
and procedures for the benefit of the public (public interest theory) and do not feel threatened by 
the organisations that it has to regulate even though they may resist the regulation. However, the 
final stages (maturity and old age) the private organisations unite and begin to confront the agency 
who eventually become captured by those they are supposed to regulate.  The life-cycle theory 
proposes that although regulators might start to use their discretional regulatory powers 
independently, they would gradually be captured (Millstone and Lang 2008; Howlett and Newman 
2013). 
Table 2.1: Bernstein’s genealogical model of regulatory regimes (1955)  
Stage Summary of Activity 
Gestation  Problems are discovered or perceived by specific stakeholders in a 
particular area. Advocacy groups organise and petition government 
for a public solution. 
 Regulatory agency created by government 
Youth Boundaries of regulation and legal jurisdiction are not clear; 
regulation is probably ineffective. 
Maturity  Controversies are over. Regulation becomes institutionalised. 
 Regulatory capture occurs 
Old Age Industry has fully captured regime. Regulatory agency exclusively 
fights for the status quo. 
Source: Howlett and Newman (2013) 
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Howlett and Newman (2013) criticise Berstein’s model in that it does not explain the steps towards 
the different stages and it does not provide sufficient information at each stage. They proposed an 
alternative life cycle model of the regulatory regime by including additional stages/activities prior 
to the youth phase: infancy and childhood (Table 2.2).  Such models are proposed to assist 
policymakers identify the different steps in the regulatory process.  
Table 2.2: Revised model of the early stages of a regulatory regime life cycle 
Life Cycle Stage Regulatory Activity 
Gestation   Emergence of a problem on the agenda as a threat, hazard or 
risk 
 Public acknowledgment of issue 
Infancy  Poor knowledge base 
 Efforts at issue suppression 
 Attempt to adapt existing statutes and rules to current 
problems 
 Exhortation to encourage voluntary activity 
Childhood  Desire to create new rules but no clear knowledge of what 
these rules/standards should be 
 Large scale research programs for hazard characterisation 
and initial quantitative risk assessments 
 Responding to lobbying  
 Venue shopping 
Youth   
 
 Smaller scale maintenance research 
 Emergence of more direct, authoritative state regulation 
 Development of standards 
 Frozen issue frames 
 Litigation  
Source: Howlett and Newman 2013 
However, Becker (1983) held a slightly different view and argues that regulation will not only 
benefit industry because some consumer groups will also be able to put pressure on government, 
although he acknowledges that industry has much to gain from regulation and are in a better  
position than consumers to ensure that regulation is made in their favour. He also extends his 
assumptions to point out that there will be opposing consumer pressure groups all competing to 
exert the most pressure on government to develop regulation in their favour. Stigler (1971) 
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believed that all the regulated groups are united in their mission and do not have conflicting 
interests. Jenkins (2011) agrees and states that the general public hear the word ‘regulation’ and 
envision government defending the consumer. Although, he concludes, the truth is that 
government introduces regulation to those who ask for it which usually means organised interests 
seeking to block a competitive threat. This is consistent with den Hertog’s (2010) definition of 
regulation in that regulators act in the interests of both public and private interests (den Hertog 
2010). Den Hertog (2010 p3) states that regulation is “the employment of legal instruments for the 
implementation of social-economic policy objectives” and “the employment of legal instruments 
by public actors to pursue public and private interests”. This definition recognises regulation as 
both a public and private activity. 
A criticism of private interest theory tends to stress the ease with which regulatory capture can 
occur. Industry groups tend to be successful in capturing the regulatory process mainly because 
they have the economic resources in doing so. The underlying principle of Stigler’s theory which 
states that “the political process is captured by those it is meant to regulate” (Stigler 1971 p4) is 
that industry uses its ‘power’ to establish and enforce rules in their favour and therefore regulation 
becomes ineffective in meeting public interest goals because the interests of private organisations 
are considered. However, Croley (2011) disagrees with Stigler’s assumptions. In his view, while 
regulatory capture is possible it is not inevitable, primarily because the regulatory process is 
governed by a legal framework that provides some protection from political influence in the form 
of transparency and electoral credibility. Carpenter and Moss (2013) agree and argue that it should 
not be assumed that a regulatory agency has been ‘captured’ if it sometimes supports those it is 
regulating. Zingales (2013) also adds that regulatory capture does not necessarily imply that 
regulators are corrupt and dishonest but are persuasive in offering additional assistance to 
businesses so that they comply with the law. In other words, regulators being educators and 
advisors and so such social bonds are not undesirable but rather regulators show understanding to 
the regulated if they genuinely need help in understanding the regulations and how to comply with 
it. Regulatory literature shows that enforcers mainly adopt a co-operative approach to enforcement 
and this may be mistaken for regulatory capture (Hutter and Amodu 2008; Farnheart and 
Glicksman 2015; Holley and Sinclair 2017).  
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2.4 Food Legislation in England  
Van der Meulen (2010) states that food is one of the most regulated areas in the world. He also 
points out that government intervention and the establishment of food laws and regulations ensure 
the safety of food that is imported or exported. This is so that the regulatory requirements of 
importing/exporting countries are met and procedures are in place so that food is not spoiled or 
unsafe by the time it reaches the consumer (Van der Meulen 2010). 
The Food Safety Act 1990 (as amended) (The Act) is the primary piece of legislation in the UK. 
It differs from the previous statutes in that ‘safety’ is added to the title and is a key word so 
consumers think that their concerns are being addressed (Wilson et al 2015). Under this legislation 
food businesses are responsible for ensuring that food they prepare and serve is safe to eat (Food 
Standards Agency). Prior to the 1980s food was considered safe unless proved otherwise, using 
scientific analysis in the form of microbiological testing of random batches of food products. This 
end-product testing was criticised as being unsuitable because by the time the results of the tests 
were ready the product was already on the market for sale (Zwietering et al 2016).   
The majority of food law is in the form of regulations and directives that come from Europe and 
seek to harmonise the free movement of food and feed in the EU with the aim of “modernising 
EU food legislation to make it more coherent, understandable, flexible and promote better 
enforcement of legislation and provide greater transparency for consumers” (Vapnek and Spreij 
2005 p60). The regulation of food generally takes place at national level although international 
legislation has had a strong impact on food safety policies at national levels. National regulatory 
frameworks have to be adjusted to meet international obligations due to the exchange of food 
across international borders with an emphasis on preventing barriers to trade (WTO 2015). Food 
safety legislation has progressed mainly due to the increase in international trade and foreign 
travel. Such globalisation of the food industry has introduced new challenges for food safety 
because it can be difficult to ensure food safety over long distances (Fukuda 2015). Buckley and 
Reid (2010 p26) conclude that “the global trade of food items, especially those originating from 
developing countries has resulted in some significant food safety problems” such as new emerging 
pathogens and food fraud. It has become necessary to improve regulatory activities on a national 
and international scale because of the incidences in food poisoning outbreaks and the increase in 
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global trade (Vapnek and Spreij 2005; Mensah and Julien 2011). Alomirah et al (2010) highlights 
the need for international food standards to protect the health of consumers from new emerging 
pathogens and to ensure fair practices in food trade.  
In January 2006, the food industry became subject to new legislative requirements, the Food 
Hygiene (England) Regulations 2006, after the EU Regulations (Regulation (EC) no. 852/2004) 
were introduced (there is similar legislation in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland who have 
been given certain powers to establish their own legislation). However, as mentioned earlier, new 
regulations came into force in January 2014: Food Hygiene (England) Regulations 2013 (these 
have since been amended: Food Hygiene (England) (Amended) Regulations 2016) (FSA 2017). 
The main purpose of any legislative revisions is to eliminate any inconsistencies and duplication 
making it easier to interpret and enforce. There were originally 17 food directives emanating from 
Europe but they have now been consolidated into 3 regulations termed ‘The Hygiene Package’ 
which fall under the umbrella of the General Food Law Regulation (EC) 178/2002 (the framework 
of European law). These regulations are Regulation (EC) 852/2004 (the hygiene of foodstuffs); 
Regulation (EC) 853/2004 (refers to food businesses that deal with food of animal origin) and 
Regulation (EC) 854/2004 (which relates to the organisation of official controls on products of 
animal origin intended for human consumption (www.food.gov.uk). The Food Standards Agency 
(FSA) an independent UK government department focusing on the protection of consumers in 
relation to food safety issues states that the general overhaul of EU legislation is designed to restore 
consumer confidence in the wake of food related incidences and consumer pressure on government 
(Middleton 2017).  Additional government regulation has been developed and implemented due 
to these food safety incidents. For example, it is now mandatory for food businesses to implement 
a food safety management system that conforms to the principles of HACCP. Previous research 
has sought to determine the effects of government legislation on, for example, food businesses 
(Fairman and Yapp 2005; Green and Kane 2014). However, this study seeks to explore whether 
such legislation has assisted enforcement officials (namely EHPs) in their duties to enforce the 
law.  
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2.5 Regulatory approaches  
Porket (2003 p49) described government regulation to be on a scale “ranging from highly 
restrictive to highly permissive with respect to the degree of freedom that the regulation allows”. 
Highly restrictive regulation gives the organisation little or no freedom to find alternative options 
to comply with the regulation and is often referred to as command and control regulation. 
Conversely, regulation that is highly permissive increases the freedom of those being regulated 
and alternative forms from traditional regulation are implemented, for example, self-regulation 
(Sharma et al 2010). This study identified two common approaches to food safety regulation, 
namely command and control and risk based regulation. 
2.5.1 Command and Control Regulation 
Command and control regulation is the traditional regulatory approach when a government 
develops regulation for controlling the activities of industry telling them what to do and how to do 
it (Gunningham 2015). The command and control approach is characterised by ‘commands’ which 
outlines standards and rules to be followed and ‘controls’ in the form of legal sanctions to monitor 
and enforce these rules if organisations do not comply (Baldwin et al 2012). The general focus is 
on remedial policies rather than more comprehensive prevention techniques. This means that 
corrective action to remedy offences is required as opposed to systematic approaches designed to 
prevent the offence occurring in the first place (Bocher 2011; Baldwin et al 2012). Consequently, 
command and control regulation has been criticised because it lacks flexibility, has complicated 
rules and can result in over-regulation. This may place a high economic burden of some businesses 
particularly micro, small and medium sized enterprises because they will have to follow the law 
in the same way as larger organisations that will have far greater resources and expertise (Hutter 
and Amodu 2008). This can result in non-compliance by encouraging businesses to intentionally 
avoid compliance because of the hostile relationship between the regulators and those being 
regulated (Murphy 2017). Bardach and Kagan (2017) in their fieldwork on environmental and 
occupational safety and health regulation found that legalistic regulation can lead to a resistance 
in the willingness to comply. When businesses felt that regulators were being too legalistic in the 
application of rules and imposition of fines, they would tend to respond by only doing what is 
minimal to comply with the law because there is no incentive to go beyond the minimum standard 
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set by the regulations. Bardach and Kagan (2017) suggest that if government policies are perceived 
to be unreasonable, resistance can occur even from those who are normally willing to comply with 
the law. Blanket rules are set without due consideration of the different characteristics of the 
organisations that have to comply making the regulations too authoritarian and a burden on 
businesses (Hampton 2005; Tombs 2016).  
A report by Hampton (2005) outlined proposals to reduce such administrative burdens on 
businesses. Hampton stated in his government report that unreasonable regulations and 
inconsistent enforcement practices impose unnecessary burdens on regulated businesses. Such 
burdens can include the costs involved in adapting operational procedures to align with the new 
legislation, training employees and the purchase of equipment and materials (Hale et al 2011). In 
addition, new regulations can be burdensome for small business who fail to understand the 
complex rules and regulations and are therefore at a disadvantage (Fairman and Yapp 2005; Hale 
et al 2011). This in turn will stifle innovation and competition. 
Hampton (2005) proposed that regulators adopt a risk based approach to regulation which means 
resources are concentrated in the areas where it is most needed. Hampton recommended that risk 
assessment should underpin all regulatory interventions and there should be no intervention or 
enforcement without a risk based justification. This was also advocated by the Better Regulation 
Executive (BRE) who proposed that regulations should not result in businesses having to incur 
costs in order to comply with regulations, which can act as a barrier to competition and reduce 
productivity (BRE 2018). The BRTF offers five principles that regulators need to take into account 
when devising, implementing, enforcing and reviewing regulations: proportionality, 
accountability, consistency, transparency and targeting (Table 2.3) (BRTF 2005). Black (2014) 
states that regulation, or regulatory governance, is the organised attempt to manage risks or 
behaviour in order to achieve a publicly stated objective or set of objectives. Black (2014) also 
states that regulatory disasters are partly due to poorly designed and/or implemented regulations 
which have an adverse effect on the health and wellbeing of people or the environment. Tombs 
(2016) buttresses this argument by stating that around 80,000 deaths a year are due to lack of 
effective regulation in environmental pollution, food poisoning and health and safety (and needless 
to say lack of effective enforcement).  
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EHPs may be indirectly affected by the regulatory process (Battersby 2017). However, the fact 
that society continues to experience some foodborne illnesses makes it plausible to assume that 
the food industry is not producing an efficient level of safety thereby resulting in government 
intervention to legislate for safe food (Sharma et al 2010; Fortin 2017). The question is whether 
government legislation being effectively translated (enforced) on the ground? Most studies have 
used environmental health records and base their conclusions on analysis of these records to 
determine the effectiveness of government legislation (Lee et al 2012; Murphy et al 2013; 
DaCunha et al 2016). This study provides more insight into core critical issues of food hygiene 
legislation and how they affect the enforcement duties of EHPs.   
Table 2.3: The five principles of good regulation by the Better Regulation Task Force which 
was introduced in 2005 and is still followed by government officials. 
Proportionality Regulators should only intervene when necessary. Remedies should be 
appropriate to the risk posed, and costs identified and minimised. • 
Policy solutions must be proportionate to the perceived problem or risk 
and justify the compliance costs imposed – don’t use a sledgehammer 
to crack a nut. • All the options for achieving policy objectives must be 
considered – not just prescriptive regulation. Alternatives may be more 
effective and cheaper to apply. • “Think small first”. Regulation can 
have a disproportionate impact on small businesses, which account for 
99.8% of UK businesses. • EC Directives should be transposed without 
gold plating. • Enforcement regimes should be proportionate to the risk 
posed. • Enforcers should consider an educational, rather than a 
punitive approach where possible. 
Accountability Regulators must be able to justify decisions, and be subject to public 
scrutiny. • Proposals should be published and all those affected 
consulted before decisions are taken. • Regulators should clearly 
explain how and why final decisions have been reached. • Regulators 
and enforcers should establish clear standards and criteria against 
which they can be judged. • There should be well-publicised, 
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accessible, fair and effective complaints and appeals procedures. • 
Regulators and enforcers should have clear lines of accountability to 
Ministers; Parliaments and assemblies; and the public. 
Consistency Government rules and standards must be joined up and implemented 
fairly. • Regulators should be consistent with each other, and work 
together in a joined-up way. • New regulations should take account of 
other existing or proposed regulations, whether of domestic, EU or 
international origin. • Regulation should be predictable in order to give 
stability and certainty to those being regulated. • Enforcement agencies 
should apply regulations consistently across the country. 
Transparency Regulators should be open, and keep regulations simple and user-
friendly. • Policy objectives, including the need for regulation, should 
be clearly defined and effectively communicated to all interested 
parties. • Effective consultation must take place before proposals are 
developed, to ensure that stakeholders’ views and expertise are taken 
into account. • Stakeholders should be given at least 12 weeks, and 
sufficient information, to respond to consultation documents. • 
Regulations should be clear and simple, and guidance, in plain 
language, should be issued 12 weeks before the regulations take effect. 
• Those being regulated should be made aware of their obligations, 
with law and best practice clearly distinguished. • Those being 
regulated should be given the time and support to comply. It may be 
helpful to supply examples of methods of compliance. • The 
consequences of noncompliance should be made clear. 
Targeting Regulation should be focused on the problem, and minimise side 
effects. • Regulations should focus on the problem, and avoid a 
scattergun approach. • Where appropriate, regulators should adopt a 
“goals-based” approach, with enforcers and those being regulated 
given flexibility in deciding how to meet clear, unambiguous targets. • 
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Guidance and support should be adapted to the needs of different 
groups. • Enforcers should focus primarily on those whose activities 
give rise to the most serious risks. • Regulations should be 
systematically reviewed to test whether they are still necessary and 
effective. If not, they should be modified or eliminated. 
Source: BRTF (2005) 
The criticisms of command and control regulation have therefore led to the use of alternative 
approaches to regulation with risk based approaches such as self-regulation and enforced self-
regulation becoming more widely used.  
2.5.2 Risk Based Legislation 
Risk based regulation (RBR) is now emerging in a variety of areas, for example, food safety, 
occupational health and safety and environmental pollution. It is the preferred regulatory approach 
since it is meant to minimise the regulatory burden on business because it is the business that 
assesses its own risks and how to tackle them (Black 2014; Hutter and Bostock 2017). The 
importance of RBR was underlined in the UK by the Hampton Report (2005) as mentioned earlier. 
Hampton stressed the importance of adopting risk based approaches across all regulatory areas and 
that risk assessment is an essential element of regulation. It is an assessment of risks to ensure that 
the highest risks are targeted first (Hampton 2005). It is thought that the Food Hygiene (England) 
Regulations 2006 (which have since been revised) were introduced so that governments become 
more proactive in their regulation of the food industry by making businesses more responsible for 
the food that they prepare and sell by the adoption of a risk based food safety management systems, 
a self-regulatory mechanism to ensure food safety (Taylor 2008; Green and Kane 2014). 
Risk based approaches hold a number of potential advantages over traditional regulation in that 
they allow organisations to make their own decisions which can result in greater compliance than 
with government-imposed rules like command and control (Black 2014; Hutter and Bostock 2017). 
In addition, this approach to regulation is seen as a way of saving valuable resources in terms of 
time and money. This is because the focus should be those risks within a business that are 
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considered critical which must be managed as a matter of priority (Black and Baldwin 2012; Black 
2014).  
Two examples of RBR that are prevalent in the food industry are self-regulation and enforced self-
regulation. 
(A) Self-regulation 
The perceived deficiencies of command and control regulation resulted in the development of 
alternative strategies such as self-regulation. Self-regulation (sometimes called industry self-
regulation) can be defined as “a process whereby an organised group regulates the behaviour of 
its members” (Baldwin and Cave 1999 p39). This is when industry formulates its own rules (which 
are voluntary) for its members to adhere to. Self-regulation can offer significant advantages over 
traditional command and control regulation including greater flexibility and adaptability and the 
ability to address industry-specific issues directly and more quickly (Ojo 2010). Self-regulating 
organisations have the knowledge and expertise about their businesses which will result in more 
practicable rules and regulations that are flexible and tailored to the conditions within an 
organisation making it more likely to comply with the rules (Ojo 2010; Sharma et al 2010; Ogus 
and Carbonara 2011).  
Braithwaite (2011) states that organisations prefer to act on their own initiative rather than being 
told what to do by government or regulating authorities and so the burdens of regulation upon 
businesses are reduced resulting in high commitment to compliance as it generates a sense of 
‘ownership’. Baldwin et al (2012) state that this makes self-regulation more cost-effective because 
any issues can be addressed more quickly because there is in-house expertise. They further mention 
that standards are generally developed by those who are technical experts or skilled personnel in 
the industry and therefore are aware of what works well. Self-regulation is considered to have the 
potential to contribute to a higher level of compliance with rules. The flexibility of self-regulation 
enables it to adapt more easily and rapidly to changing market conditions and technological 
innovations and it is often better for individuals to act on their own initiative rather than to be 
forced into a particular course of action (OECD 2015).  
Chapter 2 Regulation 
 
37 
 
Despite its benefits self-regulation has attracted criticism. First of all, the self-regulation approach 
may not be appealing in a sense that it may be difficult to see how effective a professional body 
will be in enforcing rules on its own members with the possibility of conflicts of interest and 
question the accountability of the self-regulators (Bartle and Vass 2007). Secondly, there will be 
some scepticism about whether the sanctions/punishment will be adequate in dealing with non-
compliance. In this sense, the self-interests of the self-regulators are brought into question so that 
industry will be the beneficiaries of the regulation and the public interest ignored. The third 
criticism is the enforcement of such standards and principles against those who breach the rules. 
Again, unless the self-regulatory body is backed by the government, it is difficult to see how, and 
to what extent a regulatory body can ensure compliance which can create distrust and a loss of 
public confidence in self-regulation as a regulatory mechanism (Castro 2011).  
Gaffikin (2005) raises questions about the openness, transparency and accountability of the process 
and suggests that self-regulation is contrary to the principles outlined in the Hampton Report 
(2005) and the Better Regulation Task Force (2005). Braithwaite (2011) states that self-regulation 
is frequently an attempt to deceive the public into believing in the responsibility of an irresponsible 
industry and is a strategy to give the government an excuse for not doing its job.  The government 
must therefore rely on the goodwill and cooperation of organisations for their compliance 
(Coglianese 2017; Gunningham 2017). Sharma et al (2010) suggest that any self-regulatory 
scheme must implement accountability mechanisms that are transparent and reviewable as per the 
principles proposed by the BRTF.   
(B) Enforced self-regulation  
The use of enforced self-regulation (ESR) in environmental health and other regulations such as 
health and safety is widespread and is increasingly the favoured approach according to Braithwaite 
(2011).  It differs from self-regulation in that the standards to be achieved are determined by the 
regulator and not from within the industry. These are enforced by regulatory agencies established 
by government and it is not industry that develops and enforces the rules (Hutter and Amodu 2008; 
Ojo 2009). ESR therefore avoids the major pitfalls of command and control regulation and self-
regulation in that regulation is not left entirely to the willingness of companies to regulate nor is it 
heavily dependent on government control (Hutter and Bostock 2017). Business has the flexibility 
to devise their own rules which meet the standards demanded by legislation but are adapted to their 
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particular circumstances and risks associated with their particular business. Subsequently, 
businesses will be more committed to rules and systems which they have devised themselves 
(Hutter and Amodu 2008; Hutter and Bostock 2017).  
In considering food law there have been significant changes to the regulatory framework following 
several high profile food safety related scares such as BSE and the E.coli outbreaks. Food safety 
regulation is becoming acknowledged as an important issue and government reports such as 
Hampton (2005), Macrory (2006) and Pennington (2009) have highlighted the need for effective 
regulation. For example the application of HACCP (Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point) which 
replaced end product testing, is considered an example of enforced self-regulation. 
Proponents of the HACCP system perceive it to be the most cost-effective approach to ensure food 
safety and is used nationally and internationally to ensure harmonisation, particularly with respect 
to global food trade (Kafetzopoulos et al 2013; Wallace and Mortimore 2014; Wallace et al 2018).  
HACCP is considered an effective and efficient approach to food safety because it allows food 
businesses to put systems in place to ensure potential risks within the business are controlled. It is 
therefore seen as a preventative method as opposed to a reactive method and so it is meant to 
prevent foodborne illness by identifying risks through preventative controls (Fortin 2017). Food 
businesses have to identify the hazards present within their operations, implement and monitor 
controls, and document this process (Taylor 2008; Vegaris 2015; Wallace et al 2018). 
A considerable amount of literature has been published on HACCP and despite its benefits and 
mandatory requirement in UK law, many studies have reported barriers to its implementation 
particularly in small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (Domenech et al 2011; Ramalho et al 2015 
Nayak anü Waterson 2017; Wallace et al 2018).  Fairman and Yapp (2006) found that the 
application of enforced self-regulation in food businesses is problematic in SMEs because of their 
specific characteristics and generally do not understand the risks associated with their activities. 
They also argue that SMEs in particular may have problems in self-regulating in any form. 
However the introduction of a new method of HACCP for SMEs was introduced in 2008 to make 
it easier for SMEs to comply with the food safety management system element of the legislation 
(Taylor 2008). Safer Food Better Business (SFBB) was introduced as a food safety management 
tool to assist SMEs to comply with the requirements for documented HACCP-based procedures 
(Taylor 2008). The SFBB pack has been adapted to the range of food businesses such as 
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restaurants, Indian and Chinese cuisine and also residential care homes. A survey carried out by 
the Better Regulation Delivery Office (UK) in 2012 to gauge the usefulness of SFBB found that 
businesses mentioned that SFBB enabled them to be compliant with food hygiene legislation. The 
report also revealed that 87% of SMEs reported that this food safety management system helped 
them manage their businesses, with 45% commenting that it actually made their businesses more 
profitable (Warren and Samuel 2012). 
2.5 Chapter Summary 
The term regulation has a wide range of definitions and is primarily considered as a policy 
instrument to promote economic and social wellbeing (Baldwin et al 2012). Regulation involves 
the intervention of government with the purpose of influencing or correcting the behaviour of 
individuals or industry. It is designed to solve a particular problem or produce a particular outcome 
which requires ongoing monitoring (Braithwaite 2011; Hutter and Bostock 2017).  
Economic theorists (Stigler 1971; Posner 1974; Peltzman 1976; Becker 1983) believe that there is 
an important place for theories of regulation which can be used to explain how and why 
governments regulate. Regulation is designed to either protect the public interest from adverse 
private activity or in the interests of private organisations protecting them against competition and 
consumers (den Hertog 2010, 2012). Government has a responsibility to develop regulation 
without unnecessary constraints but at the same time ensuring the safety and protection of society 
as publicised in reports by Hampton (2005), Better Regulation (2005) and Macrory (2006). 
In addition, two main approaches to regulation have been identified. The traditional command and 
control regulation tending toward legalism and seen as a rigid application of regulations. The more 
flexible risk based regulation (in the form of self-regulation and enforced self-regulation) is 
tailored towards the particular circumstances of individual organisations. The challenge for 
regulatory authorities is to develop regulatory approaches that address barriers that would not only 
prevent organisations from complying with the regulation but also assist enforcement agencies in 
their enforcement duties. There have been few empirical investigations on how regulation has 
impacted upon the statutory enforcement duties of EHPs and this study explores these issues in 
relation to inspection and the use of enforcement tools. Enforcement and compliance are therefore 
major elements of regulation and will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER THREE: REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT  
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses literature relating to regulatory enforcement of regulated organisations. It 
also addresses compliance, an important aspect of enforcement, outlining the reasons for 
compliance and non-compliance with examples being specific to the food industry. This chapter 
of the thesis also explores the enforcement tools available to EHPs and alternative options that 
could be included in a food law enforcement toolkit, namely civil sanctions. The chapter concludes 
with  
3.2 Regulatory Compliance 
According to Hutter (2011) compliance is an essential component of any piece of legislation with 
governments employing inspectors who make decisions to ensure organisations comply with the 
law. Regulatory compliance is seen as a process that organisations follow to ensure that they are 
conforming to a particular piece of legislation so that they will not be liable to sanctions (usually 
in the form of fines or imprisonment) for failure to comply (Black 2014; Gunningham 2015b; 
Bardach and Kagan 2017). 
3.2.1 Definitions of Compliance 
Scholarly literature on regulation defines compliance by focusing on the degree to which 
businesses or individuals obey the law (Parker and Nielsen 2011; Murphy 2017). 
Individuals/businesses need to operate within established parameters of the legislation so that they 
will not be punished (Parker and Nielsen 2011). In their empirical studies of small and medium 
sized enterprises (SMEs) Yapp and Fairman (2004) suggest that compliance has a different 
meaning to businesses and enforcement agencies with respect to food safety compliance. The 
authors noted that businesses thought they complied with legislation if they were “doing all they 
were told to at an inspection or advisory visit or other intervention”. They felt that the enforcement 
officer was responsible for compliance and they argued that the reason for this way of thinking is 
that enforcement officers are supposed to identify any contraventions in the legislation and notify 
the business of how they can take action to remedy the situation. Conversely, enforcement officials 
viewed compliance as a proactive and continual process and businesses should take responsibility 
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in complying with the law by being proactive rather than reactive, that is, not waiting for harm to 
be done before taking action (Braithwaite 2011; Black 2014; Hutter and Bostock 2017).  
Much of the literature explains compliance in terms of behaviour and attitude towards obedience 
to regulations.  
3.2.2 Compliance behaviour 
Parker and Nielsen (2011) noted that compliance refers to the behaviour and attitude of individuals 
and businesses towards regulation. They distinguish between objectivist and interpretivist 
approaches to compliance. Objectivist approaches to compliance “identify and explain how, why 
and in what circumstances individuals and firms comply with regulation, and when and why they 
do not” (Parker and Nielsen 2011 p3) and so this approach explains attitudes towards compliance. 
Interpretivists’ approaches to compliance explain how regulation is interpreted and understood. In 
this instance, compliance can refer to “meanings and interpretations, social habits and practices 
and interactions and communications between different actors in the implementation process” 
(Parker and Nielsen 2011 p3). 
Other researchers mainly conclude that businesses fall into one of three groups depending on their 
attitude toward compliance with legislation. Businesses are either amoral calculators, political 
citizens or organisationally incompetent (Kagan et al 2011; Murphy 2016). Economic/amoral 
actors are businesses that only comply with rules if it benefits them and are therefore motivated by 
profit (Kagan et al 2011). This economic perspective was first hypothesised by Becker (1968) who 
claimed that “firms will comply with the law only if the expected cost to them of the violation 
exceeds the benefit they derive from the violation” (Becker 1968 p172). In other words, such 
businesses will be discouraged from committing an offence if there is a likelihood of them being 
caught and punished with a severe penalty. Ogus and Abbot (2002) assert that such organisations 
know they are committing an offence but do it anyway if it will benefit them. This view is also 
supported by other scholars including Faure et al (2009 p163) who propose that “individuals and 
firms can be induced to comply with the law if their (expected) costs of contravening the law 
exceeds the benefits to them”. Parker and Neilsen (2011) also state that the use of formal or 
informal sanctions to punish non-compliance are not effective if businesses think they will greatly 
gain from their non-compliance.  However, Tombs (2016) argue that since all organisations are in 
business to make profit anyway then they will always be amoral calculators who only comply with 
Chapter 3 Regulatory Enforcement 
 
42 
 
regulatory requirements when they know the penalties are very harsh. One of the first such studies 
on compliance by Makkai and Braithwaite (1991) alluded to the fact that the perceived risk of 
getting caught leads to compliant behaviour. A later study by Ko et al (2010) found a reduction in 
health and safety offences in those organisations that previously been punished.  
The second group, political citizens, are businesses that are inclined to comply with legislation but 
will violate the law if they do not agree with it because they consider the law to be unreasonable 
(too legalistic) or a burden (Bardach and Kagan 2017). Bardach and Kagan (2017) conducted 
interviews with businesses to get their views on environmental and occupational health and safety 
regulation. They drew attention to the fact that when the businesses perceived that the regulation 
was legalistic, the businesses would only make the effort to achieve the minimum level of 
compliance and not be bothered to put in more effort to ‘over comply’.   
Finally, the third group are incompetent organisations. These are businesses that are willing to 
comply but are not equipped to do so primarily due to ignorance, inadequate knowledge and 
awareness of how to comply with legislative requirements (Yapp and Fairman 2005a). Empirical 
research by Yapp and Fairman (2006) found that small-medium enterprises (SMEs) within the 
food industry were vulnerable to several factors that prevented non-compliance with food 
legislation, one of which was lack of knowledge and understanding. Cartwright (2012 p9) calls 
this incompetence “organisational failure rather than calculated wrongdoing”. This means that 
because people are ignorant or oblivious to the laws they break the rules without realising it (Parker 
and Nielsen 2011). In other contexts, commentators have sought to divide businesses into similar 
categories. For example, Baldwin (2014) separated businesses into the categories of: well-
intentioned and well informed; well-intentioned and ill-informed; ill-intentioned and ill-informed, 
and problematic with respect to compliance with health and safety law.  
Enforcement officials need to correctly identify amoral calculation, incompetent management and 
political citizenship. If they mistake an incompetent manager for an amoral calculator, their efforts 
to improve compliance may result in frustration (Kagan et al 2011). This means that enforcement 
officials need to make the appropriate decision in order to deal with non-compliance based on the 
offence but also the attitude of the business. This study builds on the existing literature to determine 
whether EHPs are provided with suitable and efficient enforcement tools to handle the wide range 
of food business with different attitudes and behaviour towards the law.   
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Furthermore, Kagan et al (2011) proposes that regulated businesses are motivated to comply based 
on three basic fears. These fears proposed by Kagan et al (2011) are documented in the literature 
as motivations of compliance (namely calculated, normative and social) and are somewhat aligned 
with the type of attitude a business has towards compliance. The first type of fear is the fear of 
being caught and punished. This could be regarded as calculated motivation when organisations 
believe they can benefit from non-compliance with the law if they can avoid being caught and 
fined and is therefore similar to those businesses regarded as amoral calculators. Calculated 
motivation is based on three related theories: the likelihood of detection, the likelihood of a fine 
and the cost of compliance. There is an increase in compliance if it is thought that contraventions 
would be detected (Van Wingerde 2011). However, the empirical research on regulatory 
compliance is contradictory. Ko et al (2010) found a reduction in health and safety offences in 
those organisations that previously been punished. They concluded that severe punishment 
increases fear among businesses and so increases the likelihood of them investing in ways to 
comply with the law. On the other hand, Parker and Neilsen (2011) in their study of businesses in 
Australia found no evidence that increasing fear of penalties will significantly increase 
compliance. Nevertheless, some research studies have demonstrated that the size of the penalty 
has little impact on whether businesses comply or not (Thornton et al 2005; Gray and Shimshack 
2011; Simpson et al 2013).  
Secondly, the fear of gaining a bad reputation. This has been labelled as social motivation in that 
those being regulated desire approval and respect from those people they associate with, for 
example, other regulated entities, the general public and inspectors (Cartwright 2012). Kagan et al 
(2011) suggest that such businesses are unaffected by threats of severe penalties but rather negative 
publicity is considered more terrifying to these businesses because it affects their reputation. 
Supporting this assumption, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) carried out a study in 2010 and 
concluded that both large and small businesses are affected by adverse publicity which can result 
in alienation of customers and therefore loss of business (OFT 2010). Similarly, Mensah and 
Juliene (2011) revealed that 85% of the respondents enjoyed the benefit of increased customer 
satisfaction due to compliance with food safety regulations.  
Finally, fear of a bad conscience, that is, a sense of duty to comply and beliefs about what 
businesses consider to be right and wrong. This is also called normative motivation (Tyler 2006; 
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Murphy et al 2016). Murphy (2017) describes such people as moral actors because they are 
motivated to comply with the law because they want to do the right thing rather than the fear of 
being caught and punished. Using data from 113 paper and pulp mills, an earlier study by Gray 
and Shadbegian (2005, Gray et al 2014) observed that each facility was inspected for pollution 
offences once a year on average. Their results showed that only 16 per cent of these businesses 
where found to be non-compliant with the regulations showing that most businesses are compliant 
even in lieu of infrequent inspections and very harsh legal penalties (Gray and Shadbegian 2005, 
Gray et al 2014). A later study conducted by Borck and Coglianese (2011) reported that some 
businesses go beyond compliance even though they are not required to do so. Kaine et al (2010) 
state that regulations are meant to encourage a change in behaviour and is used as an indication 
that governments have achieved their policy objectives. They also assert that if regulations are to 
be a success then compliance with the regulations is crucial.  
An alternative perspective to understand why people comply with the law has been recognised as 
procedural justice (Murphy et al 2009). Murphy (2014) suggests that such a theory explains 
compliance with the law even if there is little chance of being caught. Several authors have 
concluded that this theory is based on the fact that if those responsible for enforcing the law operate 
in a fair, respectful and dignified manner, then they will be seen as morally upright and deserving 
to be obeyed (Murphy et al 2009; Jackson et al 2012). An early study by Makkai and Braithwaite 
(1994) revealed that nursing home managers were more likely to comply with regulatory standards 
if they felt nursing home inspectors had previously treated them with procedural justice. Those 
managers who felt that inspectors had used heavy-handed deterrence threats were less compliant 
in a follow-up inspection. Murphy (2017) also agrees that the treatment individuals receive from 
an enforcing authority has some bearing on compliance. She states that the criteria used to define 
procedural justice include respect (respectful towards individuals when enforcing the law), 
neutrality (being fair and not biased but treating everybody the same), trustworthiness (the 
enforcement official shows genuine care and is sensitive to the needs of individuals) and voice (the 
enforcing authority gives individuals the opportunity to express their views and concerns in 
relation to any enforcement decision).  
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3.3 Regulatory Enforcement 
Regulatory enforcement refers to the way in which regulators relate with regulated entities in order 
to get them to comply with the law (McAllister 2010; Gunningham 2015a).  A regulatory 
framework needs to be developed in a way that makes enforcement effective to enable businesses 
and individuals to comply (OECD 2010). Therefore, enforcement and compliance are important 
elements of any regulatory framework and failure to enforce laws can lead to a lack of credibility 
regarding these laws. This is because even minor legal activity needs to be controlled otherwise 
businesses or individuals could become immune to the law making it ineffective in achieving its 
purpose (Gunningham 2015a).  
Much of the regulatory literature reports that enforcement officials can generally choose between 
two different enforcement strategies: deterrence, and advice and persuade (often referred to as 
compliance strategy) (Gunningham 2015b). These strategies often translate into the enforcement 
style used by enforcement officers. May and Winter (2000 p145) define enforcement style as the 
“character of the day-to-day interactions of inspectors when dealing with regulated entities”. 
Thus, with regards to enforcement strategies, EHPs will either adopt a legalistic (the use of 
punishment for non-compliance) or conciliatory (using education and advice or persuasion and 
negotiation) style (McAllister 2010). 
3.3.1 Deterrence Strategies 
This enforcement strategy emphasises the use of harsh punishment for contraventions of the law 
in order to deter offenders from further rule-breaking behaviour (Tyler 2011). The 
penalty/punishment must be such that it is not economically feasible to defy the law (Braithwaite 
2018). Literature makes a distinction between general deterrence and specific deterrence. General 
deterrence is based on the belief that businesses will be discouraged from breaking the law if they 
are aware that other businesses have been harshly dealt with (Parker and Nielsen 2011). 
Gunningham (2015b) revealed that sanctions against other businesses serves as a reminder to 
businesses that they must review their own compliance status. It also has a reassurance function to 
voluntary compliant businesses in that those other businesses who try to deceive enforcement 
officers will not get away with it. With regards to specific deterrence, it is thought that a business 
which has previously been punished will make an effort to avoid further punishment due to non-
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compliance, that is, they will not break the law in order to avoid future penalties (Braithwaite 
2018).  
The literature has highlighted various problems that deterrence strategy can present with respect 
to enforcement policy and practice. One such problem is that regular inspections are required so 
that those being regulated know they are under constant scrutiny and so will not be able to hide 
their non-compliance. Another challenge for regulators is ensuring that punishment for non-
compliance will be a deterrent feared by regulated businesses. Effective penalties are an essential 
last resort mechanism to ensure compliance and therefore consumer confidence in the food supply 
chain (Braithwaite 2011, 2018). However, Kagan et al (2011 p41) point out that “an overzealous 
use of deterrent approaches can foster resentment and retaliation leading regulated groups to 
refuse cooperation or apply political pressure to reduce enforcement”. Such resentment can also 
be caused by an unfair punishment given and so the businesses will become uncooperative in the 
future.   
Punitive measures are meant to deter illegal behaviour by sending a strong signal to others who 
want to break the law. This style of enforcement secures against regulatory capture so that 
enforcement officials are not manipulated by the organisations they are regulating (Oded 2010; 
Rechtschaffen 2011). Moreover, according to Braithwaite (2011), it makes sense to resort to a 
more punitive enforcement style when a persuasive style of enforcement has already been tried. 
By punishing non-compliance in a severe way, such punishment is intended to discourage 
prospective offenders from contravening the law, thus making compliance with the regulations 
becoming the norm (Hutter and Bostock 2017).  Enforcement policy and practice must send a 
signal to those being regulated that the regulator is fair but tough. Ineffective enforcement will 
encourage non-compliance (Parker and Nielsen 2011).  In other words, enforcement authorities 
should prevent non-compliance by ensuring the benefits to be obtained through noncompliance 
are much lower than those obtained through compliance. This can be probably be achieved by 
frequent inspections to regularly detect non-compliance and harsher penalties (Gunningham et al 
2017).  
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3.3.2 Compliance Strategies 
Compliance strategies are more lenient in nature compared with deterrence strategies. These 
strategies are concerned with advising and persuading businesses to comply rather than 
confrontation and conflict (Parker and Nielsen 2011). According to Gunningham (2015b) 
bargaining and negotiation are the characteristics of a compliance strategy. With this type of 
compliance strategy, the enforcement official will adopt a co-operative/accommodative style of 
enforcement.  
The co-operative/accommodative style of enforcement aims to prevent contraventions and secure 
long term compliance by persuasion, negotiation, bargaining and education (Amodu and Hutter 
2008). Jacobs and Cordova (2005) argue that no regulatory system can operate through fear and 
coercion and the enforcing officer can improve compliance through building a relationship with 
businesses. A study carried out by Yapp and Fairman (2005b) describes this style of enforcement 
as informal in that enforcement officials do not use formal legal methods to secure compliance. 
Instead they use education, negotiation and persuasion as opposed to threat or coercion. It has been 
reported by Braithwaite et al (2011) that inspectors use this style of enforcement for incompetent 
organisations as they sympathise with the difficulties such businesses may be facing in an attempt 
to comply with regulations and so offer advice and are less willing to issue threats of prosecution. 
Enforcers work closely with those they regulate and act more as educators and consultants as 
opposed to issuing threats and intimidation (Bukowski et al 2012). A growing body of literature 
has investigated this topic and claim cooperative enforcement strategies are more effective than 
strategies that rely solely on deterrence or threats of prosecution (Bardach and Kagan 2017). 
Braithwaite (2002, 2018) also observed that if there is not a threat of formal enforcement there will 
be a reduction in compliance. Advocates of the conciliatory approach also argue that prosecution 
of every trivial offence is counterproductive because it puts the business on the defensive and 
destroys any possibilities of co-operation or open communication about compliance problems 
between the business and the inspector (Bardach and Kagan 2017). A flexible enforcement style 
may signal a more business friendly regulatory climate. They further contend that the cost of 
prosecuting every offence which inspectors find would be a waste of scarce resources and 
enforcement agencies should conserve its limited resources to prosecute the most serious 
offenders. In addition, there is evidence to suggest that cooperative enforcement approaches 
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increase compliance (Earnhart and Glicksman 2015). Murphy (2014, 2017) and Braithwaite (2018) 
further argue that how people are treated by regulatory authorities can change their motivational 
postures in either a positive or negative manner. This has been referred to as procedural justice 
which was discussed in the previous section. 
However, Gunningham (2015b) points out that adopting only a compliance based strategy to 
enforcement can lead to permissiveness on the part of the enforcement officer with serious offences 
going unpunished. He suggests that more compliant businesses will consider their time and effort 
and resources into complying with the law a waste of time when other businesses are getting away 
with regulatory offences. Furthermore, while this approach can be highly beneficial, it raises an 
important concern regarding ‘regulatory capture’ in that inspectors may be more compassionate 
towards such businesses and be willing to overlook offences (Carpenter and Moss 2013). 
Regulatory capture can therefore weaken any subsequent enforcement actions of the enforcing 
officer (Carpenter and Moss 2013). This view is also shared by May and Winter (2000) who claim 
inspectors can exhibit retreatist enforcement behaviour in that they prefer to avoid conflict with 
regulated entities and work out problems through informal means. Enforcement officials can 
become intimidated by political authorities sympathetic to the regulated industry and so fail to 
punish practices that are a risk to the public (McAllister 2010). McAllister (2010) suggests that 
this could be because they lack leadership or legal power. In addition, they may be corrupt or have 
been captured by those they are regulating in that these enforcement officials are sympathetic to 
the regulated industry. It also could also be that enforcement officials themselves have a negative 
view of the law they enforce.  
According to Baldwin et al (2012) and Gunningham (2015b) neither compliance nor deterrence 
has proved effective or efficient enforcement strategies and there has been some debate in literature 
about which strategy achieves the best results in terms of compliance with legislation. The 
evidence suggests that a compliance strategy, whilst valuable in encouraging and facilitating those 
willing to comply with the law to do so, may prove disastrous for those unwilling to comply with 
the law. Deterrence on the other hand, is important to remind businesses that they will be punished 
for non-compliance, but its impact varies (Murphy et al 2016; Braithwaite 2018). For example, 
Parker and Neilsen (2011, 2017) suggests that deterrence is more effective against small 
organisations than large organisations and better at influencing knowledgeable businesses than 
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incompetent organisations. Unfortunately, it can actually prove counterproductive and regulatory 
resistance may develop in that the business will become unwillingly to work with the enforcer, 
withholding information for fear that this information will be used against them in a court of law 
(Braithwaite 2017). However, compliance and deterrence strategies have limitations when used by 
themselves. Some regulatory scholars argue that a mix of the two strategies is likely to be the 
optimal regulatory strategy as regulators need to deter persistent offenders, encourage honest 
businesses to comply and reward those who go beyond compliance (Gunningham 2015b; Knox et 
al 2016; Murphy and Neilsen 2017).  
It becomes apparent for this study to understand how EHPs view the legislation they enforce in 
order to recommend ways to enhance its implementation. Early literature did not engage with 
EHPs with respect to their enforcement style and there are few studies in current literature that 
investigates the enforcement style EHPs adopt in their selection of regulatory interventions and 
enforcement action and how this impacts on compliance levels of food businesses (Yapp and 
Fairman 2005b, 2006; Bukowski et al 2012). This study provides an opportunity to advance the 
knowledge of the enforcement style of EHPs with respect to the enforcement tools that are 
currently available to them. The findings make an important contribution to the field of food law 
enforcement in that it explores aspects such as gender identity, race and level of experience that 
have not been discussed in the literature. 
A spectrum of enforcement styles was conceived by Kagan in 1994 and summarised in Figure 1 
below. 
Figure 3.1: Enforcement Styles from Retreatism to Legalism. 
Retreatist → Conciliatory → Flexible →Perfunctory →Legalistic 
An enforcement official that portrays a conciliatory style of enforcement uses education and advice 
as an enforcement tool. The flexible style of enforcement refers to situations where officials do 
not adopt threatening behaviour when enforcing regulations. Officials that exhibit a perfunctory 
style of enforcement carry out their duties rather mechanically. Legalistic officials enforce 
regulations in an authoritarian (rigid) manner and are quick to punish offenders for non-compliance 
(Bardach and Kagan 2017).  
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Buckley (2015) is of the opinion that regulatory outcomes are shaped by the approach taken by the 
of the enforcement official to implement the legislation in question. Such approaches can bring 
about different outcomes depending on the situation or it could be that the same approach can be 
used in the same situation but bring about different outcomes. For example, inspectors might 
interpret legislative requirements flexibly by providing information that assists businesses, or more 
rigidly by being authoritative in their manner (Gunningham 2015a,b; Murphy 2017; Braithwaite 
2017, 2018) reported that when there is a co-operative approach between enforcement officials 
and those they are regulating, there is an improvement in compliance. Furthermore, Gray and 
Silbey (2014) provide evidence to suggest that organisations identify enforcement officials as a 
threat, an ally or as an obstacle.  They believe that organisations view the enforcement official as 
a threat when they (the organisation) are opposed to government regulation and are of the opinion 
that the enforcement official is only looking for evidence of non-compliance and disinterested in 
the operation of the organisation. Furthermore, enforcement officials as an ally to the organisation 
means that both parties are willing to work together in order for the organisation to achieve 
compliance with the legislation. Organisations regard the enforcement official as an obstacle when 
they have insufficient knowledge about the operational procedures within the organisation. 
Enforcement officers therefore have to adopt different responsive enforcement strategies 
depending on the type of business they are dealing with and their response to compliance (Black 
2014; Braithwaite 2017). Early work by Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) adopted an enforcement 
pyramid as a way of resolving the challenge of dealing with varied compliance.  
3.3.3 Enforcement Pyramid 
An enforcement pyramid (Figure 2) was developed by Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) based on the 
assumption that food law enforcement operates a graduated approach. The different levels in the 
pyramid represent the different enforcement actions (graduated enforcement response). The 
enforcement actions increases in severity with harsher (punitive, coercive, legalistic, sanctioning 
or deterrence) tools at the top of the pyramid and the more lenient strategies (co-operative or 
accommodative, flexible or conciliatory) at the base of the pyramid. Ayres & Braithwaite (1992, 
2017) argue that pyramidal enforcement strategies work best when the measures at the top of the 
pyramid are truly feared.  
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Figure 3.2: The Enforcement Pyramid  
 
Source: Ayres and Braithwaite 1992 
The enforcement pyramid offers a solution to the problem of how to choose between a persuasive 
and a punitive enforcement style (Mascini 2013; Braithwaite 2017). The theory behind the 
enforcement pyramid is that enforcement officials start with persuasive style of enforcement such 
as advice and education. This is considered a low cost activity and less intervention as the business 
attempts to stop problems cheaply and voluntarily, taking responsibility for their actions of non-
compliance. This is mainly used for businesses that genuinely want to comply with the law 
(Braithwaite 2017). If this does not work because either the business does not co-operate and/or 
the contravention will cause harm, then the enforcement officer moves to the next level on the 
pyramid (Braithwaite 2017). Prosecution is the highest sanction and considered a high cost 
activity.  When those being regulated become willing to cooperate, regulators should, according 
to Ayres and Braithwaite, “be able to forgive a history of wrongdoing and de-escalate down the 
pyramid to less harsh enforcement” (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992 p33). Mild administrative 
sanctions are positioned in the middle of the pyramid. The enforcement pyramid is one of the ways 
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in which responsive regulation is applied, that is, for example, the enforcement authority being 
responsive to the businesses they are regulating.  
Braithwaite (2011 p484) attributes responsive regulation’s influence directly to the enforcement 
pyramid: “responsive regulation has been an influential policy idea because it formulated a way 
of reconciling the clear empirical evidence that sometimes punishment works and sometimes it 
backfires, and likewise with persuasion”. Braithwaite (2011, 2017) assumes that the enforcement 
pyramid has been effective because it has offered a theoretically sound practical means for 
choosing between both enforcement styles. However, Mascini (2013) argues that it is doubtful 
whether the enforcement pyramid has solved all practical and theoretical problems with regards to 
the choice of enforcement style in that the enforcement pyramid has significant limitations. For 
example, some enforcement officers may only use enforcement tools at the bottom of the pyramid, 
whilst some will make regular use of those tools at the top and will not use the tools in the middle 
of the pyramid. As a result, there is no gradual escalation and enforcement inspectors therefore use 
their discretion in order to adapt their enforcement style to the willingness and capacity of 
businesses to comply (Gunningham 2011, 2015a). In addition, adverse publicity is excluded from 
the pyramid as it is considered a more effective deterrent than prosecution (Murphy 2017). 
3.3.4 Food law enforcement (enforcement options available to EHPs)  
Food law enforcement is essentially at local level, with environmental health departments of Local 
Authorities (LAs) being the enforcement body (Middleton 2017). LA’s employ Environmental 
Health Officers and Food Safety Officers/Technicians, collectively known as Environmental 
Health Practitioners (EHPs) as the key professionals responsible for monitoring the hygienic 
operation of food businesses and assessing compliance with food safety legislation (Mortimore 
and Wallace 2013; Wallace et al 2018). EHPs have discretion with the type of enforcement they 
can choose in order to get food businesses to comply. 
Regulatory agencies such as Environmental Health Departments are equipped with a range of 
enforcement tools (toolkit) to deal with non-compliance and inhibit unacceptable and inappropriate 
behaviour (Middleton 2017; FSA 2017). The majority of non-compliance is identified during the 
inspection (other ways for identifying non-compliance is via complaints or food poisoning 
outbreak).  There are different enforcement strategies that EHPs use to encourage food businesses 
to comply with food legislation, for example, informal warning letters (if compliance is achieved, 
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no further enforcement action needs to be taken) and more formal actions such as the service of 
statutory notices and as a last resort, prosecution. Table 3.1 provides an illustration of the 
enforcement options available to EHPs: 
Table 3.1 Enforcement Options available to EHPs 
 
Statutory Provision 
 
Enforcement Tool 
 
Details 
Food Hygiene (England) 
Regulations 2013 Regulation 6 
 
Food Safety Act 1990 Section 10 
Hygiene Improvement 
Notice 
Hygiene Improvement Notice Inspectors 
can also issue improvement notices when 
non-compliance is detected but does not 
necessarily impose an immediate risk to 
health and safety. These notices usually 
include actions the business must take in 
order to rectify the workplace situation 
and within a specified time. 
Food Hygiene (England) 
Regulations 2013 Regulation 7  
 
Food Safety Act 1990 Section 11 
Hygiene Prohibition 
Notice 
Hygiene Prohibition Notice. This is 
issued by inspectors when an immediate 
risk to health and safety is detected in a 
workplace and a cessation of an activity 
is deemed necessary. The notice may 
include directions on how the business 
can remedy the risk and that activity can 
resume once that action has occurred. 
Food Hygiene (England) 
Regulations 2013 Regulation 8 
 
Food Safety Act 1990 Section 12 
Hygiene Emergency 
Prohibition Notice 
Hygiene Emergency Prohibition Notice 
Issued when there is an imminent risk of 
injury to health. The effect of the notice is 
to close the business immediately or 
prevent the use of equipment or process. 
Food Hygiene (England) 
Regulations 2013 Regulation 10 
 
Detention Notices Detention 
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Food Safety Act 1990 Section 9 Food which does not satisfy the legal 
requirements is seized and detained 
pending further investigation. 
Food Hygiene (England) 
Regulations 2013 Regulation 9 
 
 
Remedial Action 
Notices 
A RAN initially applied only to premises 
approved under EC Regulation 853/2004 
which include premises handling 
products of animal origin (POAO). 
However, in 2012, amendments to the 
domestic hygiene legislation in Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland extended the 
scope of RANs into premises that are 
registered under Regulation 852/2004 
which are premises that do not require 
approval. There is no such scope in 
England. 
A RAN may be served to:  
- prohibit the use of any equipment or any 
part of the establishment  
- impose conditions upon or prohibit the 
carrying out of any process; or  
- require the rate of operation to be 
reduced or to be stopped completely.  
Code for Crown Prosecutors 
 
Local Authority Enforcement 
Policy 
Prosecution A business can be prosecuted when a 
serious alleged breach has occurred. The 
outcome of these court proceedings could 
be monetary fines and/imprisonment 
Source: Food Law Code of Practice 2017 
The Food Law Code of Practice (2017) states that LAs should ensure that any enforcement action 
taken be aligned with the principles outlined in the Hampton Report (2005). The range of 
enforcement options available to EHPs when enforcing food law include: 
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 Educating food business operators; 
 Giving advice; 
 Informal action; 
 Sampling; 
 Detaining and seizing food; 
 Serving Hygiene Improvement Notices/Improvement Notices; 
 Hygiene Prohibition Procedures/Prohibition Procedures and 
 Prosecution procedures. 
(Food Law Code of Practice 2017) 
The enforcement action taken depends on the type of contravention, the compliance history of the 
business/food business operator and the behaviour/attitude of the food business operator with 
regards to compliance with the legislation (Food Law Code of Practice 2017). Successful 
enforcement of the regulations depends on the ability of regulated businesses to comply and obey 
the law. Within the context of food law enforcement, inspections are crucial because they are a 
form of control in order to implement and enforce regulations and this will be discussed in the next 
section (Filion and Powell 2009, 2011; Läikkö-Roto et al 2015; Buckley 2016; Nayak and Taylor 
2018).  
3.3.5 Regulatory Inspections  
According to the OECD (2015) inspections are one of the most important ways to enforce 
regulations and improve the effectiveness of enforcement practices and therefore ensure regulatory 
compliance. Jacobs and Cordova (2005 p6) define an inspection “as a method of intervention that 
is used when regulations are implemented in order to bring about compliance and reduce non-
compliance”. Mouchtouri et al (2010 p122) also state that “inspections are applied in various 
fields of human activity, where standards and rules have been set, such as health and safety, 
engineering and environmental health. An inspection is a procedure conducted in order to examine 
establishments, processes, products, systems and records. Overall, it aims at assessing conditions 
and operations in relation to specific standards”.  
An inspection is therefore considered the primary method for identifying and correcting unsafe 
food handling procedures and practices in food businesses (Reske et al 2007; Powell et al 2013). 
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It is thought to be a fundamental aspect of public health service since it is necessary to ensure the 
safety of food in order to prevent foodborne illnesses among consumers (Hoag et al 2007; Reske 
et al 2007). A food hygiene inspection therefore verifies if minimum standards in relation to 
general food handling, employee hygiene, temperature control, cross contamination of food items, 
cleaning and disinfection, pest control  and removal of waste, are being maintained (Yeager et al 
2013). Powell et al (2013) state that food safety audits and inspections are one activity used to 
verify that a food producer or individual is following specific guidelines, requirements or rules.  
Despite its prominence as a primary tool to monitor good hygiene and food preparation practices 
within food businesses, some studies have shown that inspections are ineffective in identifying 
food businesses that are likely to cause food poisoning, although such research has been 
inconclusive (Jin and Leslie 2003, 2009; Reske et al 2007; Filion and Powell 2009; Salis et al 
2015; Nayak and Waterson 2016). Burke et al (2011) argue that such conflicting outcomes imply 
inspections alone appear to be inadequate to prevent food poisoning outbreaks to occur in food 
businesses. Waters et al (2013) also argue that inspections must not be effective because foodborne 
illness outbreaks continue to occur and government inspectors have failed to prevent foodborne 
illness outbreaks. Following the E.coli outbreak in Wales, a number of mistakes and shortcomings 
by environmental health officers were identified (Pennington 2009, 2014). 
 
Inspections can be announced or unannounced. Both announced and unannounced inspections are 
a form of monitoring and evaluation. However, announced inspections require prior scheduling, 
whereas unannounced inspections do not (Klerks et al 2013). According to Klerks et al (2013) the 
announcing of inspections is derived from the relationship between the enforcing official and the 
organisation which is based on co-operation and trust. Unannounced inspections, on the other 
hand, suggests that there is little trust between the enforcing official and the organisation in which 
the enforcing official wants to expose regulatory deficiencies within an organisation. There are 
mixed views as to which approach is more effective. An early study by Reske et al (2007) 
concluded that announced inspections are more effective in improving food safety in restaurants. 
Waters et al (2013) also supports the idea that announced inspections result in fewer 
contraventions in food safety practices compared to when inspections are unannounced. However, 
Dechenaux and Samuel (2014) claim that unannounced inspections can be more effective than 
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announced inspections enabling regulators (and enforcement officers) to make a better 
assessment/judgment of food hygiene and safety operations within that food business. 
Environmental Health Practitioners (EHPs) in England have other regulatory interventions besides 
inspections, available to them. These are official controls (monitoring, surveillance, verification, 
audit, sampling for analysis) and non-official controls (advice, education/training, intelligence 
gathering and sampling). Inspection is classed as an official control and also includes partial 
inspection which only covers certain elements of an inspection (Food Law COP 2017).   
The Food Law COP defines interventions as “activities that are designed to monitor, support and 
increase food law compliance within a food establishment” (Food Law COP 2017 p69). 
Interventions used to improve compliance within food businesses and according to the Food Law 
COP (2017 p69) “should be applied in a risk based manner”. 
 Audit: EHPs examine the food safety management system of a business to ensure that they 
are operating in the way they should. 
 Monitoring: EHPs observe the way in which a food business complies with the law. 
 Surveillance: EHPs observe food businesses and their activities. 
 Verification: EHPs check to see if requirements have been fulfilled. 
 Sampling: EHPs can take food, equipment etc. for microbiological analysis. 
 Advice, education/training: EHPs provide food businesses with the information that they 
need in order to comply with the legislation. 
 Intelligence gathering: EHPs gather information to find out more about a food business via 
questionnaires for example. 
(Bukowski et al 2012; Food Law COP 2017) 
Building on the research by Bukowski et al (2012) who investigated how enforcement officers 
select regulatory interventions and enforcement action and how this impacts on the compliance 
levels of food businesses, this study provides more insight into the demographic characteristics of 
the enforcement officers and their use of regulatory interventions and enforcement tools. 
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3.3.6 Regulatory Risk Assessment /Food Hygiene Rating Scheme  
The Hampton Report (2005) stated the importance of a risk assessment as a way of focussing 
resources so that enforcement authorities do not carry out unnecessary inspections, devoting their 
time and energy into prioritising inspections in businesses that are considered high risk. The Food 
Hygiene Ratings Scheme is an example of regulatory risk assessment and is an initiative of the 
Food Standards Agency. It is a national scheme operating in the UK and provides consumers with 
information about the hygiene standards within food businesses (Vegaris 2015; Spencer and 
Young 2015; Draper 2016; Nayak and Taylor 2018; FSA 2017). The rating score given reflects 
the findings of an inspection carried out by EHPs (Vegaris 2015).  EHPs use a risk based approach 
to plan inspections. Premises that pose a highest risk are inspected most frequently, while those 
businesses that do not pose such high risks are inspected less frequently. The frequency of Local 
Authority (LA) inspections is driven by the use of a risk assessment model which is set out by the 
FSA in the Food Law Code of Practice (COP) 2017.  
The risk factors of the FHRS used to calculate the rating score are: level of (current) compliance 
with food hygiene and safety procedures (including food handling practices and procedures, and 
temperature control and the measures taken to prevent food from becoming contaminated with 
food poisoning bacteria); level of (current) compliance with structural requirements (including 
cleanliness, layout, condition of structure, lighting, ventilation, facilities etc.); serving vulnerable 
clientele; and confidence in management/control procedures which is how the business manages 
and records what is being done to ensure food that is being prepared and sold is safe for human 
consumption. Each risk factor is given a score depending on the risk level of the business. The 
total of these scores determine the frequency of inspection which can be between 6 months and 5 
years. In addition there are six different food hygiene rating scores from a score of 0 (lowest score) 
up to a score of 5 (highest score) (Food Law COP 2017). Food businesses receive a score based 
on the degree of compliance with the food safety regulations (Da Cunha et al 2016).  The FHRS 
was adopted to ensure better allocation of resources in that higher risk businesses are inspected 
more frequently. However, visiting high risk businesses more frequently must not be at the expense 
of the quality and consistency of inspection according to Vegeris (2015). This national scheme 
currently operates on a voluntary disclosure system in England and Northern Ireland although 
businesses are encouraged to display these stickers/certificates. In Scotland and Wales it is a 
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statutory requirement for businesses to display a sticker with their rating at their premises (Vegaris 
2015; Draper 2016; Jones 2018).   
The purpose of the FHRS is twofold: firstly, consumers can make choices about where they eat 
and secondly, it encourage businesses to improve their hygiene standards which can subsequently 
reduce the incidence of food poisoning illness and outbreaks (Filion and Powell 2011; Vegaris 
2015; Draper 2016; Nayak and Taylor 2018; FSA 2017).  The FHRS can be considered an 
incentive for compliance for food businesses since consumers will be patronising them based on 
their inspection score (Nayak and Waterson 2017; Nayak and Taylor 2018). An early study by Jin 
and Leslie (2003) show that customers are directed towards establishments with higher hygiene 
scores compared to lower scoring premises. Furthermore studies by Lee (2013) and Choi et al 
(2013), consumers rely heavily on the publication of risk rating results when choosing where to 
eat. It is reported by Ho (2012), Choi and Scharff (2017), Harris et al (2017) and Dai et al (2019) 
infer that consumers will not dine at an establishment with a poor inspection rating.  Subsequently, 
according to Fleetwood et al (2019) a high food rating score (and therefore improved hygiene 
practices) also serves as an economic incentive for food establishments.  
However, previous studies surrounding the impact of the food hygiene rating score on food 
poisoning remain inconclusive. A study Ho (2012) examined data from over 700,000 inspections 
in San Diego and New York, primarily focusing on the inspection grades. He concluded that there 
is a lack of consistency and a high score does not necessarily equate to future high hygiene 
standards. In addition, the implementation of such disclosure systems have not cause a reduction 
in food poisoning outbreaks in New York. Similarly, a study by Vegaris (2015) to assess the 
incidence of foodborne illness in local authorities that were operating the FHRS compared to local 
authorities that were not operating the scheme also revealed that there was no evidence to link the 
operation of the FHRS and a reduction in reported food poisoning cases in England and Wales. 
Similarly, it emerged from findings by Jones et al (2017) that a poor food hygiene inspection score 
does not predict a foodborne outbreak. However, da Cunha et al (2016), Fleetwood et al (2019), 
Alvseike et al (2019) convey contradictory results where they conclude that there is a link between 
outbreaks of foodborne illness and low food hygiene inspection scores. 
The FHRS also acts as a reputational tool intended to reassure consumers of that the hygienic 
practices of food businesses are being monitored (Vegeris 2015; da Cunha et al 2016; Jones et al 
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2017). Cartwright (2012) states that the loss of reputation of a business is important. There is a 
fear that if this reputation is lost then it will have a detrimental effect on a business in terms of 
business profits. Thornton et al (2011), Seo et al (2015) and Harris et al (2017) believe that bad 
publicity is feared over monetary penalties and is therefore seen as an important reason for 
businesses to comply. Cartwright (2012) also agrees that the size of the sanction or penalty for 
non-compliance has limited impact upon compliance rates. Hutter and Amodu (2008) assert that 
the use of informal sanctioning such as embarrassment and shame can be strong motivators for 
compliance. Research by Ipsos MORI in 2010 found the threat of adverse publicity to be crucial 
in motivating compliance, noting that that 89% of respondents agreed that the threat of adverse 
publicity is just as important as any financial penalty. Cartwright (2012) also uses the argument 
that adverse publicity can be an effective regulatory sanction as well as playing a crucial role in 
assisting consumers to make choices about where they eat. Negative publicity is taken more 
seriously and has a considerable impact on the way in which consumers make decisions about 
patronising a particular food business (Seo et al 2015; Choi and Scharff 2017; Dai et al 2019).  
Conversely, Coffee (2007) contests the claim that adverse publicity is an important enforcement 
tool. He states that “adverse publicity may operate disproportionately as a penalty because it is 
difficult to control …..because…. its exact impact cannot be reliably estimated nor is it 
controllable so that only the guilty are affected” (Coffee 2007 p5).  Whitman (2011) also agrees 
with this assumption and claims that “too much enforcement power is being unleased on a fickle 
and uncontrolled general populace” (Whitman 2010 p21).  The Better Regulation Task Force 
(BRTF) also raised concerns about the potential for adverse publicity to operate unfairly. They 
raise concern about the use of the internet which they say be used to spread rumours which could 
damage to the reputation of a business and state that businesses can be subjected to a form of 
“brand assassination” (BRTF 2010). 
Another point of concern is the use of scoring systems as a mechanism to provide food safety 
related information is controversial. Jones et al (2008) and da Cunha et al (2016) suggest risk 
assessment methods adopted by EHPs may be ineffective because the assessment is subjective and 
it is reliant on the inspector’s ability to determine the presence of hazards. This is because the 
assessment of risk is based on the correct identification of hazards and the correct appraisal of their 
significance (Green and Kane 2014; Nayak and Taylor 2018). Potential inconsistencies may arise 
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from the subjectivity between different officers as well as between different local authorities 
(Almanza 2012). Baldwin and Black (2010) note that these scoring systems are qualitative in their 
assessment but given a numeric score which is essentially quantitative since many systems exist 
to quantify results during inspection (Filion and Powell 2009). There is therefore a perception that 
enforcement of food law is inconsistent due to this flexible system (Hutter and Amodu 2008; Lee 
et al 2012). The irony is that it was introduced to prevent inconsistency.  
This study seeks to critically evaluate how EHPs perceive the FHRS in providing accurate and 
reliable inspection results both to the food business and the general public. Previous research has 
focused on assessing the effectiveness of such inspection disclosure systems with respect to food 
business compliance, the incidence of foodborne illness and level of training of food handlers (Ho 
2012; Da Cunha et al 2016; Choi and Scharff 2017; Harris et al 2017; Dai et al 2019; Fleetwood 
et al 2019). However, the current literature does not adequately address EHP perceptions of the 
scheme in terms of its practicality, that is, whether the risk factors and the associated scores of the 
FHRS adequately assesses the compliance of a food business.  
Different countries use different inspection systems and formats for reporting inspection results 
such as scores, grades, symbols, colours or description of violations. Examples of the different 
food disclosure systems used in different countries to evaluate and classify food establishments: 
In Brazil food establishments are graded using letters A, B, C and pending, where A is classified 
as low risk (Da Cunha et al 2016). In Los Angeles, USA, food establishments are given a score 
ranging from 0 to 100, where 100 points equates to good standards of hygiene. The grade 
designations are colour coded with green indicating good; yellow (acceptable) and red 
(poor/closure) (Ho 2012). In Newton, Massachusetts (USA), points are deducted depending on 
level of risk, using numbers and words to describe the inspection grade. A zero to 400 points scale 
is used, where 400 equates to no contraventions. There are also five grade designations: superior, 
excellent, fair, unacceptable, and failing (Sullivan 2017). 
Reports by Hampton (2005) and Macrory (2006) recommend that the enforcement toolkit of UK 
regulators needs to be extended. They suggested a more flexible system of civil sanctions be 
incorporated into any regulatory framework and these will be discussed in the next section. 
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3.4 Alternative Enforcement Toolkit: Civil Sanctions  
The Macrory report (2006) called for a range of civil sanctions, including financial penalties which 
can be imposed by a regulator without the need to go to court. Administrative/civil penalties are 
“penalties imposed by a regulator without the intervention of a court, although usually a right to 
appeal to court or similar independent tribunal” (Macrory 2006 p41). In the criminal process 
prosecution can be disproportionate with fines often small compared with the economic benefits 
of non-compliance. In addition, prosecution can be costly and time consuming for the LA. 
According to Hampton (2005) and Macrory (2006) the current sanctioning regimes have to rely 
on criminal prosecution when this may not be necessary in some cases. For example, minor 
repeated breaches such as a kitchen in a food business not having antibacterial soap for food 
handlers to wash their hands. They also suggested that regulatory powers are ineffective 
particularly in targeting persistent offenders. The Hampton Report (2005 p38) concluded that:  
“…the penalty regime at present does not provide effective deterrence because the penalties 
handed down by courts often do not reflect either the severity of offences”.  
There has been widespread recognition that prosecution for regulatory offences is not the most 
effective form of sanction. Hampton (2005) and Macrory (2006) suggested that more flexible, 
targeted and responsive options are required in an enforcement toolkit. Enforcement sanctions are 
an important part of any regulatory system to provide a deterrent and thus ensure compliance with 
regulations. Rouviere and Caswell (2012) identify three types of sanctions in connection with 
inspection practices. The first are repressive sanctions mainly used for “stubborn offenders” who 
disobey the law.  Sanctions for non-compliance may include the closure of premises, seizure and 
detention of food. The second type of sanction, informative sanctions, are for less severe offences 
and are dealt with by means of advice, notices and warning letters which are used to motivate food 
businesses to comply. The third type of sanction are negative information provided to consumers. 
This includes the display the results of food hygiene inspections, for example, the food hygiene 
rating scheme as discussed in section 3.3.6. The Hampton and Macrory reports recommended that 
a comprehensive review of regulators’ penalty regimes be undertaken and recommended the 
incorporation of civil sanctions into any regulatory regime and this is discussed in the following 
section (Hampton 2005; Macrory 2006). Administrative penalties, which are quicker and simpler 
than court proceedings, could reduce the burden of time and worry placed on businesses under 
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threat of prosecution, while allowing regulators to restrict prosecution to the most serious cases, 
where the stigma of a criminal prosecution is required. 
This led to the introduction of the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act (RESA) 2008 
designed to provide consistent enforcement of regulations between and within LAs.  The sanctions 
available under RESA 2008 are: fixed monetary penalty notices; discretionary requirements 
(which include variable monetary penalties, compliance notices and restoration notices); Stop 
notices and Enforcement Undertakings. Fixed Monetary Penalties have been used in the UK for 
some time in areas such as fly-tipping and parking tickets. They are used for minor regulatory 
offences and involve the imposition of a monetary penalty for a fixed amount.  Discretionary 
requirements address more serious offences using variable monetary penalties (although not those 
that will be subject to criminal prosecution), a compliance notice is similar to the current statutory 
improvement notice in that the business has to comply with the issues stated in the notice within a 
specific period of time otherwise be liable to prosecution or a monetary penalty. Restoration 
notices are similar to compliance notices but there must be some harm caused by the business not 
complying with the law. Stop notices are issued when there is a significant risk causing serious 
harm to human health or the environment thus immediately stopping an activity that can cause 
harm. Finally, Enforcement Undertakings are agreements made between the regulator and the 
business/offender to make corrective action(s) to remedy a situation. This will allow businesses to 
put things right quickly without further sanctioning/punishment (RESA 2008; Adshead and 
Andrew 2009).  
According to Woods and Macrory (2010) civil sanctions are seen as an alternative designed for 
minor non-compliance and involves the imposition of penalty without intervention of court. 
Therefore it may be more effective to deal with regulatory offences (Macrory 2006; Woods and 
Macrory 2010). Woods and Macrory (2010) report that criminal law will not accommodate all 
regulatory breaches within a piece of legislation and so need a cost effective and efficient 
enforcement mechanism. Regulators are therefore provided with flexible sanctioning powers to 
deal with minor breaches of the law, that is, cases where there is non-compliance but this does not 
warrant criminal prosecution. Macrory’s concept was generated from the enforcement pyramid as 
an intermediary between lenient and severe enforcement strategies. The aim was to reduce the 
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financial incentive for non-compliant behaviour and thus prevent individuals from benefitting 
financially from non-compliance (Macrory 2006). 
It can also be expensive for LAs to undertake a prosecution so the proposal to incorporate civil 
sanction into the regulatory enforcement toolkit means that LAs do not need to waste their time 
and resources preparing for court proceedings (Macrory 2006). The Law Commission estimates 
state that savings could be achieved if the regulators in areas such as farming, food safety, banking 
and retail sales take action under civil law rather than taking a criminal prosecution thus allowing 
the regulator to target their resources better. “Relying on the criminal law to deter and punish risky 
behaviour in regulatory contexts may be an expensive, uncertain and ineffective strategy” (Law 
Commission 2010 p3). Faure and Svatikova (2012) also agree that because administrative 
proceedings are more informal than criminal proceedings the imposition of civil sanctions is a 
relatively cheaper alternative as a criminal prosecution can be difficult and time consuming. 
Secondly, civil sanctions reflect the severity/magnitude of offence or the economic benefit gained 
through non-compliance to ensure that offenders are deprived of the economic benefit that they 
has gained from their non-compliance. The nature of the system allows a distinction to be made 
between serious breaches of the law that are intentional or reckless and those offences that are not 
necessarily serious but still need to be punished (Macrory 2006; Macrory and Woods 2010).  
However, Ogus (2009) points out two major limitations to civil sanctions.  First of all, the public 
may not like civil sanctions because they lack the stigma of criminal conviction (although an 
advantage to businesses) as they may fail to teach those breaking the law a lesson. Secondly, he 
states that there is a limit to the severity of the administrative charge. If sanctions are not going to 
be high enough (that is, to hinder businesses from gaining an economic benefit through not 
complying with the law), then the deterrent effect would be lost (Nehme 2008). Other reasons have 
been put forward in literature as to why criminal law is favourable over civil sanctions. One reason 
that has been put forward by Faure and Visser (2003) is that civil law does not really deter but 
fixes a price for behaviour in the form of a sanction.  
Administrative penalties are used widely in other countries and can also allow regulators to 
eliminate the economic benefit of illegal activity more easily. In Germany, for example, most 
regulatory offences are punished as Ordnungswidrigkeiten (administrative offences). Fines can be 
set up to €500,000, and businesses can appeal to a special tribunal if they feel the penalty is 
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undeserved or disproportionate. The system has been described as the most coherent and 
comprehensive system of regulatory enforcement (OECD 2010; Faure and Weber 2017). 
According to Ogus and Abbot (2001), Germany has a coherent and comprehensive regulatory 
enforcement system and relies upon the use of administrative and civil sanctions and considers 
them to be as effective as criminal sanctions. The concept of administrative offences was 
introduced as far back as 1949 and even before this date, it was recognised that dealing with non-
compliance with regulation should be separate from the criminal process. Like the UK the German 
system has adopted a similar enforcement pyramid identifying the administrative fine at the centre 
of the pyramid (Ogus et al 2010).  
Another country where civil sanctions have been developed is in the US. Punishment in America 
has radically changed over the past 30 years with its increasing reliance on criminal prosecution 
(just like in the UK), imprisoning more people (at a rate of five to seven times) compared with 
other industrial countries such as France, Germany and Sweden (Barker 2009). This has led to the 
development of civil sanctions to reduce penal sanctioning such as imprisonment (Barker 2009). 
The sanctioning system in the US recaptures the economic benefit that the offender has gained 
from non-compliance. This has had a major impact in the area of environmental protection for 
example, where the use of computer modelling has helped to calculate the proposed penalty figure 
to be imposed on a business.  
The UK government established a review of the sanctioning regimes of regulators to identify 
adequate deterrents to regulatory non-compliance. Not all regulatory agencies use civil sanctions 
in the UK even though they have been in place for some time. Environment Agency who was the 
leading regulatory agency to adopt civil sanctions in the UK but the current use of civil sanctions 
in environmental legislation in the UK has been limited (Woods and Macrory 2010).  In addition, 
the Housing and Planning Act 2016 has recently introduced civil penalties as an alternative to 
prosecution. It allows financial penalties of up to £30,000 for certain housing offences such as 
overcrowding, failure to comply with an improvement notice and offences relating houses in 
multiple occupation (www.gov.uk). 
However, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) is of the opinion that HSE enforcement officers 
and those working in local authority have sufficient powers to assist them in their enforcement 
duties to ensure regulatory (HELA 2009). The HSE seem to think that civil sanctions are totally 
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replacing prosecution and raise concerns in relation to the fact that enforcement officers may 
overlook serious offences and substitute prosecution with a fine. In addition, they also question 
whether civil penalties will change the behaviour of the regulated and point out that the role of the 
enforcer to advise and assist businesses in their compliance will be diminished (www.hse.gov.uk). 
This study makes a significant contribution to the literature by providing empirical data to explore 
the perceptions of EHPs on whether civil sanctions will be an alternative and additional 
enforcement tool that will assist them in their food law enforcement duties as well as providing an 
effective deterrence to food businesses. 
3.5 Chapter Summary 
Enforcement, often in the form of an inspection, refers to a system in which society is meant to act 
in a certain way to comply with the law (Hutter 2011). Anyone who contravenes and disobeys the 
law are punished (Parker and Nielsen 2011; Braithwaite 2011; Bardach and Kagan 2017). 
Regulatory compliance is a process that organisations follow to ensure that they are conforming 
to a particular piece of legislation so that they will not be liable to sanctions (usually in the form 
of fines or imprisonment) for failure to comply (Black 2014; Gunningham 2015b; Bardach and 
Kagan 2017). Enforcers have a range of enforcement tools to deter non-compliance and so their 
behaviour in terms of how they interpret the law (communicating the meaning of a given policy) 
is critical (Black 2014).  
There has been much research into what motivates businesses to comply with or evade regulations 
and also how organisations respond to different enforcement styles. This study seeks to explore 
the opinions of EHPs with regards to the practicality of the current enforcement tools that may 
improve the way regulations are implemented and enforced, for which the scholarly literature is 
silent. The next chapter acts as a bridging chapter to discuss the gaps in the literature and provide 
a link between the primary and secondary data and a justification for the primary data study. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
 4.1 Introduction 
The aims of the chapter are to provide a link between primary and secondary data and to provide 
a justification for the primary study. The chapter will focus on identifying gaps that will provide 
the coherent investigation resulting in new knowledge, theory and practice. 
4.2 Narrative discussion of the literature review 
Table 4.1 highlights the gap in the literature and the implications for this study. The interview 
themes for the study are shown in Table 4.2 below. 
A review of the literature enabled gaps to be identified within the area of food law enforcement.  
Whilst gaps were identified, they were grouped into themes to form a coherent base for the primary 
data section. The main conclusions from the literature review were used to establish the parameters 
of the data collection. 
 Table 4.1 Gaps in literature 
Literature Source 
 
Gap in the Literature Implications for this study 
 
Reske et al (2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Klerks et al (2013) 
  
The empirical research was conducted in 
Minneapolis, USA. It used a quantitative study 
to investigate the benefits of implementing an 
announced restaurant inspection program from 
the perspective of food businesses. Obvious 
direction for future research would be to 
explore the views of enforcement practitioners 
in the UK through a qualitative methodology. 
 
 
  
This study carried out quantitative and 
qualitative research regarding the differences 
between announced and unannounced 
inspections. The study took place in nursing 
homes and related to health care and used 
existing data to draw conclusions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
This highlights a gap in the use of 
qualitative methodology to investigate the 
views of EHPs in England whether 
adopting announced or unannounced food 
hygiene inspections lead to more or less 
food hygiene contraventions. 
 
Etienne et al (2015) 
 
This was a post-implementation study of the 
introduction of remedial action notices (RANs) 
for non-approved premises in Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland. 
This highlights the gap in literature of how 
RANs in non-approved premises would 
affect enforcement practices in England. 
This study investigates the perceptions of 
EHPs in relation to RANs and how they will 
affect their enforcement toolkit. 
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Kettunen et al (2015) 
 
  
Evaluates the effectiveness and uniformity of 
the use of food enforcement measures in 
Finland. Investigate how rapidly the use of 
enforcement measures leads to compliance 
with food safety regulations. 
 
 
This study filled the gap by conducting a 
qualitative study of the perceptions and 
views of EHPs in England. Narratives from 
sampled EHPs (taking into account factors 
such as gender, race and level of experience 
in food law enforcement) on how they 
perceive current enforcement measures. 
 
daCunha et al (2016) 
 
Evaluate the results of the food safety strategy 
deployed during the 2014 FIFA World Cup in 
Brazil. The participants were consumers, food 
business operators, health surveillance auditors 
and co-ordinators who completed a survey 
about the inspection scoring system. 
 
 
The main gap here is the manner in which 
data is collected – quantitatively. This is a 
qualitative study for an already established 
scoring system. 
Gap = Practicality of the FHRS for food law 
enforcement; suggestions for improvement. 
 
Bukowski et al (2012) 
 
  
Qualitative research with LAs on how EHPs 
choose regulatory interventions and 
enforcement actions in order to get food 
businesses to comply with the legislation. 
Decision-making process regarding 
enforcement action. Assessing which 
interventions are most effective at improving 
and sustaining compliance. 
No information regarding future research but 
the study did not provide the views of EHPs 
regarding alternative enforcement tools such as 
civil sanctions. 
The study filled the gap by providing in-
depth interviews of the perceptions of EHPs 
regarding current regulatory interventions 
looking at factors such as gender, race and 
level of experience in food law enforcement 
as well as their views regarding civil 
sanctions. 
Source: Based on the Literature Review 
Table 4.2 Summary of research objectives and interview themes depicted from literature 
The themes identified from the literature can be summarised in Table 4.2. Based on the gaps in 
literature, the following themes were established as the basis for the primary data. 
Aim 
 
Research Objectives Interview Themes Literature Citations 
  Inspection frequency  Worsfold (2007);Newbold et al 
(2008); Holley (2010); Pizzino 
& Rupp (2013) 
 To investigate EHPs perceptions 
of food hygiene inspections as a 
regulatory intervention for food 
safety in capturing 
contraventions of the law. 
Variations and practical use of 
the inspection form 
Isaacs et al (1999); Lee et al 
(2010); Choi & Almanza (2012) 
 
  Announced inspections vs 
Unannounced inspections 
Reske et al (2007); Waters et al 
(2013) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Challenges with conducting 
food hygiene inspections and 
strategies needed to overcome 
such challenges. 
 
Green-Brown & Selman (2005); 
Neal et al (2011); Harris and 
Murphy (2015); Laikko-Roto 
(2015) 
Chapter 4 Empirical Framework 
 
69 
 
To critically examine 
Environmental Health 
Practitioners (EHPs) 
perceptions of the 
relevancy and effectiveness 
of current policies, 
practices and legislative 
frameworks as they relate 
to enforcing food 
legislation. 
 
To investigate EHP perceptions 
on the impact of the food 
hygiene rating scheme as a risk 
strategy tool for enforcement. 
The practicality of the FHR 
scale to score food businesses. 
Lee et al (2010); Morrison and 
Wong (2014); Brar (2016); da 
Cunha et al (2016) 
 
  The best format to 
communicate food hygiene 
inspection results. 
Lee et al (2010); Morrison and 
Wong (2014); Brar (2016); da 
Cunha et al (2016) 
 
  Voluntary vs mandatory 
display. 
 
 
 
 
Lee et al (2010); Morrison and 
Wong (2014); Brar (2016); da 
Cunha et al (2016) 
 
 To critically examine the 
enforcement sanctions currently 
available to EHPs and whether 
(in their opinion) alternative 
enforcement tools would be 
more appropriate. 
Validity of the enforcement 
system – which enforcement 
measures are more effective 
way to achieve compliance 
Bukowski et al (2012); Nieober 
et al (2015); Kettunen et al 
(2015) 
Civil sanctions as an 
alternative tool to aid food law 
enforcement 
 
Hampton (2005); Macrory 
(2006); Macrory and Woods 
(2010); Faure and Svatikova 
(2012) 
To investigate EHPs perception 
of whether a specialist court 
would be required to deal with 
food law offences. 
Specialist court to deal with 
food hygiene offences 
 
Adshead and Andrew (2009); 
Macrory (2014) 
Attitude of magistrates with 
respect to food offences. 
Dhami (2013); Tombs and White 
(2013); Macrory (2014) 
To investigate EHP views 
regarding their level of training 
and general working 
environment in relation to the 
current economic climate. 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Based on the Literature Review 
A qualitative study of the perceptions and views of EHPs in England was conducted and narratives 
from the sampled EHPs were compiled. The next chapter will outline the methodology adopted by 
this study in achieving the aim and objectives of this research. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESEARCH METHOLOGY 
5.1 Introduction 
The chapter evaluates and justifies the methods that were used for this study including the research 
philosophies and methodological approaches that will elicit information to answer the study’s 
research questions. The chapter also discusses and justifies the sample selection, data collection 
and analysis to provide credibility of the research in relation to validity and reliability. The chapter 
ends with a discussion on ethical considerations, limitations of the fieldwork and concluding 
remarks. 
5.2 Research Framework 
This research is based around the research onion (Figure 5.1) by Saunders et al (2011) who stated 
that this framework is used to explain the research philosophy, research approaches, research 
strategy, choices and time horizons, as well as data collection techniques and analysis procedures, 
which are important aspects of any research process. The research onion helped the researcher 
understand the process and different variables of the research and ensured all aspects of the 
research process were comprehensively covered by this study. The approach in using the research 
onion framework is to go from the outer layer to the inner layer.  
The first layer of the research onion is the philosophical stances associated with philosophies. It 
refers to a set of beliefs concerning the nature of the reality being investigated (Bryman 2012). 
Identifying the research philosophy also provides justification of how the research will be 
undertaken (Flick 2015). 
The second layer is the research approach which is a plan and procedure that consists of the steps 
of broad assumptions to detailed method of data collection, analysis and interpretation. It is 
therefore, based on the nature of the research problem being addressed. Saunders et al (2011) 
propose two main research approaches: deductive and inductive.  
The third layer of the research onion refers to research strategies. The choices outlined in the fourth 
layer of the research onion are qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods (use of both qualitative 
and quantitative methods). Time horizons make up the fifth layer and refers to the time limit/target 
for the completion of the research study.  
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Figure 5.1: The Research Onion 
 
Source: Saunders et al (2011) 
Finally, the sixth layer of the research onion, techniques and procedures, outlines the practicalities 
of data collection and analysis. When data is systematically collected and properly analysed it 
enables the researcher to answer the research questions.  
The following sections will discuss and provide a justification for, the research methods used for 
this study using the research onion framework as a guide. 
5.3 Research Philosophy 
This section presents a discussion of the research philosophy adopted by this study. Research 
philosophy is connected to the nature and development of a research, which consists of the main 
assumptions of how the researcher perceives the world (Collis and Hussey 2014; Saunders et al 
2011). The clarification and successful implementation of the research design is only achievable 
when the philosophical issues are well understood (Easterby-Smith et al 2012). This is to ensure 
that all aspects of the research are appropriately informed by the underpinning philosophy.  
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Research philosophy incorporates several research paradigms (or assumptions) which influence 
the way in which the research is conducted (Pernecky and Jamal 2010).  According to Crotty 
(2015) and Bryman and Bell (2015), research philosophy helps develop the research study in 
question so that a better understanding of the research methods based on such philosophies can be 
acquired. Hakansson (2013) also points out that research philosophy is the starting point for any 
research by articulating that research philosophy “constitutes assumptions about valid research 
and appropriate research methods and is the stand-point, which becomes the point of view for the 
project” (Hakansson 2013 p69). 
Hasan (2014) states that there are three main paradigms positivism, interpretivism (also called 
constructivism) and realism. Saunders et al (2011) provides ten philosophies: Interpretivism; 
Positivism; Objectivism; Pragmatism; Functionalist; Realism; Radical structuralist; Radical 
humanist; and Interpretive. Rossman and Rallis (2017) identify four different paradigms: 
positivism, interpretivism, critical humanism (a subtype of interpretivist view) and critical realism 
(a subtype of the positivist view). However, they suggest that the two primary paradigms are 
positivism and interpretivism.  Similarly, Easterby-Smith et al (2012) also cite that the two 
commonly used paradigms are positivism and interpretivism. 
This research study adopted a philosophy centred around critical realism. Realism is a philosophic 
belief, according to which the reality exists independently of observers (Grant 2018). In addition, 
interpretivism as a theoretical foundation is a useful and appropriate approach for this research 
context as it allows for a discussion with EHPs regarding the perceptions of food law and its 
enforcement. Rakić and Chambers (2011) stated that research which adopts an interpretivist 
philosophical assumption is more reliable in capturing human perceptions and experiences. This 
aligns with the aim of this research which is concerned with capturing the perceptions of the EHPs 
and their experience of food law enforcement. This study also adopted an epistemological position 
due to the subjective nature of the study in that the researcher interacted with the respondent EHPs. 
In epistemological research, the researcher endeavours to build a relationship with the participants 
(Easterby-Smith et al 2009; Myers 2013). The information obtained from the participants is based 
on their experiences and is therefore considered subjective evidence (Bryman and Bell 2015).  
A positivist philosophy was rejected because it is generally associated with experiments to collect 
numerical data from large samples and a deductive approach is undertaken (Gray 2018). This type 
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of research is designed around hypotheses and examine relationships between several variables 
(Blackstone 2012; Collis and Hussey 2014; Hakansson 2013). According to Cooper and Schindler 
(2011), the concept of positivism is associated with the idea of objectivism in which researcher’s 
own beliefs are not able to influence the research study. Thus this type of philosophy generates 
quantitative data and includes questionnaires and surveys. Interpretivism (or constructivism) 
contrasts positivism in that it looks at perceptions and experiences as opposed to experiments 
(Creswell 2013; Gray 2014). This process is therefore subjective rather than objective since it 
produces an insight into behaviour and includes interviews and focus groups (Rakić and Chambers 
2011). These methods usually generate qualitative data (Scotland 2012; Denscombe 2014).  
5.4 Research Approaches 
Research methods are often associated with two theoretical approaches namely deductive and 
inductive approach (Hakansson 2013). The deductive reasoning is mainly associated with 
scientific research in which hypothesis is defined and research is carried out to explain any 
relationships between variables in order to provide evidence about whether or not the hypothesis 
is true (Blackstone 2012; Hakansson 2013; Bryman and Bell 2016). Creswell and Plano Clark 
(2007 p23) say that the deductive researcher “works from the ‘top down’, from a theory to 
hypotheses to data to add to or contradict the theory”. According to Blackstone (2012), this means 
that such research progresses from a general level (look at existing theories) to a more specific one 
(test the hypothesis by analysing data that emerge from these theories).  
Conversely, the inductive approach progresses from specific observations from the data to broader 
general statements about these observations/experiences (Gray 2014). This is sometimes called 
bottom-up approach because according to Creswell and Plano Clark (2007 p23) “it starts with 
specific cases, using the participants’ views to build broader themes and generate a theory 
interconnecting the themes” and finally develop some general conclusions or theories.  
In the case of this study, an inductive reasoning was applied since a deductive approach is often 
considered particularly suited to the positivist approach, which permits the formulation of 
hypotheses and the statistical testing of expected results to an accepted level of probability (Snieder 
and Larner 2009). Inductive methods are often qualitative in nature and this research employed 
qualitative techniques in order to carry out an in-depth investigation and obtain a deeper 
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understanding of the experiences of environmental health practitioners (EHPs) responsible for 
food law enforcement within local authorities (LAs). Therefore, the choice of an inductive 
approach is appropriate for this study because of its qualitative nature and being concerned with 
the generation of new theory emerging from the data (Hakansson 2013). In addition, induction 
reasoning moves from specific observations to broader generalisations and theories in detecting 
themes and patterns in the data (Creswell and Plano Clark 2011; Barbour 2014). A deductive 
approach was also not used based on objectivity in the assessment of the observations. This is in 
contrast to the use of an inductive research approach which relies on subjectivity in the evaluation 
of the observations to support the results of the research. 
5.5 Research Strategies 
The research strategy is how the researcher intends to carry out the work (Saunders et al 2011). 
Saunders et al (2011) state that there are seven main research strategies, emphasising that there is 
no strategy, which can be considered to be the best one for all kinds of researches. Saunders et al 
(2011) identifies the following strategies: experiment, survey, case study, action research, 
grounded theory, ethnography and archival research. Gray (2014) asserts that the type of research 
strategy/design chosen depends on whether, for example, a positivist or interpretivist stance is 
taken. 
Exploratory research was one of the strategies used in this study. This is because exploratory 
research is conducted to examine a problem or issue when the research is unique or there are few 
studies which can be referred to for information on it. In this case the enforcement challenges of 
EHPs has not been adequately researched.  Denscombe (2014) holds the view that exploratory 
samples are often used in small scale research as a way of investigating issues or theories that are 
relatively new and provide the researcher with data from ‘unchartered waters’. For example, when 
a policy change is being considered.  
This research adopts an ethnographic exploratory study which aims to establish and review the 
perceptions that EHPs have towards regulatory interventions and enforcement options currently 
available to them. Ethnography engage directly with participants, gathering their views through 
interviews (Ritchie et al (2014). It also describes cultural practices and traditions and interprets 
social interaction within a culture (Denscombe 2014).  
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Other strategies were not considered because, for example, in the case of experimental research 
this refers to the strategy of creating a research process that examines the results of an experiment 
against the expected results (Saunders et al 2011). Experimental research looks at the relationships 
between variables in which one variable can be manipulated to see if and how it influences the 
results (Hakansson 2013). Similarly, surveys which tend to be used in quantitative research 
projects and involve sampling a representative proportion of the population (Bryman and Bell 
2015) was rejected as a suitable strategy for this particular study. Surveys produce quantitative 
data that can be analysed empirically. Survey strategy of the research onion is often linked with 
the deductive approach (Silverman 2014). 
5.6 Research Choices 
The fourth layer of the research onion is the research choice which refers to whether the study 
adopts qualitative or quantitative approach or a combination of the two (mixed 
methods). According to Hakasson (2013) and Silverman (2014, 2017) a quantitative research 
method uses large data, usually represented by graphs and charts and statistics test whether the 
hypotheses (the starting point of the research in which an idea or theory) are true or false. 
Quantitative research tends to use close-ended questions (questions which can be answered with a 
yes or no) to test specific variables derived from the hypotheses and comparisons or relationships 
between the statistical data (variables) can be analysed using statistical methods. (Soiferman 2010; 
May 2011).  A quantitative report uses frequencies and percentages. Furthermore, the quantitative 
methods adopts an objective approach and is aimed at generalisation of the results (Easterby-Smith 
et al 2011). The quantitative research is consistent with the deductive research approach and 
informed by a positivist philosophy (Bryman 2016).  
On the other hand, qualitative research methods are not usually concerned whether the sample is 
statistically representative because the objective is to reach conclusions that are not necessarily 
applicable to the entire population (Bryman 2016). Instead, in-depth studies are carried out 
(participants are asked open-ended questions which require more thorough answers) using a small 
number of participants and investigates personal experiences and opinions of the participants with 
regards to a particular subject (Webly 2010; Bryman 2012; Choy 2014). Cresswell (2013p4) 
defines qualitative research as: “The use of interpretive/theoretical frameworks that inform the 
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study of research problems addressing the meaning individual or groups ascribe to a social or 
human problem …… qualitative researchers use an emerging qualitative approach to inquiry, the 
collection of data in a natural setting sensitive to the people and places under study, and data 
analysis that is both inductive and deductive and establishes patterns or themes”.  
A qualitative design was used for this study as it involved exploring the perceptions of 
Environmental Health Practitioners (EHPs). This meant questioning them about their experiences 
and opinions in relation to the enforcement of food legislation. Denzin and Lincoln (2011 p3) 
describe qualitative research as a set of interpretive, material practices that make the world visible. 
These practices transform the world. They turn the world into a series of representations, including 
field notes, interviews, conversations, recordings and memos to self…..qualitative researchers 
study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of or interpret phenomena in terms 
of the meanings people bring to them.  Cresswell (2013) and Myers (2013) point out that qualitative 
research is designed to help researchers understand the experiences of people in their own 
environment in order to address a particular social or human problem. Soiferman (2010) also 
asserts that the objective of qualitative research is to gather information from participants so as to 
form ideas about their perspectives on a particular subject.  It can be argued that since the main 
focus of this study is to explore the perceptions of EHPs then it is appropriate to engage in a 
qualitative study, asking open-ended questions in order to obtain as much information as possible.  
Furthermore, the relationship between the researcher and the participants has been cited as a 
significant aspect of qualitative research (Cresswell 2009; Soiferman 2010; Myers 2013). 
Silverman (2014) states that quantitative research often involves little contact with the participants 
and statistical tables do not provide much information compared with descriptive narratives that 
are able to identify, for example, body language. The researcher and the respondents operate in the 
same profession and so provides an opportunity for the researcher to obtain detailed accounts of 
their experiences (Barbour 2014).  Merriam (2016) agrees that qualitative research reports are 
typically rich with details and insights into participants' experiences and where quantitative 
measures cannot adequately describe or interpret a situation (Richie et al 2014 and Yin 2014). 
Qualitative research embraces a more profound understanding of social behaviour in a way that 
may not be obtained from a purely quantitative study (Blackstone 2012). Examples of qualitative 
data generation methods include focus groups and interviews (Riche et al 2014).  
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The research used the words of the participants to obtain their personal experiences rather than 
statistical procedures. A small sample size was used compared to a large data set. Hakansson 
(2013) states that reliable results can still be achieved using smaller samples. In addition, more 
than one research method can be used to complement each other, this is called triangulation 
(Hakansson 2013). In this study, only one qualitative method was used. The researcher initially 
conducted questionnaires but the response rate was very poor and so sought to conduct interviews 
only so that a rich quality of data could be obtained. In addition, there is a belief that in quantitative 
research, the researcher separates themselves from the participants (Soiferman 2010).  Silverman 
(2014) also agrees that quantitative research often involves little contact with people, a 
disadvantage of this method. This is further addressed by Choy (2014) who states that quantitative 
research does not deal with human perceptions and beliefs. Therefore a quantitative method is 
unsuitable for this study. 
The qualitative approach is drawn from the constructivist paradigm (Bryman and Allen 2011). 
This approach requires the researcher to avoid imposing their own perception of the meaning of 
social phenomena upon the respondent (Banister et al 2011). The aim is to investigate how the 
respondent interprets their own reality (Bryman and Allen 2011). An effective means by which to 
do this is through interviews, or texts, where the response to a question can be open (Feilzer 2010). 
Furthermore, the researcher can develop the questions throughout the process in order to ensure 
that the respondent further expands upon the information provided. Qualitative research is usually 
used for examining the meaning of social phenomena, rather than seeking a causative relationship 
between established variables (Feilzer, 2010). In qualitative Approach the data is collected 
mainly to describe factors rather than reaching to a statistical inference. It is an unstructured 
exploratory research method. Here the important factors of character, behaviour, attitude, opinion 
etc are subjectively assessed. (Myers 2013) Usually qualitative studies are used for explanatory 
purposes (Kothari 2008).This research study is a qualitative research with an inductive approach.  
However, criticises qualitative methods because of its association with subjectivity and the belief 
that interpreting information in a qualitative manner is open to potential pitfalls such as 
misunderstanding what a respondent has said. Therefore there is the problem of adequate validity 
or reliability because it focuses on a smaller sample compared with a quantitative study 
(Onwuegbuzie and Leech 2010). Another drawback is that the use of qualitative methodology can 
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be time consuming because it involves transcribing the narratives of the participants obtained 
during the interviews, observations and focus groups (Choy 2014). These drawbacks were 
overcome by asking the participant to expand on their answers in cases were the researcher sought 
further clarification. Transcribing the narratives is time consuming but allows the researcher to 
obtain detailed information from participants of the study (Bryman and Bell 2015). 
5.7 Time Horizons 
The next layer of the research onion framework is time horizons. The time horizon is the time 
framework within which the project is intended for completion (Saunders et al 2011). A time limit 
is usually fixed for the completion of a task or activity. This fifth layer of the research onion has 
two-time horizon methods: the cross sectional and the longitudinal (Bryman 2012). Cross sectional 
is when data is collected at a certain point and is used to conduct a short time study (Flick 2015). 
A longitudinal time horizon is for a long-term study. Both approaches can be used to observe the 
behaviour of a group of people or an aspect or events. 
This research adopted the cross-sectional time horizon because the time was prefixed for the 
completion of the study. The time horizon for conducting the research was prefixed and planned. 
The longitudinal method although it can be used to study behaviour and events, is more adhered 
to repeated studies over a period of time to identify correlation between observations and changes 
among the results over different time periods. A cross-sectional approach for the time horizon 
means that the focus of the research is on the current situation. Behavioural studies usually 
conducted in longitudinal methods requires a long time period for observation (Saunders et al 
2011, 2015). A limited period of time was allotted to the researcher to conduct the data collection 
for the samples selected and so longitudinal methods were not suitable.  
5.8 Techniques and Procedure: Data Collection and Analysis 
The final layer of the research onion is data collection and analysis and is dependent on the 
methodological approach used (Bryman 2012). The process used at this stage of the research 
contributes significantly to the study’s overall reliability and validity since the most important 
elements in a research study are data collection and data analysis (Saunders et al 2011). The 
reliability and validity of a research is directly applied to the measurement of data (Silverman 
2017). There are two types of data collected for a systematic analysis for any research: primary 
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data and secondary data (Kumar 2011). Primary data refers to information that is generated first 
time or that are generated to meet the specific requirements of the investigation at hand. Secondary 
research requires the use of relevant academic literature to buttress research findings. This study 
utilised both primary and research data. 
There are various sources of primary data such as questionnaires, interviews, focus groups, 
observations and surveys (Saunders et al 2015a). The primary data chosen for this study was semi-
structured interviews via a social media outlet, Skype. This is because the interview is the most 
commonly used method of data collection in the study of human behaviour since it is considered 
to be the most effective method of gaining information about a person’s perceptions, beliefs, 
feelings, attitudes, opinions etc. An interview can be structured, unstructured or semi-structured 
(Hakansson 2013). A structured interview means that the interview questions are presented in the 
same order whilst a semi-structured and unstructured interviews are more flexible in their approach 
to the questions being asked based on human conversation (Kvale and Brinkman 2009; Qu and 
Dumay 2011). A semi-structured interview was used in this case. According to Blackstone (2012), 
qualitative interviews have several strengths over other forms of research methods. First of all, the 
researcher can obtain detailed information about the topic under investigation. Secondly, 
participants are able to share their experiences and the responses are not restricted. Thirdly, it is 
thought that a participant’s body language provides additional data for the researcher.   
However, Blackstone (2012) points out some negative aspects of qualitative interviews. The main 
one is having to rely on the respondents’ ability to recall the information/experiences being asked 
as well as the possibility of information being withheld or distorted resulting in inaccurate 
information/data. Another drawback of qualitative interviews is that they are time consuming 
because the researcher has to transcribe and analyse several interviews which can be very laborious 
(Kemparaj and Chavan 2013). Study’s approach: Several types of interview exist including face-
to-face and email interviews. This study chose to carry out face-to-face interviews using internet 
technology (Skype) due to the geographical location of the researcher and the respondents.  The 
interviews were recorded to obtain a verbatim record of the interview. Other forms of data 
collection such as focus groups were not used because of the researcher’s geographical location 
and the ability to gather all the participants in a group at any one time. 
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In this study semi-structured interviews were conducted remotely via Skype. Interviews are used 
extensively by qualitative researchers examining legal phenomena, and perceptions of law and the 
legal profession (Singhal and Malik 2012; Epstein and Martin 2014; Dobinson and John 2017). 
Email questionnaires were originally used but were abandoned because of the poor response from 
the pilot study. In addition, some of the responses to some of the questions were not informative 
enough and would not generate enough data to draw substantive conclusions. Blackstone (2012) 
states that interviews are useful when answers to questions require lengthy explanations and the 
use of close-end questions on a survey would not work well especially since the interviewer may 
need to ask follow-up questions based on the answers given by the respondent. Semi-structured 
interviews allow for the ordering of questions to be employed flexibly to allow for unforeseen 
comments to be probed further (Barbour 2014). Qu and Dumay (2011) state that the focus of an 
interview guide covers the main themes/topics and issues that is being researched and the 
interviewer wants to learn. Bias was eliminated from the research by recording the interviews 
rather than relying on memory. In addition, recording the interviews allowed direct quotes from 
the respondents to be used as emphasis (Driscoll 2011).  
A semi-structured interview procedure was used in that questions where prepared beforehand 
(Appendix 5). An interview guide allows the interviewer to ask the participants the same questions 
so as ensure the important issues are discussed (Blackstone 2012). In addition, when applicable, 
respondents were prompted for more information and useful probes were planned prior to the 
interview. This provides a valuable tool for the interviewer (Blackstone 2012). The probes were 
determined after the pilot study. The majority of the questions were open-ended as opposed to 
closed questions. Blackstone (2012) states that open-ended questions give the respondent the 
opportunity to answer the questions in their own words and phrases. The interviews were 
conducted at a time (and location) convenient to the participant and taking into account the time 
difference between the UK and the researcher’s location in the USA. Blackstone (2012) implies 
that it is advantageous for the researcher to conduct interviews where the participant feels 
comfortable and with little or no distractions. 
The way in which people communicate with each other has developed rapidly over the years and 
sources such as mobile phones, I-pads and emails have increased in usage (Hutcheson and 
Longhurst 2017).  Skype in particular is used by millions of people so that they can connect with 
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family and friends. As with any interviewing method, it has some benefits and drawbacks (Table 
5.2). According to Deakin and Wakefield (2013) skype in research contexts enables the researcher 
to conduct interviews in the same way as ‘live’ face to face interviews. Nehls et al (2015) agrees 
that Skype should be a viable option for qualitative research. Deakin and Wakefield (2013 p3) also 
believe that “the online interview should be treated as a viable option to the researcher rather 
than just as an alternative or secondary choice when face-to-face interviews cannot be achieved”. 
This study sought to explore this relatively new way of data collection since the researcher had 
relocated to the US and the respondents were located in the North West of England.  
The use of Skype allows for free communication and offers a novel method to collect qualitative 
data. It reduces the time and place limitations of face to face interviews as well as conducting the 
interview in a convenient location/place conducive to the participant (Deakin and Wakefield 2013; 
Janghorban et al 2014).  Cater (2011 p2) asserts that the traditional face to face interviews creates 
problems in relation to the “geographical dispersion, and physical mobility boundaries”. 
Consequently, the interviews occur in more convenient conditions for participants. The flexibility 
may resolve the researcher’s concern to reach key informants and increase participation. 
Nevertheless, the selection of a disruptive environment could affect interviewee concentration and 
data gathering (Deakin and Wakefield, 2013). 
Interviews via Skype can still be recorded and transcribed just like face to face interviews and the 
researcher is still able to observe the body language of the participant to some degree, although 
this may not be possible for Skype via audio (Deakin and Wakefield 2013). Although Cater (2011) 
argues that ‘disembodied interviews’ can be a barrier in observing body language and also building 
up a rapport between the researcher and the participant. Hay-Gibson (2009) also suggest that 
building rapport can be an obstacle with Skype interviews because, for example, there is no 
physical contact in exchange of pleasantries between the researcher and the participant and also 
the disruption of the flow of conversation due to technical problems may ensue. To overcome this, 
the study contacted the participants by telephone and email prior to the interview so that a 
relationship could be built. According to Deakin and Wakefield (2013) online rapport is only a 
problem when the participant is not as receptive as the researcher hoped. 
Additional challenges for online interviewing, include embarrassment as the participants may feel 
like they are being filmed according to Hay-Gibson (2009). In addition, Deakin and Wakefield 
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(2013) argue that online interviews will exclude those participants who are not technologically 
competent and/or do not have internet connection. These challenges were not a problem for this 
study because all the respondents were familiar with using Skype and had internet connection in 
their homes. Moreover, it has been argued by Denscombe (2014) that the quality of responses 
gained through online research is much the same as responses produced by more traditional 
methods. Another challenge of online interviews is that participants can pull out at any time just 
by logging out of Skype. For this reason Deakin and Wakefield (2013) state that this can increase 
non-attendance and possible rescheduling. All the participants in this study were willing to 
participate and so there was no problem of absenteeism. However, because of demanding 
schedules, only two of the respondents had to reschedule. 
Nevertheless, the online interview should be treated as a viable option to the researcher rather than 
as an alternative or secondary choice when face-to-face interviews cannot be achieved. 
Table 5.1 Advantages and disadvantages of using Skype and implications for the study  
 Benefits 
 
Drawbacks Implications for this study 
Recruitment 
 
Allows interviewees and 
interviewer flexibility in terms 
of organising the interview 
time 
Potential interviewees may be 
put off participating if they do 
not know how to use Skype 
All respondents were 
conversant with Skype and 
had access to a computer at 
home. 
Logistical and 
technological 
considerations 
 
Health and safety concerns 
reduced when interviewing at 
night Cost effective Time 
effective Greater flexibility of 
researcher and interviewee in 
terms of interview time In the 
vast majority of cases, no 
technological problems were 
encountered as researchers 
were appropriately trained in 
the use of Skype 
In some cases, recording 
material will need to be 
purchased and interviews 
conducted in specific 
locations where Skype is 
available The distance 
between researcher and 
interviewee can make it easier 
for participants to drop out as 
they feel less commitment to 
the process than with face-to-
face interviews Technological 
problems in some cases lead 
to issues in sound quality 
making recording difficult 
Technological or signal 
problems can make the 
building of rapport difficult 
A simple recording device 
was used to record 
interviews. No respondent 
abstained from taking part 
and were committed to 
participate in the study. 
Fortunately there were no 
technological or sound 
problems during the Skype 
interviews.  
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Ethics  
 
There is no need to obtain 
phone numbers from 
participants Interviewees can 
withdraw with the click of a 
button Anonymity can be 
easily ensured 
Gaining informed consent 
verbally can make the 
beginning of the interview feel 
very formal and may not set 
the right tone for an interview 
Ethical issues may arise in 
taking video or audio 
recordings of the interview. 
Participants need to be made 
fully aware of this Participants 
may feel uncomfortable being 
filmed in their own home 
Ethical approval was 
obtained prior to the 
fieldwork. Respondents 
were informed about the 
nature of the study. 
Rapport 
 
In the majority of cases, 
building rapport can be 
established just as well as in 
face-to-face interviews. 
Exchanging emails, messages 
or reports can facilitate this 
process 
When interviewing a reserved 
interviewee, building rapport 
can be difficult 
The researcher was already 
familiar with about half of 
the respondents prior to the 
study so building up a 
rapport was not a problem. 
Those respondents that the 
researcher was not familiar 
with received an 
introductory telephone call 
and regular emails prior to 
the Skype interview. 
Audio or video 
 
Audio and video allow 
interviewees to choose the 
level of contact they wish to 
engage in 
Video is not possible in some 
cases as it can reduce sound 
quality 
Video call was possible in all 
cases as none of the 
respondents declined to use 
it. 
Absenteeism  Time and money have not 
been spent if the interviewee 
does not log on to complete 
the interview 
Participants appear to be more 
likely to ‘drop out’ of the 
interview last minute or 
without notice 
None of the respondents 
dropped out of the interview. 
However, two of the 
respondents needed to 
reschedule. 
Source: Deakin and Wakefield (2013) 
This study opted for Skype as the method for data collection primarily because of the geographical 
location of the researcher and the respondents. Deakin and Wakefield (2013) state that face-to-
face interviews can be problematic if there are financial constraints and logistical problems where 
the researcher and participants are geographically dispersed. In addition, Skype still has the sound 
and visual function so that communication does not differ from traditional face to face interviews 
and therefore makes it a better option than using the telephone (Hutchenson and Longhurst 2017). 
Both the researcher and the participant were aware that technical problems in the form of a frozen 
screen or poor sound quality could ensue which could disrupt the conversation. However, it was 
Chapter 5 Research Methodology 
 
84 
 
agreed that if this should happen then the interview would restart after reconnection. Fortunately, 
such problems did not occur. 
There are very few studies that use video-conferencing interviews and so this study adds an 
alternative primary research method to the food law enforcement literature. Skype is also widely 
used and the software is free to download and provides flexibility for the researcher and 
participants (Hutchenson and Longhurst 2017). 
5.8.1 Analysis of interviews 
The data were analysed from the transcripts obtained from the interviews. This was a laborious 
task since it involved playing the recording back several times and typing the narrative. Blackstone 
(2012) states that a verbatim transcription is advantageous over taking notes as it records exactly 
what was said during the interview. She also suggests including non-verbal gestures during the 
transcription as well as voice tone and emphasis of certain words. Hakansson (2013) states that the 
most commonly used methods for analysis of qualitative data are coding, analytic induction, 
grounded theory, narrative analysis, hermeneutic, and semiotic. Statistics, descriptive and 
inferential statistics, is used to analyse data. Barbour (2014) suggests that interview data can be 
analysed using a variety of approaches: content analysis, thematic analysis, conversation analysis 
(the structure and strategies involved in constructing talk). 
Coding involves the analysis of transcribed interviews using software that is able to turn qualitative 
data into quantitative data. Computer programs such as NVivo which are designed to organise and 
analyse large amounts of qualitative data (Hakansson 2013). This study adopted narrative analysis 
as the method for analysing the data. This type of analysis allowed the researcher to analyse 
attitudes and beliefs. 
5.9 Sampling Method and Sampling Selection 
Blackstone (2012) suggests that sampling strategies ideal for qualitative research evolve around 
non-probability sampling where the objective is to carry out an in-depth study. In addition the 
sample size is usually small in order to acquire a thorough understanding of the study area.  
According to research literature there are several types of non-probability sampling available to 
researchers and include purposive samples where participants meet a specific criteria; snowball 
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samples rely on participants to recruit new people to take part in the study; quota samples whereby 
the participants are selected from within a chosen specific subgroup; and convenience samples in 
which participants are selected by means of convenience (Etikan et al 2016).  
The sampling method used for this study was purposive sampling. The quota method was not used 
because subgroups were not necessarily a focus of the research.  The convenience method was not 
used because of the risk of gathering poor quality data, resulting in poor research outcomes 
(Oppong 2013). According to Kemparaj and Chavan (2013) convenience sampling engages a 
volunteer sample which is used when researchers need participants to come forward to identify 
themselves (e.g., placing notices in newspaper for people with certain experience).  
The respondents were selected using purposive sampling because they met specific criteria in that 
the study was limited to environmental health practitioners employed by Local Authorities in the 
Northwest of England who are responsible for food law enforcement. In this case, according to 
Blackstone (2012), the goal is to use participants with specific experience as opposed to those 
whose experiences are diverse. In addition, this is the type of strategy in which the respondents are 
chosen because they can best contribute to the aims objectives of the study (Elo et al 2014; 
Vasileiou et al 2018). Hennink et al (2016) states that qualitative studies commonly use purposive 
sampling (as opposed to probability sampling) as it seeks to obtain ‘information rich’ data rather 
than a focus on the number of participants taking part in the study.  
 
In addition to purposive sampling, the researcher also adopted a snowballing approach as a 
complement as the researcher already anticipated the likelihood of not being able to reach many 
EHPs due to the possibility of busy schedules and vacation. Snowballing methods and convenience 
sampling strategy have their advantages and disadvantages. For example, they might be biased by 
volunteers, as well as the risk of the population not being represented by the sample (Flick, 2015). 
In addition, another drawback of the purposive sampling method, for example, it was difficult to 
get in touch with many EHPs. The researcher overcame this by reaching out to team leaders and 
managers of food units. 
Blackstone (2012) points out that a potential concern is sampling bias which occurs when 
participants do not represent the wider population from which they were drawn. Oppong (2013) 
also mentions that some people may decline to participate in the study and so become under-
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represented. It could be argued that there was sampling bias in this study since it did not get the 
views of those who did not participate and they may have different views from those who did 
participate. For example, there were some EHPs who mentioned that they could not participate in 
the study because they were too busy or where about to go on leave. Therefore sampling bias 
cannot be totally eliminated. Nevertheless, the researcher endeavoured to prevent this problem by, 
for example, following up with EHPs once they returned from leave. 
With regards to sample size states that there are no specific rules as to what is the appropriate 
sample size. A sample is a representative segment of a larger population (Bryman 2012). In 
quantitative research, the sample size and how it is selected can be used to establish the reliability 
of the results of the study. In qualitative research, the sample characteristics are also important, 
but much smaller samples tend to be used (Malterud et al 2016). 
Webly (2010 p1) states that even though the sample size will be small, the findings will be 
representative “in the sense of capturing the range or variation in a phenomenon, but not in the 
sense of allowing for the estimation of the distribution of the phenomenon in the population as a 
whole”.  Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2010) point out that sample sizes in qualitative research should 
not be too large because it may be difficult to obtain data rich findings. They also note that at the 
same time the sample should not be too small that insufficient data is obtained. Denscombe (2014) 
is of the same opinion and asserts that the sample size should be sufficient to enable the researcher 
to feel that enough information has been collected.  In qualitative research, the size of the sample 
is less important, and the concept of representativeness is not as strong a guideline for the validity 
of the research (Flick 2015).  
The study discovered that there are a total of 1,496 EHPs (full-time equivalent) employed to 
enforce food law in England (FSA 2018). The total number of EHPs employed in the LAs that 
took part in the study was fifty-eight (58). However, twenty-one participants from seventeen LAs 
were interviewed. The researcher believed that the saturation point of the data had been reached.  
According to O’Reilly and Parker (2012) and Walker (2012), data saturation is reached when there 
is enough information to replicate the study and the ability to obtain additional new information 
has been attained. Fusch and Ness (2015) state that failure to reach data saturation has an impact 
on the quality of the research and a negative impact on the validity of the research. They also 
suggest that interviews are one method by which study results reach data saturation. However, 
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qualitative samples must be large enough to ensure that most or all of the perceptions that might 
be important are disclosed, but at the same time if the sample is too large, the data becomes 
repetitive and redundant (Mason 2010).  In other words, the concept of saturation is when the 
collection of new data does not shed any further light on the issue under investigation (Kerr et al 
2010; Bryman 2012). 
According to Bonde (2013) potential participants for a research study can consist of people who 
share similar characteristics, attitudes, experiences and behaviours. Researchers refer to groups 
sharing similar characteristics as ‘homogenous’, whereas groups with dissimilar characteristics are 
‘heterogeneous’ (Bryman 2012; Bonde 2013). The more homogenous the target audience, the 
sooner data saturation will occur because individual interviews are likely to overlap considerably 
in content (Bryman, 2012). 
As mentioned earlier the appropriate sample size is debatable but Morse (2015) states that the 
common guiding principle for assessing the adequacy of a purposive sample is saturation. He 
proposes that saturation could be reached between 16-24 interviews (Morse 2015). Other 
researchers have also suggested guidelines for qualitative sample sizes: Marshall et al (2013) 
suggest that qualitative studies should generally be between 20 and 30 interviews. Green and 
Thorogood (2018) also concur that there is very little new information generated after interviewing 
20 people. Francis et al (2010) state that overall study saturation is reached by the seventeenth 
interview. However, in another study by the same authors, overall saturation was reached by the 
fourteenth interview. Ritchie et al (2014) suggest that studies employing individual interviews 
conduct no more than 50 interviews so that researchers are able to manage the complexity of the 
data analysis. Hagaman and Wutich (2017) showed that sample sizes of 20 to 40 interviews were 
required to achieve data saturation. Mason (2012) suggests it is still better to have a smaller number 
of interviews that are creatively and interpretively analysed, than to increase the sample size where 
the researcher may run the risk of running out of time and fail to analyse content properly. Other 
scholars advocate for a narrow range. For example, Guest et al (2006) believe data saturation 
typically occurs by the twelfth interview, with themes becoming identifiable after the sixth 
interview provided that the target audience is relatively homogenous. 
In this study, it emerged that after the twelfth interview with the twelfth participant, data saturation 
was reached. However, to make sure the data were saturated and avoid premature closure of data 
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collection, the interviews continued. From the fifteenth to the twenty-first interview no new 
knowledge was gained and the similar comments were being heard. When the qualitative 
researcher determines additional interviews no longer reveal fresh insights, theoretical data 
saturation can be said to have occurred (Bryman 2012; Saunders et al 2018). It is at this stage of 
diminished returns that the researcher determines enough interviews have been conducted (Bonde 
2013). 
Table 5.3 presents an overview of the LAs from which the respondent EHPs were employed 
together with the number of food businesses within the LA area. It can be seen that the sample 
LAs include different types of LAs. 
Table 5.4 presents a summary of the sample sizes used in previous food law enforcement studies. 
It can be seen that the sample size for this study is relatively compatible with previous food law 
enforcement studies. 
 Table 5.2 Local Authorities that participated in the study 
Local 
Authority 
 
Brief Overview 
Total number 
of food 
businesses 
within the 
local authority 
area 
Total 
number of 
EHPs 
enforcing 
food law 
Number of 
EHPs that 
participated 
in the study 
LA 1 Coastal resort  1798 3 2 
LA 2 A diverse and vibrant town 2465 6 1 
LA 3 A large town 1400 3 1 
LA 4 Large mainly urban city 3502 7 2 
LA 5 A large town 1809 4 2 
LA 6 A small city 1169 3 2 
LA 7 A medium-sized city 1247 3 1 
LA10 A large town 4977 5 2 
LA11 A small city 922 2 1 
LA12 Coastal borough and ranked 
one of the most deprived 
nationally 
1986 3 1 
LA13 A medium sized city 679 2 1 
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LA14 A medium sized city 2363 4 1 
LA15 A small rural town 1893 3 1 
LA16 A large rural town 3096 6 2 
LA17 A medium sized city 1856 4 1 
 
Table 5.3 A summary of sample size used in food law enforcement studies 
Author Year  Journal  Investigated Aspects Sample Size 
Pharm et al  2010 BMS Public Health 10: 
345 
Public health inspectors’ 
perceptions of the key food safety 
issues in public health, Ontario, 
Canada. 
23 EHPs 
Choi & 
Almanza 
2012 Food Protection Trends 
32(1) pp26-33 
An investigation into EHP 
perceptions of the words used to 
describe contraventions of the law 
in Indiana, USA. 
25 EHPs 
Bukowski et 
al  
2012 Report carried out on 
behalf of the Food 
Standards Agency 
Exploring the decision making 
process of EHPs in relation to 
regulatory practice. 
12 LAs /77 enforcement 
officers that included trading 
standards and heads of 
service 
Nieboer et al  2015 Report carried out on 
behalf of the Food 
Standards Agency 
Experimental study investigating 
the consistency and variation of 
food hygiene assessments of EHPs 
in the UK. 
35 EHPs 
Tombs  2016 
 
Centre for Crime and 
Justice Briefing 
Inspection and enforcement actions 
of environmental health staff in 
Merseyside. 
35 EHPs across the 
environmental health 
spectrum 
 
5.10 Validity and Reliability of the Research 
Noble and Smith (2015 p7) state that “qualitative research is frequently criticised for lacking 
scientific rigour with poor justification of the methods adopted, lack of transparency in the 
analytical procedures and the findings being merely a collection of personal opinions subject to 
researcher bias”. Two important areas to ensure that qualitative research demonstrates rigor are 
validity and reliability (Grossoehme 2014). Validity refers to whether there is truth in the 
conclusions of the research and reliability describes consistency and whether the study can be 
repeated using the same methods (Bryman and Bell 2016). Early work by Lincoln and Guba (1985) 
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proposed trustworthiness as a way to assess reliability and validity in qualitative research. There 
are four aspects of trustworthiness: credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability. 
Kemparaj and Chavan (2013) state that credibility refers to the believability of the findings and 
the steps taken to demonstrate credibility. Those participating in the research were identified and 
described accurately Elo et al (2014). Kemparaj and Chavan (2013) asserts that transferability 
refers to whether it is possible for the findings from the research to be generalised to other groups, 
that is, the same conclusions can be reached. The dependability of qualitative data refers to whether 
the findings are likely to apply over time and under different conditions (Elo et al 2014). 
Conformability of qualitative research is concerned with the researcher has conducted the research 
in an objective and impartial manner (Hakansson 2013). It also refers to the potential for different 
people to obtain similar results (Kemparaj and Chavan 2013.  
To make the research valid, it was subjected to all the various stages identified from literature in 
order to eliminate or reduce any weaknesses inherent in the study.  
5.11 Pilot Study 
According to Hazzi and Maldaon (2015) pilot studies are small scale studies involving a small 
sample size that is used prior to the main study. Pilot studies are thought to be important because 
they deal with any problems that could occur in the main research study. In other words any 
revisions to the main study can be made before it is carried out (Kim 2011; Brinkmann and Kvale 
2018).  Although pilot studies can be time consuming, they are worthwhile otherwise problems 
could occur in the main study. However, early work by Holloway (2008) argues that pilot studies 
are not necessary for qualitative research in case it is not possible to exclude those taking part in 
the pilot study. Conversely, Kinchin et al (2018) argue that piloting provides the qualitative 
researcher with clear aims and objectives of the study as well as ensuring its validity. Both 
arguments are plausible. On one hand participants will be familiar with the interview process and 
questions. But on the other hand, participants may become disinterested: familiarity breeds 
contempt!! In addition, the sample will include participants who have prior knowledge of the 
process and those who do not which may not make the research impartial (Kim 2011). 
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Nevertheless, a pilot study was conducted on three EHPs during an environmental health training 
workshop in order to determine the suitability of the interview questions. These EHPs did not take 
part in the final study since they were not employed by LAs in the northwest of England. These 
EHPs brought up a number of issues relating to the questions that were to be used in the actual 
interviews. For example, it was pointed out that the interview schedule was too long and some of 
the questions seemed repetitive. In addition, it helped the researcher to anticipate follow-up 
questions in response to some of the answers given by those that took part in the pilot study. The 
final interview schedule therefore required some minor adjustments. The interview schedule was 
revised in order to address the issues in the questions that were not easily understood or not 
similarly understood by the respondents.  As the revised set of questions was consistently 
understood by the potential respondents, this was deemed to provide a reliable response across the 
set of questions included in the interview schedule. 
5.12 Ethical Consideration 
Ethical consideration is important in social sciences research and prior to conducting any research, 
ethical approval is required (Collis and Hussey 2014; Cresswell 2013). This is because a researcher 
is gathering data through interaction with individuals and such research is regulated so as to protect 
all those involved (Blackstone 2012). Bryman and Bell (2015) identified 10 principles of ethical 
practice: (1) ensuring that no harm comes to participants (2) respecting the dignity of research 
participants (3) ensuring a fully informed consent of research participants (4) protecting the 
privacy of research subjects (5) ensuring the confidentiality of research data, (6) protecting the 
anonymity of individual or organisations (7) avoiding deception about the nature or aims of the 
research (8) declaration of affiliations, funding sources and conflicts of interest (9) honesty and 
transparency in communicating about the research (10) avoidance of any misleading or false 
reporting of research findings. These ten guidelines provide useful information about ethical 
principles for conducting a research project. 
 
Silverman (2017) also states that ethical consideration is a necessity and that it mainly deals with 
consent (informed consent), confidentiality and trust. With regards to consent, this generally means 
informed consent from the participants in that they have a right to be informed about the research 
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and they also have the right withdraw from the study at any time (Qu and Dumay 2011). Blackstone 
(2012 p61) defines informed consent “as a subject’s voluntary agreement to participate in 
research based on a full understanding of the research and of the possible risks and benefits 
involved”. Therefore, participants should not be forced to take part in any study. Confidentiality, 
which is often interchanged with anonymity, refers to the protection of participants in terms of 
their identity so that their names or any other traits associated with them are not disclosed during 
the write-up (discussion) of the research (Allen and Wiles 2015). Saunders et al (2015b) view 
confidentiality as a generic term that applies to any information (verbal or written) that is concealed 
and not shared with anyone other than the researcher since complete anonymity can never really 
be achieved.  Trust considers the relationship between the researcher and the participants. 
Kemparaj and Chavan (2013) state that ethical issues are particularly important in studies of a 
qualitative nature because of the more intimate nature of the relationship that typically develops 
between researchers and study participants. All these issues are closely linked with the ten 
guidelines outlined by Bryman and Bell (2015). 
Prior to commencing the study, ethical approval was applied for and ethical clearance was obtained 
from the University of Salford Ethics Committee in order to conduct interviews with the EHPs. 
Each participant was sent an informed consent form (Appendix 2) stating their understanding and 
rights as participants. They were informed that their participation and their responses would be 
kept anonymous and confidential. None of the participants required formal permission from their 
local authority to participate in the study. Walliman (2011) states that informed or written consent 
should include the necessary information to fully inform participants. A similar view is offered by 
Blackstone (2012) who states that researchers need to provide details about the research including 
benefits of participation and any risks that may be involved in participating. In this study, the 
participants were asked to read and sign the consent form prior to interviews being carried out. 
The participants freely volunteered and were not compelled to take part. All interviewees were 
also made aware that the interview would be recorded. In face-to-face interviews, this would be 
clear as the interviewee could see the recording device, however, since online interviews were 
conducted the participants were made aware of the recording device (Deakin and Wakefield 2013). 
All the data obtained from the field in the form of a manuscript/hard copy were kept in a locked 
drawer, while the soft copies were stored in a computer and password protected. Particular care 
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was taken by the researcher to ensure that all removable storage instruments such as USB sticks 
were kept in a protected place (researcher’s home office) at all times. The name and the associated 
local authority of each participant was assigned pseudonyms to allow for some form of anonymity.  
5.13 Fieldwork Strategy and Limitations 
This study was set within the context of the principal local councils in the North West of England, 
namely those in Cheshire, Cumbria, Greater Manchester, Lancashire and Merseyside, representing 
rural and urban regions which consists of 41 Local Authorities. There will be, as with any research, 
limitations on the fieldwork, data and analysis. Apart from the usual limitation of resources and 
time constraints, the data only captured those EHPs that are employed within LAs in the North 
West of England. It excluded EHPs working in other parts of England and the UK, and also those 
working in the private sector or self-employed. It is hoped that this will capture the overall 
perception/views of EHPs in general and getting a sense of the applicability of the legislation as it 
was not be feasible to cover all local authorities within the England or the UK. However, a similar 
study could be undertaken in other regions of England and a larger comparative study could be 
undertaken on a global scale.  
 5.14 Chapter Summary 
This chapter discusses the various schools of thought of research philosophy and an explanation 
of the underpinning philosophy of the research outlining the justification for the choice of such a 
philosophy. The chapter also evaluates different data collection methods, their advantages and 
disadvantages and the justification for the selected method. Issues relating to reliability, validity, 
ethics and analysis were also discussed. The explanation of the research onion helped the 
researcher to understand the process and different variables of the research. This will enable the 
study to answer the key research questions as well as fulfil its aims and objectives. The following 
chapter of the research focuses on the findings of the study.  
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CHAPTER SIX: RESULTS  
6.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a review of the data analysis and results from the primary 
study. The structure of this chapter will be based on the research questions presented in the 
introductory chapter and aligning them with the themes of the empirical findings and gaps in the 
literature outlined in Chapter 4. 
The findings were developed from interviews with twenty-one Environmental Health Practitioners 
(EHPs) from seventeen Local Authorities (LAs) in the Northwest of England as discussed and 
justified in the methodology chapter of this thesis. The interviews were developed in terms of 
conversations in an attempt to get the respondents to talk freely about their experiences and 
opinions. This included obtaining information from significant gaps in knowledge such as views 
and opinions of EHPs with respect to race, gender and extent of experience. The study therefore 
purposed to build on the existing work of the Food Standards Agency (FSA) which could help 
inform policy and provide food enforcement guidance to food authorities.    
It is important to note that qualitative research is used to inform why people hold particular views, 
rather than how many people hold those views. Such research is intended to be illustrative rather 
than statistically reliable. With this in mind, when interpreting the findings from this research, it 
should be remembered that the results were not based on quantitative statistical evidence but on 
the views and perceptions of twenty-one food law enforcement officers. Throughout this chapter, 
verbatim comments have been included to illustrate particular viewpoints and the strength of 
feeling among respondents. The names of the respondents and the corresponding LAs are 
anonymised to protect individuals. Pseudonyms and numbers are used to replace the names of the 
respondents and their corresponding local authority so that it is not revealed which respondents 
are linked to a particular location. Other features from the data provided details of gender and years 
of food law enforcement experience and number of years qualified as an EHP, for example EHP11 
LA4, female; qualified as an EHP for 14 years and enforcing food law for 12 years. 
Several themes emerged from the interviews to address each research question. The summary of 
themes and responses emerged through analysing statements in each transcript. See Appendix 6 
for an example of a transcript. The results are presented in tables which consist of themes and sub-
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themes as well as a summary of key similarities and differences among respondents and a summary 
of the theme. 
As mentioned earlier, a total of 21 EHPs (12 male and 9 female) from 17 LAs took part in the 
study. The majority (12) of respondent EHPs had been employed at their LA for 15 years or less 
and a few (2) had been employed for more than 20 years. The study also revealed that the majority 
(12) of the respondents had been enforcing food law for 10 years or less. In addition, there was a 
minority (4) EHPs who had previously been active on other units of their respective environmental 
health departments for some time prior to working on the food team. Almost all the respondents 
(19) had been qualified as an EHP for 5 years or more with a small majority (8) indicating that 
they had been qualified as an EHP for 11 years or more. With respect to age, half of the respondents 
(10) were less than 40 years old and a small minority (4) were over 51 years of age.  
This information was gleaned from the questions in section one of the interview schedule: 
 Gender:                      Male (    )               Female (    ) 
 Age range:  21-30yrs (    )   31-40yrs (    )    41-50yrs (    )    51-60yrs (  )     61yrs+ (    ) 
 What is the name of your Local Authority (LA)?   
 How long have you worked for this LA? 
 How many years have you been fully qualified as an Environmental Health Practitioner?  
 How many years have you been enforcing food law? 
 How many food officers (including yourself) are in the team?  
6.2 Findings from Research Question 1 
RQ 1:  Are food hygiene inspections effective as a strategy in food law enforcement: views 
from the environmental health practitioners? 
This section will highlight results developed from the study as it relates to how EHPs view the 
effectiveness of food hygiene inspections in relation to other regulatory interventions. This 
research question fulfils research Objective 1: To investigate EHPs perceptions of food hygiene 
inspections as a regulatory intervention for food safety in capturing contraventions of the law. 
Themes from the interviews were developed: Regulatory Interventions (sub-themes - frequency of 
use; financial implications; practical solutions) and Inspection Practices (sub-themes - challenges; 
announced vs unannounced inspections; resource implications; strategies). Factors such as gender 
and level of experience was analysed to establish any similarities or differences since this has not 
been discussed in the literature. 
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The responses allowed the researcher to develop two interview themes to help achieve the 
objectives for this particular research question. 
1. Regulatory interventions 
2. Inspection practices 
There are several regulatory interventions at the disposal of EHPs and inspections are one of such 
regulatory intervention. EHPs were asked about their views regarding all regulatory interventions. 
It was necessary to gather this information in order to get an idea of how EHPs view other 
regulatory interventions, as well as inspections, which are also used in food law enforcement. The 
respondent EHPs were asked to make comments about the effectiveness of each intervention with 
respect to improving and sustaining compliance especially when dealing with repeated breaches 
of the food legislation. During the interviews the EHPs were allowed to talk liberally about the 
practicality of each intervention.  
6.2.1 Regulatory Interventions 
EHPs are equipped with regulatory interventions detailed in the Food Law Code of Practice 2015. 
These interventions are used to attempt to reduce the risk of potential foodborne hazards that may 
exist within a food business. EHPs have two types of intervention at their disposal, namely official 
controls and non-official controls. These interventions have already been discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3.  The responses of the sampled EHPs are highlighted in Table 6.1 below. The study 
identified three sub-themes from the gaps in literature to guide the investigation as well as a 
summary of the respondents’ responses. 
The information was gathered from questions in section two of the interview schedule: 
 What are your views on the current regulatory interventions? (Official controls: 
inspections; monitoring; surveillance; verification; audit; sampling. Non-official controls: 
education/advice; information and intelligence gathering; sampling). Answer how often 
you use these controls: always, sometimes or never. 
 Are they effective in improving and sustaining compliance and in dealing with repeated 
breaches of the legislation? 
 Practicability – do they work in practice? Why or why not? 
 Pros and cons of each regulatory intervention.                                                                        
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Table 6.1: EHP views on the regulatory interventions outlined in the Food Law Code of 
Practice 2015 
Theme: Regulatory Interventions 
Sub-Theme  Summary of Responses 
Frequency of use  Full inspection is the intervention that is mostly used by EHPs along with advice 
and education/training. One EHP highlighted his partiality towards education and 
training by saying: 
 
“A part of the job that I thoroughly enjoy – especially with new businesses. Many people 
are literally unaware of the requirements and it is satisfying to teach them new things and 
help them comply. Advice and training by themselves can have a greater impact than formal 
enforcement”. EHP6 LA1, male, qualified as EHP and been enforcing food law for 4 
years 
 
 EHPs are reluctant to use partial inspections. EHP7 from LA5 commented on the 
implication of using full inspection instead of partial inspection: 
 
“I manage a team of officers and I find officers are reluctant to use the ‘partial’ inspection 
because if something goes wrong down the line (for example, a food poisoning outbreak), 
the officer could be perceived to not have done a thorough job. In the majority of cases, 
officers carry out a full inspection even when a ‘partial’ would have been appropriate, for 
example in businesses perceived as being low risk”. EHP7 LA5 female qualified as an 
EHP for 16 years and enforcing food law for 17 years 
 
Another participant alluded to a similar notion: 
“A rolling program of full inspection is vital. It is effective and sustains compliance if it is 
consistent and focused. Partial inspection can be effective as a short term measure when 
only certain issues are addressed, e.g. projects, but we don’t really use it because something 
could go wrong as soon as we walk out of the door! It would be nice to cut back on full 
inspections and replace them with partial inspection, monitoring or verification visits but 
it’s just not possible”. EHP13 LA9 female qualified as an EHP and enforcing food law 
for 15 years 
 
 Some of regulatory interventions, namely audit, monitoring, verification and 
surveillance are part of the inspection process and should not be considered as 
separate/distinct components of enforcement. This is reflected in the following 
statements: 
 
“I don’t see the point of distinguishing between official and non-official controls. These 
interventions form part of the food hygiene inspection and so there isn’t a need for partial 
inspection, monitoring, surveillance, verification and audit. I’ve been enforcing food law 
for more than 20 years and I just don’t think there is a need for such interventions”. EHP3 
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LA3, female, qualified as an EHP for 32 years and been enforcing food law for 27 
years. 
 
“The Food Law Code of Practice needs to be reviewed so that some of the current 
regulatory interventions are disregarded as they are not really necessary. When we carry 
out an inspection we do all of these things – monitoring, audit etc. There are some of these 
interventions that I never use like surveillance and monitoring. I think the regulatory 
interventions should just include inspection (not partial), sampling, education/advice and 
intelligence gathering”. EHP20 LA16, male, qualified as EHP for 22 years and 
enforcing food law for 21 years. 
 
 Interventions such as sampling, whilst useful, are not used frequently because LAs 
are responsible for their own sampling budget and local government resources are 
being significantly reduced. 
 Intelligence gathering is the regulatory intervention that was thought of as having 
little practical use. 
 There are regulatory interventions that some EHPs define differently from that put 
forward by the FSA. 
 
Financial 
implications 
 Insufficient resources for ongoing food sampling programme. 
 No money for local authorities to implement their own education and training 
programmes to food handlers. 
 Dwindling workforce to carry out food law enforcement. 
 Inability for several LAs/EHPs to meet performance targets set by the Food 
Standards Agency due to staff shortages. 
 Fewer food hygiene inspections. 
 
Practical 
solutions  
 Eliminate performance related targets. 
 Reduce and/or eliminate those regulatory interventions that are considered as 
redundant. 
 Unnecessary to distinguish between official and non-official controls. 
 Deliver training courses to food handlers on site or have a designated officer(s) to 
deliver food hygiene training. 
 Food businesses to bear the cost of food sampling. 
 
Key similarities among participants: 
 Full inspection is the most effective regulatory intervention 
 Lack of resources prevents interventions such as sampling and training from being fully executed 
 
Key differences among participants: 
 The current regulatory interventions are adequate 
 The current food legislation facilitates consistency 
 Revision of food legislation needed 
 
Summary:  
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The respondents regarded full inspection as the most effective regulatory intervention. Although other 
interventions were considered of little practical use, a few of the respondents thought that the current regulatory 
interventions are adequate and revision of the food legislation is unnecessary. In addition, many local 
authorities are experiencing budget cuts which could lead to a change in the dynamics of an environmental 
health department and the way in which food businesses are inspected. 
 
6.2.2 Inspection practices amongst EHPs 
The sampled EHPs where asked a series of question about general inspection practices including: 
the challenges they encounter when carrying out food hygiene inspections; preference towards 
announced or unannounced inspections; whether and how the current economic climate has 
affected inspection activities and suggestions for new strategies that could assist them to 
effectively carry out inspection activities. Their responses are highlighted in Table 6.2 from the 
questions in section three (part A) of the interview schedule: 
 Do you think food hygiene inspections are effective in capturing food hygiene 
contraventions?  
 On average, how long does it take you to conduct a food hygiene inspection? (less than 
half an hour; 30-45 mins; 45mins – 1 hour; 1 - 1½ hours; 1½-2 hours; more than 2 hours 
 What do you consider sufficient time to conduct a food hygiene inspection?  
 Do you think there are areas on food hygiene inspections that could be modified to improve 
its effectiveness?  
 In your opinion, do you consider announced inspections better at achieving compliance 
than unannounced inspections?  
 What do you consider the optimum inspection frequency for food businesses? 
 
Table 6.2: The responses of the EHPs regarding their views about current inspection 
practices 
Theme: Inspection practices 
Sub-Theme  Summary of Responses 
Challenges  
 
 
 
 
 There is insufficient time to carry out a detailed inspection. Some of the 
concerns with respect to time are reflected in the following statement 
from a respondent: 
“I wish I could spend longer in some of the businesses I visit. Not because there 
are a lot of things wrong as such but because they don’t have a clue! They want 
to comply, of course, but not familiar with the legislation or what their 
responsibilities are. But I’m not a consultant and don’t get paid as such so I do 
my best to guide them in the right direction in the limited time I have. We are 
understaffed and got targets to meet and so can’t spend all day at one particular 
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place. I’d say on average I spend around 45 minutes at each premises”. EHP 
17 LA13, male with 17 years of food law enforcement 
 
 Inspections have several weaknesses.  EHP4 from LA4 provided further 
insight on this assertion: 
 
“One inspection may not be representative of the overall, long-term hygiene of 
a food business. On any given day, a particular food business may have greater 
or fewer offences than observed during an inspection. It is therefore up to the 
food business operator to ensure that the daily processes and procedures within 
the business are being operated in accordance with the law”.  EHP4 LA4 
female and enforcing food law for 8 years 
 
A similar view was held by an environmental health manager EHP 12 from LA8 
who had spent ten years enforcing food law prior to becoming a team leader: 
 
“I don’t think that a single inspection can capture all the problems within a 
food business and is not always a true reflection of the actual situation. We 
can’t spend every second at a business to witness what exactly food handlers 
are doing”. EHP12 LA8 female, team leader 
 
 There is a considerable amount of paperwork  
 Performance related targets need to be met  
 Revisits/re-inspections are a problem due to staff shortages 
 Inconsistencies among LAs in relation to the way inspections are carried 
out and how EHPs interpret of the legislation. One respondent made this 
comment: 
“There is a lack of consistency with respect to enforcement of food law between 
and within LAs. The interpretation of law and application of it has to be a lot 
more consistent. EHPs must be fully acquainted with the application and 
interpretation of food law, so LAs have to commit to ongoing training. 
Consistency courses within the food team and within local areas ( I attended 
one in Bootle last month for Cheshire and Merseyside councils) always raise 
the issues of inconsistency, sometimes due to officer opinion, sometimes due to 
FSA advice and other times to the leanings of the food team as a whole”. 
EHP10 LA5 female, qualified as an EHP and enforcing food law for 17 
years 
 
 Inconsistencies among LAs in relation to the way inspections are 
recorded. Some of the responses are illustrated below: 
 
“We do not use a food inspection form and haven’t done so for about 6 years 
due to cutbacks. As we had to send a letter out to each business with their food 
hygiene rating score and certificate it was decided that this was enough. Purely 
down to saving money. Our print room used to print them for us but they were 
going and as we were putting a letter together anyway for the food hygiene 
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rating score it was decided to put everything in the one letter. I prefer to leave 
something with an FBO though”. EHP15 LA11, female with 15 years 
qualified as an EHP and 12 years food law enforcement 
“No we haven’t used an inspection form about a year or so since it costs too 
much and the council is making cuts everywhere. I don’t mind really because it 
avoids duplication of effort since I had to write in my PACE notebook as well 
as inspection form which doesn’t give much room to write everything down. 
And if there is so much to write I’d use a separate notepad instead of the 
inspection form during the inspection. So I have the notepad, inspection form 
and PACE notebook!!! Although the decision was a cost-saving exercise I 
realise this could be a consistency issue if other LAs are using them. EHP13 
LA9, female with 15 years food law enforcement 
Announced inspections vs 
unannounced inspections 
 Announced inspections allows food businesses to prepare for the 
inspection 
 Announced inspections allow for the appropriate persons to be present 
 Unannounced inspections allow food businesses to take a proactive 
approach to food safety 
 Unannounced inspections allows for EHPs to get a true picture of the 
food business operation 
 There is no difference between announced inspections and unannounced 
inspections 
 
Some of the statements from the respondents regarding announced and 
unannounced inspections are articulated below: 
 
“We tend to carry out unannounced inspections. It keeps food businesses on 
their toes if we turn up when they are not expecting us to. We can find out what 
really goes on”. EHP5 LA1 male, qualified as an EHP and enforcing food 
law for 8 years 
 
“I have mixed feelings about this. On one hand unannounced inspections are 
good because we can catch them unawares. But on the other hand there may be 
only one person working at the time of inspection and if they are busy they do 
not have time to answer my questions, which can be frustrating. Announced 
inspections can be good because they know we are coming so there will be 
someone available to answer questions. But then again because they know we 
are coming, they clean up the place so the inspection findings at that particular 
time may not represent what goes on there normally”. EHP10 LA5 female, 
qualified as an EHP and enforcing food law for 17 years 
Resource implications  Budget cuts within LAs 
 Reduction in the number of inspections due to a reduced workforce 
 
Strategies  LAs should charge for re-inspections/revisits. 
 Licensing instead of registration of food businesses 
 A requirement for staff: premises ratio within food businesses 
 Introduce hand held computers to assist with the inspection process 
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 New/alternative strategies needed to deal with repeat offenders and 
minor offences 
 
Key similarities among participants: 
 Insufficient time to carry out detailed inspections 
 Large amount of paperwork  
 Targets have to be met 
 
Key differences among participants: 
 The use of inspection forms during a food hygiene inspection 
 Preference for announced or unannounced inspections 
 
Summary:  
The respondents identified that there is not enough time to carry out thorough inspections as they would like 
and targets have to be met. They all agreed that there is a considerable amount of paperwork that accompanies 
the inspection process.  Not all of the EHPs mentioned that they use inspection forms to record inspection 
findings and there were differences in opinion concerning preferences for announced and unannounced 
inspections.   
 
6.3 Findings from Research Question 2 
RQ 2: Do EHPs believe that the Food Hygiene Rating Scheme (FHRS) is a reliable risk based 
method to assess food businesses’ compliance with the law?  
This research question fulfils the aim of the study and research Objective 2: To investigate EHPs 
perceptions on the impact of the FHRS as a risk tool for enforcement. In actualising the objective 
of this study, the research sought to find out from the respondents if the food hygiene rating scheme 
is a good indicator of compliance. The study sought to investigate whether the FHRS is a valuable 
asset and benefit to EHPs for which there is limited qualitative data. Theme developed from the 
interviews: Perception of the food hygiene rating scheme (sub-themes – risk factors/criteria to be 
assessed; scoring system; disclosure of inspection results; limitations; practical solutions). The 
participants provided suggestions to improve the format of the FHRS which has not been discussed 
in previous literature. 
The Food Hygiene Rating Scheme (FHRS) is a means of communicating the results of a food 
hygiene inspection to the public and to businesses. The information is presented by means of 
numbers. The score is meant to assist Environmental Health Departments to determine the 
frequency of subsequent inspections in accordance with the Food Standards Agency’s Food Law 
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Code of Practice. This is discussed in further detail in Chapter 3 of this thesis. Table 6.3 presents 
the sub-themes and a summary of the corresponding responses for EHP perception of the food 
hygiene rating scheme. These were gathered from the questions in section three (part B) of the 
interview schedule: 
 How do you assess the overall impact of the Food Hygiene Rating Scheme (FHRS) in 
assisting EHPs with their work - do you think the FHRS has a positive or negative effect? 
 Have you encountered any challenges with the FHRS during the course of your inspection 
duties?  
 Do you think the components (criteria) of the FHRS (i.e. type of food/handling; method of 
processing; consumers at risk; vulnerable groups; compliance with food hygiene, 
confidence in management) and their corresponding scores capture the food safety and 
hygiene performance within food businesses?  
 Do you have anything else to add? Are there any components/elements that should be 
excluded or included in the FHRS?  
 Can you offer any suggestions? 
 
 Do you feel mandatory display of inspection scores at food businesses is a good approach 
to food businesses improving and sustaining compliance with food legislation?  
 
 Do you think the six point rating scale adequately indicates/communicates the level of 
compliance of food businesses?   
 Do you know of any other rating systems in other countries? If yes, which countries? And 
do you feel that system better assesses food hygiene performance of food businesses 
compared to that used in England?   
 
Theme: Perception of the food hygiene rating scheme 
Table 6.3 EHP perceptions of the food hygiene rating scheme 
Sub-Theme  Summary of Responses 
Risk factors/criteria to be 
assessed  
 There should be additional risk factors to assess 
 It would be a good idea to separate the components into critical (high 
risk), medium risk and non-critical (low risk) contraventions. 
 Most of the risk factors are somewhat vague 
 It is sometimes difficult to score the risk factors to be assessed when, for 
example, one or two of them is unsatisfactory and the rest are satisfactory 
 There is no information on the form to clarify how the risk factors are 
assessed 
 
Some of these concerns are reflected in the statements from respondents below: 
 
“I think the components don’t go into much detail. This is why I advocate to do 
away with target related performance and for more time carrying out an 
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inspection. If there were more and separate risk factors we can better identify 
what’s going on in a business”.  EHP6 LA1 male, qualified as an EHP and 
enforcing food law for 4 years  
 
“We have to assign scores to each of the risk factors on the rating form. I’m not 
sure if the risk factors take into account or represents all food safety risks. It 
groups them together but I think they should be separated with separate scores. 
Why not also separate critical (high risk), medium risk and non-critical (low risk) 
contraventions and score them accordingly”. EHP2 LA2 male, qualified as an 
EHP and enforcing food law for 1 year 
 
“For me the part A – the type of food and method of handling needs to be revised. 
There are some businesses that only sell chocolate bars and can drinks so I don’t 
know why a score of 5 is given. In addition I have been in such places where, 
although they are low risk in terms of food prep etc. the storage areas at the back 
of the premises are filthy. One of such premises I visited was over-run with 
cockroaches! So I think the whole rating scheme needs to be reviewed since it 
doesn’t account for some scenarios”. EHP4 LA4 female, qualified as an EHP 
and enforcing food law for 8 years 
 
Scoring system  The risk category supports the prioritisation of the inspection of food 
businesses. 
 The inspection score reflects the risks within a business. 
 A reasonable method for determining the frequency of inspections and 
compliance amongst food businesses. An EHP gave statistics to show 
how the food hygiene rating scheme had helped with compliance within 
his local authority:  
“This approach has been applied in our local authority over the last 7 years, 
where the level of compliance has increased from 75% in 2006/7 to 93% in 
20013/14”. EHP9 LA7 male, enforcing food law for 18 years 
 The risk categories, score and inspection frequency needs to be reviewed. 
 The scoring system does not adequately reflect the risk that there will be 
a food poisoning outbreak. 
 There should be a list of risk factors each having separate scores. 
 There is no explanation on the form to explain the scoring system means. 
 
Disclosure of inspection 
results 
 It should be mandatory for food businesses to conspicuously display the 
results of the inspection. Comments from two of the respondent EHPs in 
this study supported this proposal: 
“A further problem is that a business cannot be compelled to display its score 
(although you can find it on the Food Standards Agency website). Some might 
argue that if the business isn’t displaying its score then it obviously has a score 
lower than 3, but this isn’t always the case. When a business relocates or just 
starts up it won’t have a score anyway, as it is awaiting a visit. Equally a business 
may request a revisit or may even be appealing against a score. Mandatory 
display of scores should apply across all counties of the United Kingdom and not 
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just in Wales so that consumers are equally informed and protected. It seems 
unfair that English consumers are not allowed this benefit and additionally it 
does not provide a level playing field for businesses across the UK.  There should 
also be on the spot fines for those businesses who do not display their food 
hygiene rating”. EHP3 LA3 female and enforcing food law for 27 years 
 
“Food businesses should display their inspection score – good or bad. It’s 
mandatory in Wales and should be across the UK. We find that food businesses 
with high scores of say 4 or 5 will happily display their inspection results, 
whereas those with low scores will not. So I think it should be mandatory to 
display scores. It puts pressure on the poor performing businesses and probably 
more effective than taking them to court!!” EHP5 LA1 male and enforcing food 
law for 8 years 
 
 Inspections results are not presented in a way that both consumers and 
food businesses can understand. 
 There is no consistency of disclosure between LAs. 
 Food businesses are not punished if they display an inspection result that 
is false. 
 
Limitations   The FHRS is subjective and therefore may not be very accurate. A 
respondent who has been enforcing food law for more than 25 years 
mentioned that: 
 “The rating scheme is very subjective and there is a lack of consistency in the 
implementation of FHRS nationally. More guidance may be needed to increase 
its accuracy and in particular assist inexperienced officers so that the score 
reflects the hygienic status of the food business in question. I think the system 
should be revised by the FSA to better identify high risk practices”. EHP3 LA3 
female and enforcing food law for 27 years 
 Inability to detect high risk practices. 
 Inspections are not detailed enough so as to give a valid rating.  
 Resources do not allow a greater frequency of inspection. An EHP 
relatively new to food law enforcement made the following remarks: 
 
“The frequency of inspection is based on the food hygiene rating score. So high 
risk premises are meant to be inspected more frequently than low risk ones. I 
think premises should be inspected more frequently but this will put a strain on 
our already depleting financial and staff resources”. EHP16 LA12 male, 
qualified as an EHP for 5 years and enforcing food law for 2 years 
 
 There is no procedures in place to immediately change a rating score if, 
for example, a food business is given a 5 star rating one week then is 
implicated in a food poisoning/customer complaints the following week 
or month. 
 
Practical Solutions  Local authorities should use the same databases to record inspection data. 
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 The inspection score should correspond with the enforcement action. 
 Introduce more risk factors to be assessed, for example, healthy eating. 
 Separate major and minor contraventions and score each accordingly. 
 Food businesses should be charged for re-inspection. 
 Food businesses should be punished if they display a fictitious score. 
 Alternative methods/scoring system to assess contraventions. Two of the 
respondents made comments about other scoring systems to buttress their 
arguments:  
“I know the US uses a points deduction approach whereby the scores of food 
businesses are determined by the number of contraventions and points are either 
added or deducted accordingly depending on the contravention. I think it’s better 
because everything is on one proforma although I am not sure how they work out 
the number of points that need to be deduced for a particular contravention??? 
It may be a better system though, but it would mean a total revamp of the FHRS”. 
EHP3 LA3 female and enforcing food law for 27 years 
 
“The system in Scotland is slightly different to that used in England and Wales. 
It’s just a pass or improvement required, there are no levels of distinction 
regarding compliance. Not sure if this is a good idea because a pass result could 
be seen as there are no contraventions at all and the food operations are perfect 
when in fact there could be one or two minor things that need addressing (maybe 
on repeated offences). But saying that it could save a lot of paperwork if there 
are only two types of result”. EHP10 LA5 female and enforcing food law for 
17 years 
 Change risk categories to low, medium or high risk. 
 Rate food safety and hygiene practices as either full, partial or no 
compliance. 
 
Key similarities among participants: 
 Helps improve compliance 
 The FHRS is subjective 
 Mandatory display of food hygiene rating scores 
Key differences among participants: 
 The FHRS does not have the ability to fully detect high risk practices 
 Review of the food hygiene rating scheme is required 
Summary: 
The respondents agreed that a food hygiene rating scheme, although subjective, is necessary in order to 
prioritise inspections so that food businesses that pose a greater risk are inspected more frequently. In addition, 
it was believed that the FHRS helps improve compliance amongst food businesses and therefore it should be 
mandatory for food businesses to display their score. However, EHPs who had been enforcing food law for 
more than 10 years were of the opinion that the FHRS does not have the ability to detect high risk practices 
and so a review of the scheme is necessary. 
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6.4 Findings from Research Question 3 
RQ 3: Is there a perception that the enforcement role of EHPs will be improved if alternative 
food law enforcement tools were introduced? 
This section highlights the results from the Skype interviews of the EHPs to obtain their views and 
perceptions relating to regulatory enforcement tools that they have at their disposal. This research 
question fulfils the aim and research Objective 3 of this study. To critically examine the 
enforcement sanctions currently available to EHPs and whether (in their opinion) alternative 
enforcement tools would be more appropriate. EHPs perception of whether their enforcement 
tools are adequate and if alternative options would be more suitable or appropriate. Regulatory 
Enforcement and Sanctions Act (RESA) 2008 has primarily been used in other regulatory areas 
such as environmental protection. However, there is no data on how EHPs perceive RESA and the 
options of enforcement tools as an alternative regulatory enforcement option for EHPs outlined 
therein has not been discussed in literature. The themes developed from the interviews: Perceptions 
of the current enforcement toolkit (sub-themes – challenges; strategies to overcome these 
challenges) and perceptions of alternative enforcement toolkit, civil sanctions (sub-themes – 
practical limitations; practical benefits). 
The responses allowed the researcher to develop two interview themes to help achieve the 
objective for this particular research question. 
1) Current enforcement toolkit 
2) Alternative enforcement toolkit 
EHPs are equip with a range of enforcement tools as detailed in the Food Law Code of Practice 
2015 and Enforcement Polices of LAs. This section highlights the results from the telephone 
interviews of the EHPs to obtain their views and perceptions relating to regulatory enforcement 
tools that they have at their disposal. It also provides the results regarding the perceptions of the 
EHPs towards alternative forms of enforcement, namely civil sanctions. Civil sanctions were 
introduced via the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act (2008) primarily to give the 
Environment Agency a new range of powers. Tables 6.4 and 6.5 illustrate the sub-themes borne 
from questions in the interview schedule and summary of responses from the EHPs with respect 
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to the current enforcement toolkit and alternative tools in the form of civil sanctions. The responses 
were gathered from the questions in section three (part C and D) of the interview schedule: 
What are your views on the current enforcement toolkit provided under the Food Code of Practice?  
 Warning Letters 
 Hygiene Improvement Notices 
 Emergency Prohibition Notices 
 Cautions 
 Prosecution 
 Seizure and Detention 
 Remedial Action Notices 
How do you think these civil penalties will work for food offences: fixed penalty notices; 
discretionary requirements; stop notices; enforcement undertakings? 
 
6.4.1 Theme: Current Enforcement Toolkit 
Table 6.4 EHP perceptions of the current food law enforcement toolkit 
Sub-Theme  Summary of Responses 
Perceptions about current 
enforcement tools 
 Warning letters are not considered very useful. However, they are effective for 
usually compliant businesses that have minor contraventions. A female EHP who 
had been enforcing food law for 8 years provided further insight into this 
enforcement tool:  
“As a local authority we served almost 300 warning letters this year but only about 50 
percent complied with the letters, the rest did not comply. The breaches were only minor 
and would not warrant other forms of enforcement such as a hygiene improvement notice. 
If any of the officers were likely to serve a hygiene improvement notice the business could 
appeal and probably win so we are back to square one!!! We could visit these premises 
until we are blue in the face and they still wouldn’t change but they know we can’t do 
anything! It’s so frustrating at times. What is needed is some sort of fine for situations 
when a warning letter and/or advice would be ignored and it’s not appropriate to issue 
formal enforcement notices - something like getting a parking ticket. There’s only so many 
times you can give advice for minor offences not causing a risk to public health. For 
example not having antibacterial soap or paper towels or a dirty floor unless there are 
cockroaches etc. or sampling/swabbing shows evidence of bacteria can’t do anything 
formal. The profession needs something for these repeated often unsuccessful attempts. 
Allowing us to issue fixed penalty notices for such minor food hygiene offences would be 
ideal.” EHP4 LA4 female and enforcing food law for 8 years 
 
 HINs and EPNs are used frequently as a threat to prosecution. An EHP made this 
comment: 
“Prohibition notices are very effective for serious contraventions but must be 
proportionate and justified. Very effective, but very complicated procedure with 
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possibilities to make mistakes and risk financial penalties. Need to be confident that there 
is an imminent risk to health and that the court will agree otherwise the local authority 
will have to pay compensation to the food business not to mention staff time and legal 
costs”. EHP15 LA11 female, qualified as an EHP for 15 years and enforcing food law 
for 12 years 
 
Another respondent added her thoughts about HEPNs:  
“There is also a limited range of situations in which to enable an officer to use this notice. 
Can be a complex process that may put some EHPs off serving. A good tool, but quite 
bureaucratic in attending the Magistrates Court as it is the court that will issue a hygiene 
emergency prohibition order if they agree that there is an imminent risk of injury. All this 
has to be done within a certain time frame. We just pray that an inspection on a Friday 
afternoon does not result in any major problems!!!” EHP7 LA5 female, qualified as an 
EHP for 17 years and enforcing food law for 16 years 
 
 A caution has little effect in dealing with non-compliance. 
 Prosecutions are effective but costly and time consuming. One of the respondents 
who had just qualified as an EHP less than one year ago made this comment: 
“It’s an important deterrent to get food businesses to comply with the law. Prosecutions 
can be a highly effective deterrent allowing local authorities to set an example to food 
businesses in the area and a way of reassuring the public that the environmental health 
department is doing its job in promoting public health and preventing unsafe food to flood 
the market”. EHP1 LA1 male and enforcing food law for one year 
 There is some apprehension about pursing a prosecution. 
 Male EHPs are more likely to undertake a prosecution compared with their female 
counterparts. 
 No specific tool to deal with repeat offenders. 
 Time consuming to prepare informal and formal letters/notices. 
 Some enforcement tools are ineffective. 
 Non-white EHPs mentioned that they rarely used formal enforcement tools. 
 EHPs who had been employed on other units of environmental health stated that 
they did not use warning letters. 
 
Challenges in sustaining 
compliance 
 The current enforcement toolkit cannot effectively deal with repeated breaches of 
the law. 
 Food handlers are not knowledgeable in food safety and hygiene issues. 
 Food business operators are not knowledgeable in food safety management. 
 Poor attitudes of food business operators and food handlers 
 
Strategies to overcome 
these challenges  
 The introduction of monetary fines for contraventions which should reflect risk. 
 Introduce RANs for all types of food businesses and not just those that require 
approval. One of the respondents made this comment: 
“Remedial Action Notices are currently only available for use in approved premises in 
England but should be extended to all types of food businesses. The remedial action notice 
requires the food business to take prompt corrective action without the involvement of a 
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court. I know we have improvement notices but these don’t require immediate action by 
the food business operator and emergency prohibition notices are only used in the most 
serious cases and we have to apply to the court for an emergency prohibition order. With 
remedial action notices all the bureaucracy is removed!” EHP3 LA3 female, qualified 
as an EHP for 32 years and enforcing food law for 27 years 
 
 Revise procedures for taking legal action against food businesses 
 Legal training of EHPs. One of the EHPs mentioned her inexperience in court 
procedures and her views regarding this: 
“We only have one officer who works in the same office as us and oversees our legal issues 
but she does not have a legal background so cannot represent us in court. The LA solicitor 
works in another office and does not really get what we do. In an ideal world the LA would 
train/employ an environmental health officer to have a legal background that would 
understand food law and be able to represent us in court as well as having an awareness 
of food law issues. Some of our officers have been on the legal training course organised 
by the Food Standards Agency which was good but not really enough in my opinion. If we 
had a dedicated person who understood the issues and prepared the files maybe officers 
wouldn’t shy away from prosecutions”. EHP11 LA4 female, qualified as an EHP for 14 
years and enforcing food law for 12 years 
 Revision of enforcement tools that do not enhance compliance or assist EHPs in 
their enforcement duties. 
 Food business operators should pay a fee commensurate with the enforcement 
measure to be used. 
 There needs to be alternative measures and alternative penalties to assist EHPs in 
their enforcement duties. 
 Education of food business operators and food handlers 
 
Key similarities among participants: 
 Introduction of monetary fines 
 Introduction of RANs for non-approved premises 
 
Key differences among participants: 
 Current enforcement toolkit is ineffective to sustain and maintain compliance with food law. 
 Non-white EHPs and those who had previously worked on other units of environmental health departments had 
a different outlook towards enforcement sanctions. 
 
Summary: 
The respondents identified that monetary fines and RANs would greatly enhance the enforcement toolkit of EHPs. The 
respondents who had been enforcing food law for less than 15 years suggested that the current enforcement tools are 
ineffective to sustain and maintain compliance with food law.  
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6.4.2 Theme: Alternative enforcement toolkit: Civil Sanctions  
Table 6.5 EHP perceptions of civil sanctions as an alternative food law enforcement tool 
Sub-Theme  Summary of Responses 
Practical limitations  Uncertainty about civil sanctions in relation to food law enforcement. One 
EHP responded by saying: 
“Until these sanctions are introduced for food law, I’m not sure there’s much 
benefit on speculating how they might work. Need to think about how the penalty 
will be collected and what is done with the money from these penalties”. EHP9 
LA7 male, qualified as an EHP and enforcing food law for 18 years 
 There could be a problem with deciding on the level of fines to be handed 
out. 
 Civil sanctions will not add to the existing toolkit as a means to increase 
compliance and will detract from the current enforcement options already 
in place. An EHP who had been employed at her current LA for more than 
twenty years argued that: 
“We already have these powers in the form of warning letters, HIN’s and EPNs 
Although not an agreement between the two, the local authority will highlight 
what needs to be done and the business will need to implement these 
recommendations to ensure compliance.” EHP20 LA16 male, qualified as an 
EHP for 22 years and enforcing food law for 21 years 
 
 Food law offences may not be seen as a criminal act and therefore not 
taken seriously. 
 It is uncertain if the fines will be sufficient enough to deter businesses 
from complying with the law. 
 EHPs may become reluctant to prosecute and so more serious offenders 
could escape a prison sentence. 
Practical benefits  The fines collected from food businesses could be generated into monies 
for the local authority environmental health department to alleviate 
depleting resources. 
 Civil sanctions could act as a deterrent for committing food law offences. 
 The introduction of civil sanctions into food law will lessen the burden of 
having to prepare for a court case.  
 
A few respondents cited instances were fixed monetary penalties would be useful 
in food law enforcement: 
“They could be used for more serious one off issues, for example, not registering 
the food business within the specified time, no hot water, no food safety 
management system or inappropriately stored food. They would enable us to 
punish repeat offenders and offences that are minor but need addressing”. EHP4 
LA4, female, 8 years qualified and enforcing food law for 8 years 
 
Another respondent supported this assertion: 
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“Anything that involves a business parting with money due to non-compliance 
will work. No business wants to cut into their profits so hitting them hard with a 
monetary fine and/or charging for enforcement, for example, if an officer were 
to serve a warning letter, a business would be charged for this. The service of an 
improvement notice or an emergency prohibition notice would constitute a higher 
charge. I think this would solve the repeated offence problem”. EHP11 LA4 
female, qualified as an EHP for 14 years and enforcing food law for 12 years 
 Extension of the EHP toolkit. 
 Civil sanctions will boost compliance. 
 
 
Key similarities among participants: 
 Uncertainty about civil sanctions as an enforcement tool. 
Key differences among participants: 
 Civil sanctions will not add to the food law enforcement toolkit. 
  
Summary: 
The respondents raised doubt as to whether the introduction of civil sanctions would mean downgrading food law 
offences. However, they appeared to agree that monetary punishment is advantageous over lengthy court 
preparations. Those respondents who were male and enforcing food law for more than fifteen years stated that civil 
sanctions would not complement the current food law enforcement toolkit. 
 
  6.5 Findings from Research Question 4 
RQ4: Is a specialist court required to deal with food hygiene offences?  
This research obtained primary data acquiring the views of EHPs on whether food hygiene 
offences are dealt with fairly in magistrate’s courts or if they think there should be designated 
experts and courts to deal solely with food hygiene offences. This will fulfil research Objective 4 
of this study: To investigate EHPs perception of whether a specialist court should be required 
to deal with food law offences. 
The responses allowed the researcher to develop an interview theme to help achieve the objectives 
for this particular research question. The theme developed from the interviews: Food law cases 
(sub-themes – challenges; level of satisfaction with penalty; strategies to aid prosecution). There 
are no previous studies or literature except for those relating to environmental law and 
environmental offences (Adshead and Andrew 2009; Macrory 2014). The EHPs were asked 
whether an alternative way of dealing with food hygiene offences in the form of a specialist court 
would be beneficial to their enforcement. Table 6.6 presents the main theme of food law case with 
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sub-themes and a summary of the responses made by the EHPs from the questions in section three 
of the interview schedule: 
 How many times have you taken a case to court in the last 5 years (2006 to date)?  
None (  )  1-5 ( )  6-10 (   )  1-15 (   )   >15 (   ) 
 What is your opinion on the fines imposed by the courts (from your experience and in 
general)? For example, do you think the fines provide an effective deterrence to 
businesses? Do you think the fines provide a way of improving compliance with 
regulations? Do the penalties reflect the severity of the offence? 
 In your opinion are magistrates in your area fully appreciative of the seriousness of the 
food safety offences?   
 Do you think a specialised court, investigatory board or administrative tribunal should be 
set up to handle environmental health cases in place of the criminal court?  
 What would help to improve the effectiveness of enforcement activity? Why do you say 
that? What needs to take place for this to happen? 
Theme: Food law cases 
Table 6.6: EHP perceptions of whether a specialist court is required to deal with food hygiene 
offences 
Sub-Themes  Summary of Responses 
Challenges  Prosecutions are time consuming. 
 Reluctance to engage in a prosecution. 
 No legal team to solely deal with prosecutions. 
 The monetary fines for food offences are generally low. 
 Food offences not taken seriously. 
 Inadequate legal training for EHPs. 
 Inability of lay magistrates to handle technical issues of the law. 
 Magistrates have limited legal knowledge of food hygiene offences. One 
of the respondents gave this example: 
“There are some magistrates who are relatively well versed in the law but 
because they do not deal with food hygiene and safety offences on a regular 
basis I don’t think they know how to handle them. Food law can be quite 
technical and some magistrates find it difficult to figure out how to 
proportionate fines to individual offences” EHP10 LA5 female, qualified and 
enforcing food law for 17 years 
 
Level of satisfaction with 
penalty 
 Some EHPs are generally satisfied with the penalties given to food 
business operators. 
 A few EHPs were of the opinions that magistrates normally take food 
law offences seriously. This view is captured in the words of one of the 
EHPs: 
“Yes I think magistrates are relatively appreciative. I’ve been in food law 
enforcement for some time so I’ve got a feel of the attitude of some of the 
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magistrates. Although I haven’t taken that many prosecutions, the ones I do take 
somehow come up before the same magistrate who I think is quite competent. I 
know some of my colleagues are not happy with the magistrates they often 
face”. EHP20 LA16 male, qualified as an EHP for 22 years and enforcing 
food law for 21 years 
 
However, there were some mixed comments about the attitudes of the 
magistrates:         
“Yes, they are appreciative of the seriousness of the food safety offences but 
they seem to quite sympathetic towards the business operators regarding the 
fine!”   EHP9 LA7 male, qualified as an EHP and enforcing food law for 18 
years 
 
“They seem unsure about the legislation, but seem genuinely concerned when 
they see photographic evidence, and are keen to support EHPs”.  EHP2 LA2 
male, qualified as an EHP and enforcing food law for 1 year 
 Not enough guidance provided for magistrates. 
 
Strategies to aid prosecution  Certain food law offences should be classed as criminal acts. One of 
them made this comment: 
“I believe that the cases should be treated as they are – criminal. Hopefully 
serving to continue sending out a firm message that non-compliance is indeed 
a serious offence that can potentially carry a custodial sentence”. EHP10 LA5 
female, qualified as an EHP and enforcing food law for 17 years 
 
 A clear distinction ought to be made between regulatory and criminal 
offences. 
 More guidance required for magistrates regarding sentencing and 
interpretation of food law. 
 A specialist court is required to deal solely with food law offences which 
are not necessarily criminal. Some respondents made the following 
comments: 
“Having a specialist court to handle environmental health cases makes a lot 
more sense. I would even go a step further and advocate each specialist court 
deal solely with a particular aspect of environmental health, that is, solely food 
law or health and safety etc.”EHP4 LA4 female, qualified as an EHP and 
enforcing food law for 8 years 
 
“Why not just have one that deals with food hygiene offences only or health and 
safety offences only or environmental (pollution) offences only. Or if a specialist 
court etc. is not feasible then just train magistrates to deal only with food law 
offences so they become more effective”. EHP5 LA1 male, qualified as an 
EHP and enforcing food law for 8 years 
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“A good idea. Not sure what the logistics will be though! I suppose if those on 
the board or involved in the court are EHPs then it should be ok”. EHP1 LA1 
male, qualified as an EHP and enforcing food law for 1 year 
 
 A legal team should be nominated to solely deal with prosecutions. 
 
 A specialist court is required to deal solely with food law offences. 
 
 Alternative strategies to prosecutions are necessary. 
 
 There needs to be a review of the fines given to food business operators. 
 
 
Key similarities among participants: 
 EHPs need more legal training 
 Magistrates require more guidance on how to deal with food law offences. 
 A specialist court to only handle food law offences would be ideal.  
 
Key differences among participants: 
 Level of satisfaction with the penalties handed out by the courts.  
 
Summary: 
EHPs are reluctant to take up a prosecution and agreed that a specialist court to deal with food law offences would 
be a good initiative. There were differences in the responses provided by the EHPs in relation to the level of 
satisfaction with the penalties handed out by the courts. 
 
6.6 Findings from Research Question 5 
RQ5. What are the views and needs of EHPs regarding their level of training and the general 
working environment with respect to carrying out their enforcement duties?  
The study provided an insight into the issues EHPs face in carrying out their enforcement duties 
in view of budget cuts. The study sought to obtain EHPs perceptions on whether they receive 
effective and sufficient training in order for them to carry out their enforcement duties thus 
fulfilling research Objective 5 of this study. To investigate EHP views regarding their level of 
training and general working environment in relation to the current economic climate. 
The theme developed from the interviews: Professional development (sub-themes – university 
courses; professional training and career development; job satisfaction; recruitment and retention; 
service delivery).  There are no previous studies which provides qualitative data on how EHPs in 
the North West of England view their training regime and how this impacts their enforcement 
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activities. The responses allowed the researcher to develop an interview theme with reference to 
how EHPs view their level of training and whether it impacts their enforcement duties. The 
qualitative data provides new contribution to knowledge and the responses are presented in Table 
6.7 from the questions outlined in section four of the interview schedule: 
 What is your highest level of academic achievement/qualification? 
 What other training have you acquired? 
 Is the current economic climate affecting your environmental health department and the 
work of EHPs as a whole? 
 How do you see the future of environmental health? 
Theme: Professional development 
Table 6.7 EHP perceptions of training in the current economic climate 
Sub-Theme  Summary of Responses 
University courses  There are only a few universities that offer the environmental health 
degree. 
 Not all courses provide the same course content. 
 If the economic climate becomes bleak there will be fewer EHPs then 
even fewer universities that will offer the course. 
 Some of the university lecturers are not EHPs. 
 It is very difficult for students to get a work placement with a LA. 
 
Some of the opinions about the university courses are reflected in the 
statements from respondents below:  
“I’ve not long qualified as an EHP. The university course I did was enjoyable 
enough. Some of the modules involved real life case studies to prepare 
students to work as an EHO. However, it was not a sandwich course which 
meant that I had to find my own placement with a local authority in order to 
qualify as an EHP. I was fortunate in that I had written to the LA I am working 
now at the beginning of my course to enquire about a work placement and I 
had gone in there during the summer months to help out”. EHP1 LA1 male, 
qualified as an EHP and enforcing food law for 1 year 
 
“I’ve been qualified as an EHP for some time so do not hold a university 
degree in environmental health but rather a diploma as it was back then. It 
was a lot easier. Now I am told that students virtually have to jump through 
hoops to get their qualification”. EHP20 LA16 male, qualified as an EHP 
for 22 years and enforcing food law for 21 years 
 
“I don’t think the university courses offer a practical outlook to our job. I think 
it could be structured a lot better and include EHPs as guest speakers since 
some of the lecturers had worked as local authority EHPs”. EHP2 LA2 male, 
qualified as an EHP and enforcing food law for 1 year 
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“One of our students informed me that some universities only offer a 3 year 
course which means the student graduates with a degree but is not a qualified 
EHP. There should be opportunities in place for those unable to find a LA in 
which to so their placement”. EHP3 LA3 female, qualified as an EHP for 
32 years and enforcing food law for 27 years 
 
Professional training & career 
development 
 There is a staff appraisal and development system in place. 
 Training plans are in place so that the progress of all EHPs is 
monitored. 
 There is a requirement for authourised officers to complete 20hrs CPD 
and this needs to be reviewed. 
 The competency aspect of EHP training could include simulated 
kitchens of different scenarios that EHPs come across on a daily basis. 
 EHPs not encouraged to attain further qualifications such as 
MSc/MA/PhD. Only two of the respondents possessed master’s 
degrees. 
 
Job satisfaction  No scope for EHPs to attain further academic qualifications. 
 Reduction in staff and increase in workload. 
 No recognition for work. 
 No career advancement irrespective of postgraduate qualifications 
gained. 
 EHPs are paid relatively well and the job is quite flexible in terms of 
working hours. 
 
Some concerns are reflected in the statements from respondents below: 
“All EHPs in our local authority undergo an annual training review to identify 
training gaps. This is obviously a good strategy but most of the training 
courses are not particularly beneficial in my view. I have been on several 
consistency exercise courses but there is still some degree of inconsistencies 
even within the same local authority”. EHP4 LA4 female, qualified and 
enforcing food law for 8 years 
 
“I did a masters in environmental health about 2 years ago. Fortunately the 
council paid for me to do it. However, I am not given any additional 
responsibilities and there is no opportunity to climb the ladder so to speak”. 
EHP5 LA1 male, qualified and enforcing food law for 8 years 
 
“I’ve been in my current job for about 17 years and I’m still an EHP with no 
prospect of becoming a manager or team leader. I don’t really mind because 
I couldn’t be bothered with all the politics and bureaucracy that goes with the 
job!!” EHP7 LA5 female, qualified as an EHP for 17 years and enforcing 
food law for 16 years 
 
“Many of us are reluctant to take on a prosecution because you’re pretty much 
left on your own and if you don’t have everything in order you could end up 
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looking foolish. I would advocate for more practical training in legal issues 
and probably go as far as an academic course in law to make it worthwhile, 
just something that would give me confidence to prepare a case for court and 
how to conduct myself in a court room”. EHP11 LA4 female, qualified as 
an EHP for 14 years and enforcing food law for 12 years 
 
Recruitment and retention  Due to budget cuts some LAs are not recruiting EHPs. 
 It is difficult for student EHPs to get a paid placement with a LA so 
they can complete their course. 
 The future of environmental health looks bleak if budget cuts continue. 
 The older and more experienced EHPs are beginning to leave local 
government. 
 The younger and less experienced EHPs become disillusioned about 
their profession. 
 
“The future of environmental health looks unpromising for those up and 
coming EHPs. It’s ok for the likes of me because I’m retiring in another year 
and I don’t think the council will fill my vacancies as it hasn’t done so for 
about 3 years now!” EHP20 LA6 
 
“I’ve been in my current job for almost 10 years now and I can honestly say 
that it has never been a more stressful time. Our unit used to have 14 EHPs 
now we only have half that number and still have to fulfil the same targets! I 
do pity young people coming into the profession unless this is the career they 
REALLY want to do”. EHP4 LA4 female, qualified as and EHP and 
enforcing food law for 8 years 
 
“I’ve been qualified as an EHP for about 2 years now. I love the job but I’m 
thinking of getting another qualification just in case the Council ever decides 
to get rid of more people. I’ve applied to a couple of universities to study 
architecture. It will mean another 5 or so years of study but it will be worth it 
considering the job prospects and I’m still young at 28!” EHP16 LA12 male, 
qualified as an EHP for 5 years and enforcing food law for 2 years 
“The current budget cuts have resulted in low morale among the workforce 
with having to achieve unachievable targets”. EHP16 LA12 
 
“This is an important area and I consider this profession as important because 
someone needs to monitor these food businesses that are springing up all the 
time. People are always going to eat so there needs to be some sort of 
enforcement of food businesses so I don’t think the profession will die out 
despite the budget cuts. We just have to come up with a better way of doing 
things with the little we have”. EHP12 LA8 team leader 
 
“Our local authority is doing pretty well in this economic climate and in 
comparison to other LAs. We are able to give food hygiene training to food 
businesses and even have a program aimed at young children teaching them 
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the basics of food hygiene. That said, we are a relatively small LA and so do 
not have as many food businesses to inspect compared to a larger local 
authority so we are not under the stress and strain of trying to achieve our 
performance targets. We also haven’t lost as many staff and we do have an 
officer that has just about to qualify as an EHP so she will automatically be 
employed with us”. EHP3 LA3 female, qualified as an EHP for 32 years 
and enforcing food law for 27 years 
 
“We are not as bad as some. We have 7 EHPs, one of whom is part-time. From 
the remainder, 3 are EHOs and each has a technical officer to work with who 
are responsible for inspecting lower risk premises and basically act as 
regulatory support officers. This is a great help to the EHO when they are 
called upon to prepare for a prosecution or investigate a food poisoning 
outbreak”. EHP15 LA11 
 
“Most LAs are not recruiting which is bad news for newly qualified EHPs and 
those looking to attain their full qualification and registration as an 
environmental health officer”. EHP4 LA4 
 
Service delivery  EHPs are not carrying out a sufficient number of food hygiene 
inspections.  
 Education and training has become limited. 
 LAs may soon have to charge for environmental health services such 
as issuing enforcement notices. 
 There may be a more mobile workforce to reduce the costs spent on 
buildings. 
 The use of private agencies may be called upon to assist LAs to achieve 
their performance targets. 
 
“When our unit experienced an inability to achieve our targets, we had to 
employ EHPs from an employment agency to help with the backlog of 
inspections. It worked but costs us a lot of money. I think it would’ve been 
cheaper to pay us all overtime and/or request exemption from having to attain 
the specified targets”. EHP11 LA4 female, qualified as an EHP for 14 years 
and enforcing food law for 12 years 
 
“It appears that many LAs are only inspecting high risk premises. This is what 
we are doing here because we are low on human bodies to carry out 
inspections across the board”. EHP4 LA4 female, qualified as and EHP 
and enforcing food law for 8 years 
 
One of the respondents informed this study that this has already happened in 
part in her LA: 
“There are times when I do not need to go into the office so I work from home. 
My home computer is linked to the database so I can view my emails as well 
as inputting data from my inspections. This is great for me because it fits into 
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my family life plus I do not have to pay for parking since are offices are based 
in the city centre and we do not have free parking like we used to when our 
offices were based in the suburbs”. EHP11 LA4 female and enforcing food 
law for 12 years 
 
Key similarities among participants: 
 Future of the environmental health profession looks bleak 
 Staff shortages have resulted in stress, anxiety and unachievable targets 
 Income generating initiatives 
 Mobile workforce 
 
Key differences among participants: 
 University courses 
 Private agencies 
 Employment prospects 
 
Summary: 
LAs are having to adapt to the current economic climate by implementing income generating activities that 
will bring relied to their depleting resources. 
 
 
6.7 Chapter Summary  
In conclusion, the chapter has provided empirical evidence which revealed that the sampled EHPs 
are generally satisfied with the current range of enforcement tools when dealing with food hygiene 
and safety offences. However, the majority of the responses also imply that there is a gap in the 
enforcement powers toolkit that can effectively deal with certain situations when carrying out their 
enforcement duties. There are also underlining factors such as the economic climate that can affect 
the effectiveness of food law enforcement in England. Figure 6.1 visually depicts the conceptual 
model for the enforcement of food law as perceived by sampled EHPs in the Northwest of England. 
The institutional resources are those necessary to achieve effective food law enforcement. This 
consists of relevant, enforceable food laws and regulations executed by EHPs who are equipped 
with an enforcement toolkit. Through the process of qualitative analysis, the main contextual 
aspects that affect the effective enforcement of food laws and regulations are related to consistency 
(standardisation) of these laws and regulations; education and training factors affecting the work 
of EHPs; multiple enforcement tools. The outcomes and impact result in the laws and regulations 
being interpreted differently by individual EHPs especially with the availability of multiple 
enforcement options and lack of training/training opportunities in the workplace. This influences 
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how enforcement tools are applied when inspecting food establishments. These factors are also 
linked with increased stress in the workplace which in turn leads to EHPs leaving the profession. 
The next chapter moves on to discuss these results. 
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Figure 6.1: Conceptual Framework: Environmental Health Practitioners and the Enforcement of Food Safety Regulations in 
the England 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION  
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter detailed the analysis and results of this study. This chapter addresses the 
research objectives presented in the introductory chapter by aligning and comparing the empirical 
findings with existing literature and offering implications for the study. The structure of the 
discussion chapter will therefore be based on the objectives of this study. The chapter begins by 
addressing whether food hygiene inspections capture contraventions of the law and it then 
evaluates the impact of the food hygiene rating scheme as a risk strategy tool for enforcement. The 
chapter develops by examining whether alternative enforcement tools will assist EHPs in their 
enforcement duties and whether a specialist court is required to deal with food safety and hygiene 
offences. The chapter also discusses the coping mechanisms of EHPs in relation to their working 
environment amidst the current economic climate and concludes with proposing enforcement tools 
which could be used by LAs in England. 
7.2 Regulatory Interventions 
Objective: To investigate EHPs perceptions of food hygiene inspections as a regulatory 
intervention and whether it captures contraventions of food law 
7.2.1 Inspections 
All of the respondents (21) viewed full inspection as the most effective regulatory intervention that 
best captures compliance with legislative requirements. The majority (19) of EHPs considered 
partial inspections as unnecessary. Interestingly, those participants (2) who indicated that they 
frequently use partial inspections as a regulatory intervention were male and had been 
qualified/enforcing food law for less than 5 years. Nevertheless, inspections were generally seen 
in a positive light by the respondents compared with the other regulatory interventions because it 
was mentioned that inspections allowed EHPs to engage directly with food business operators 
(FBOs) by offering advice, in addition to observing their food safety and hygiene practices. These 
results are consistent with the data from the Local Authority Enforcement Monitoring System 
(LAEMS) which is the system that LAs use to report their food law enforcement activity to the 
Food Standards Agency (FSA). LAEMS showed that inspection is the regulatory intervention that 
is mainly used by EHPs in England during 2014/15. It indicated that inspections account for two-
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thirds of the total interventions. However, the LAEMS data groups inspections and audit together. 
This is a significant finding because according to some of the respondents of this study not all 
inspections include an audit.  One example given by the respondents was the inspection of low 
risk premises such as newsagents that only sell can drinks, chocolates and newspapers. This is 
critical given that LAEMS is meant to be an accurate recording of LA activity.  The implication 
of this is that EHPs may have a different understanding of what constitutes an inspection and what 
constitutes an audit and so LAs may not be documenting their enforcement activities correctly. 
This will therefore have future implications on how data for LAEMS is recorded. 
The sampled EHPs indicated their inability to make a comprehensive risk assessment of the food 
establishment when carrying out a partial inspection which is probably why the majority of the 
respondents viewed partial inspections as ineffective. These views project the notion that the 
effectiveness of a partial inspection is low. These results differ from the study by Bukowski et al 
(2012) in that the food enforcement officers in their study were in favour of partial inspections 
because they were considered as being better use of resources for inspecting low risk premises so 
that full inspections are used for higher risk premises. The findings from Bukowski et al (2012) 
also suggested that EHPs are using partial inspections on a regular basis although some LAs were 
recording partial inspection as an inspection rather than distinguishing between ‘partial’ and ‘full’. 
It appears that the majority of EHPs in this study are using full inspections irrespective of the risk 
within food businesses.  The respondents in this study indicated their preference for full inspection 
was mainly influenced by reports from Pennington (2009, 2014). They feared that if they did not 
carry out a full inspection, something could go wrong. Bukowski et al (2012) also reported that 
there was a strong fear among the EHPs that they would be held accountable should they use other 
official controls, instead of inspection even though it is written in the food law code of practice.  
In addition, some of the respondents mentioned that they did not agree with the FSA explanation 
of when to conduct a partial inspection. For example, the Food Law Code of Practice (COP) 2017 
suggests that a partial inspection is when EHPs can inspect a supermarket’s bakery at a different 
time to its restaurant. The majority of the EHPs in this study mentioned they would not really 
classify this as a partial inspection since a full inspection was being carried out. This is implies 
that the EHPs in this study did not accept the idea of partial inspection and thought it to be a 
confusing terminology associated with a food hygiene inspection. Furthermore, the LAEMS data 
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does not distinguish between full and partial inspections and so there is no way of knowing how 
many partial inspections were carried out by every LA.  Local Authorities are probably incorrectly 
recording statistics for LAEMS since partial inspections are being recorded as full inspections. 
These findings have implications for how statistics for LAEMS are recorded. A second implication 
is that the FSA may need to review whether partial inspections are a valuable tool for food law 
enforcement. 
Even though a full inspection was the preferred choice of intervention, the interviews revealed 
concerns associated with food hygiene inspections. One such concern relates to the fact that an 
inspection may not be illustrative of what actually goes on within a food business but rather a ‘snap 
shot’ of that particular moment in time. Another concern was related to the time taken to carry out 
an inspection. Almost all (20) of the respondents agreed that there is insufficient time to carry out 
a detailed inspection. During the interviews, the EHPs revealed that depleted financial and staffing 
resources meant that officers were unable to spend as much time as they would like carrying out 
an inspection particularly at those premises that need the most help. A little over half of the 
respondent EHPs (12) were spending thirty to forty-five minutes on average at food businesses. 
Some (6) of the sampled EHPs were devoting between forty five minutes and an hour carrying out 
food hygiene inspections. The remainder were spending between one and one and a half hours. It 
is interesting to note that the more experienced EHPs (10 years or more of food law enforcement) 
were spending less time carrying out food hygiene inspections than their less experienced (less 
than 10 years food law enforcement) colleagues. The majority of the respondents (17) stated that 
they would need to spend at around 1½-2 hours to carry out a thorough food hygiene inspection at 
those premises who prepare and cook food (as opposed to those businesses who sell prepacked 
low risk foods such as can drinks and chocolate bars). Some of them did mention that this would 
obviously depend on the size of the business with larger businesses taking up more of their time. 
The remaining respondents stated that they would require 2-2½ hours. This means that they may 
to have the propensity to be more thorough than their more experienced counterparts. This is 
contrary to what Laikko-Roto et al (2015) found in their study of food inspectors in Finland. They 
discovered that the more experienced officers with more than 10 years working experience in food 
control take more time to carry out food hygiene inspections compared with their less experienced 
colleagues. The Finnish study did not specifically mention the time EHPs take to conduct food 
hygiene inspections and their data was presented in a different way. Furthermore, there are no food 
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enforcement studies that provide such data. This study therefore provides a significant contribution 
to literature with respect to EHPs actual and preferred duration of food inspections.  
In addition, the majority (15) of EHPs (irrespective of gender and experience) mentioned that an 
additional 2-3 hours per day is used in completing paperwork including the preparation of letters, 
notices and entering inspection data into the computer database which adds more time to the 
overall inspection process. The remainder of the respondents indicated that they spent 1-2 hours 
per day in completing paperwork. This finding is not currently fully addressed in literature and 
will help fill the gap in the literature. There are several implications from these results. First of all, 
if EHPs are not spending sufficient time carrying out food inspections then they may not be able 
to observe any hidden contraventions. Secondly, the possible lack of in-depth inspections may 
have implications on whether targets set by the FSA need to be abolished so that EHPs do not have 
to worry about carrying out superficial inspections.  
By enquiring whether EHPs prefer to employ announced or unannounced inspections to aid 
enforcement gave an indication which method they thought maximises compliance among food 
businesses. The results from the empirical study revealed mixed views about preference towards 
announced or unannounced food hygiene inspections. The majority (17) of the respondents gave 
no definitive answer as to whether they preferred one type of inspection over the other and 
articulated pros and cons for each. The benefits of an announced inspection cited by these EHPs 
were being able to speak to the appropriate persons, fewer contraventions probably because the 
business will be better prepared and an amicable attitude of the food business operator/employees. 
The similarities between this study and that by Reske et al (2007) reiterates that announced food 
inspections results in fewer contraventions and cultivated better relationships between the 
inspector and the food business operator compared with unannounced inspections. The drawbacks 
mentioned by the respondents were relevant to shortcomings of an unannounced inspection and 
included not being able to speak to the person in charge; more contraventions found within the 
business; defensive and often uncooperative attitude of those working in the business; the business 
is not prepared for an inspection so a great deal of time is wasted looking for paperwork. These 
observations were not identified in the study by Reske et al (2007) since they were looking at the 
performance of the food business rather than the views of the EHPs and therefore this study builds 
on existing literature. Waters et al (2013) also concluded that announced inspections result in fewer 
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inadequate food safety practices compared with when inspections are unannounced. However, this 
study was carried out in the USA. Furthermore, in a recent study by Klerks et al (2013) their 
investigation focused on Dutch nursing homes rather than food businesses or EHPs. Hence, this 
becomes a significant finding which has emerged from the empirical study.  
The remaining four EHPs leaned towards unannounced inspections as their preference. It is 
interesting to note that these four respondents had been enforcing food law for fifteen years or 
more. Their reasons for favouring unannounced inspections is applicable to the disadvantages of 
carrying out an announced inspection. The main reason was obtaining a better idea of how the 
business operated since the business will be unaware of an EHP coming to inspect the business. 
Dechenaux and Samuel (2014) support this idea that unannounced inspections can be more 
effective than announced inspections enabling regulators (and enforcement officers) to make a 
better assessment/judgment of food hygiene and safety operations within that food business. 
However, they offered a different perspective about the potential problem with unannounced 
inspections. Their findings were based on the assumption that if inspectors are corrupt then they 
will warn a business of an impending inspection, therefore the inspection will not be unannounced. 
Businesses are therefore able to hide evidence of non-compliance to avoid punishment. The EHPs 
in this study did not refer to corruption as a way of warning a food business of an impending 
inspection. Their concern was more to do with food businesses fabricating records about what 
really happens within day-to-day running of the business. This is also supported in a report by 
Pennington (2009) who argues that announced inspections allow food business operators to 
fabricate documented evidence about food safety and hygiene operations within the business. The 
implications of this is that LAs need to ensure which inspection strategy would result in better 
compliance.  
Another important discovery from this study was the use of inspection forms to record inspection 
findings. About half of the respondent EHPs mentioned that their LA has stopped using them, 
mainly as a cost-cutting exercise. Those LAs that used inspection forms offered different 
presentations to capture inspection findings (see Appendix 6). The respondents that used 
inspection forms stated that using inspection forms allows them to recall and keep a record of their 
findings. They said it was also evidence that the food business has been inspected since the person 
in charge at the time of the inspection has to sign the form at the end of the inspection. There were 
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also some negative comments about the small amount of space allocated to write inspection 
findings and this was another reason given by some EHPs for not using an inspection form even 
though their LAs provided them.  
One of these respondents mentioned that every EHP in her LA devises their own inspection form 
and are therefore recording different information resulting in possible inconsistency. Some of the 
EHPs that worked for LAs that did not use inspection forms also mentioned that each officer had 
developed their own recording system, again resulting in possible inconsistency. It was also 
revealed by some of the respondents that no agreement could be made amongst colleagues within 
the same LA regarding a standard inspection form that can be used by all EHPs. When asked about 
the format of an inspection form and what it should include, almost all (18) of the respondents 
mentioned that the form should be two pages or less. A few of them stated that the inspection form 
should include critical and non-critical areas of food hygiene and safety based on those identified 
in a food safety management system (SFBB/HACCP). Some of them said that a checklist would 
be simpler because they would not need to worry about small allocated space to write in. They 
also added that inspection forms should be detailed enough so as to capture all contraventions 
within the business. The remaining three respondents did not offer any specific suggestions but 
agreed that the form should effectively capture any contraventions. These results build on existing 
literature conclusions proposed by Laikko-Roto et al (2015) who noted that the use of inspection 
reports for food officers in Finland, particularly standardised inspection reports, leads to greater 
consistency of inspection among inspectors. The empirical findings of this study fill the gap in 
literature by addressing the different presentations of such reports. The implications for LAs are 
that there also needs to be on-going training to ensure consistency as well as the implementation 
of a national standardised inspection forms to be used by all LAs as an aid to promote uniformity 
of food hygiene inspections.   
The recurrent theme throughout the responses was the economic instability experienced by the 
majority of LAs. Several EHPs mentioned that they were carrying out fewer inspections due to 
staff shortages. The implication of this is that fewer food hygiene inspections could lead to the 
possibility of an increase in food poisoning incidences.  
Nevertheless, some of the respondents proposed strategies to improve the inspection process. This 
included businesses having to acquire a license prior to trading so that a food business cannot trade 
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unless the EHP is satisfied that the food business operator is competent in food hygiene issues. 
One EHP suggest a staff: premises ratio meaning that there should be a mandatory minimum 
requirement for the number of staff/food handlers. Others provided income generating strategies 
such as charging businesses when an inspector has to revisit premises. There was also a suggestion 
for EHPs to use an I-pad or other palm-held device instead of having to rely on paper. These 
findings has important implications for developing an effective inspection strategy for EHPs and 
raises intriguing questions regarding the nature and extent of having to work to performance targets 
in an economically charged environment. 
7.2.2 Monitoring, surveillance, verification and audit 
It emerged that other regulatory interventions audit, verification, monitoring and surveillance were 
deemed as unnecessary since the majority (15) of the respondents (irrespective of gender and food 
law enforcement experience) believed that such interventions were ineffective on their own. This 
is consistent with the LAEMS data which reveals that verification and surveillance make up just 
under one fifth of the total interventions in England for 2014/15. There is no data for monitoring 
and audit is grouped with inspection (as mentioned earlier). The study by Bukowski et al (2012) 
only found one example of monitoring being used as an official control among their sampled EHP 
participants. EHPs who had worked on other environmental health units were not mentioned in 
the study by Bukowski et al (2012) but this study found that that the EHPs who were in favour of 
monitoring, surveillance, verification and audit had previously worked in other units of the 
environmental health such as health and safety and housing of their respective or different local 
authorities and these activities had been part of their daily tasks. This finding has not been 
considered by existing literature and adds to the discussion of whether some regulatory 
interventions are ineffective in assisting EHPs in their enforcement duties. The implication of this 
is that the FSA may wish to reassess these interventions and their practicality to food law 
enforcement. 
 
7.2.3 Sampling  
Sampling is classed as an official and non-official control where formal or informal samples can 
be taken. All of the sampled EHPs in this study were in agreement that sampling is a useful tool 
as a way of providing scientific evidence that food safety procedures are (or are not) working 
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adequately. They pointed out that sampling should be an official control only and considered it to 
be a valuable intervention tool albeit an expense to the local authority. It transpired through the 
Skype interviews that sampling is not something that is done on a regular basis (unless part of the 
Food Standards Agency or other co-ordinated sampling programmes, for example, food surveys 
and projects) due to the expense since sampling is the financial responsibility of local authorities 
and lack of resources was cited as a reason for carrying out very little sampling activity. In addition, 
only a minority (5) of the sampled LAs employed a designated officer for food sampling.  
These results correspond with the LAEMS data for 2014/15 which showed that the number of 
sampling visits have decreased by 1% from the previous year in the UK and a decrease of 9.5% 
for the number of official food samples reported to have been taken. There was no data exclusively 
for England. Consequently, there were suggestions from some of the sampled EHPs that the cost 
of taking and testing samples should be at the expense of the business and not the local authority. 
It was also proposed that there needs to be a nationally agreed guideline with respect to budgets in 
order to support this essential food control work. The EHPs in the study by Bukowski et al (2012) 
also cited expense as a reason for decreased sampling activity but there was no information 
regarding the number or calibre of officers involved in sampling nor were there suggestions on 
how to maximise sampling activity and so this study offers a unique contribution to the body of 
literature. 
The implications of these findings are given that the EHPs perceived sampling as an important 
regulatory function and therefore an important aspect of food law enforcement and consequently 
it may not necessary to distinguish sampling as an official and unofficial control. A second 
implication is that since LAs are experiencing budget cuts, they may benefit from income 
generating strategies such as charging businesses for food sampling activities carried out by LAs. 
 
7.2.4 Advice and education/training 
All of the sampled EHPs found advice and education/training to be a very useful intervention. This 
intervention was viewed as positive by both male and female EHPs irrespective of length of service 
and enforcement experience. These findings are also consistent with the LAEMS data which 
revealed that education and advice visits in the UK have increased in 2014/15 from the previous 
year.  
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It was thought that through education and training EHPs can build good relationships with food 
businesses thus resulting in greater compliance with the legislation. These comments are supported 
by the work carried out by Amodu and Hutter (2008); Bukowski (2012); Bardach and Kagan 
(2017) who suggest that education and training can secure long term compliance. 
The respondent EHPs perceived that this regulatory intervention may be more effective than any 
enforcement tool, monetary or otherwise. However, a small majority (10) of the respondents (those 
who had been enforcing food law for fifteen years or more), were of the opinion that advice and 
education by themselves are unlikely to sustain compliance in the long term and will probably only 
be useful for those businesses who are keen to comply.  
It also emerged from the discussion that very few environmental health departments deliver 
training courses to food businesses due to budget cuts. A small majority of participants indicated 
that in an ideal world there would be a designated environmental health officer(s) solely 
responsible for food safety training. It was thought that such officers would not only deliver food 
hygiene training courses, ideally on the premises of the food business, but also provide regular 
follow-ups of all businesses within the local authority district to ensure that knowledge is 
transferred to what is being done in practice. They also felt that local authority EHPs should be 
able to have the time to fully educate and train the businesses they are responsible for inspecting 
as this could probably lead to greater compliance and knowledge of the law among many food 
businesses.   
The implications for these findings is that if most of the literature reveals that education/training 
increase compliance with food legislation then LAs will need to have a generous training budget 
in order to effectively assist food businesses in gaining knowledge to comply with the law. In 
addition, food hygiene training should be relevant to the needs of the food handler and the business 
so that they can be motivated to have a positive attitude towards food hygiene and safety issues. 
This could be achieved by incorporating a separate inspection score rating for education and 
training as one of the respondent EHPs suggested.  
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7.2.5 Intelligence Gathering 
Intelligence gathering was another intervention that all EHPs were rarely using because it was 
thought of as having little practical use. This is in contrast to the study by Bukowski et al (2012) 
in which the respondents indicated that intelligence gathering is an important aspect of their daily 
activities and a crucial part in their enforcement role.  Furthermore, the LAEMS data revealed that 
the use of this intervention has increased in 2014/15 from the previous year and was used more 
times by EHPs compared with advice/education and sampling visits during 2014/15 in England. 
The EHPs in the Bukowski et al (2012) study concluded intelligence gathering was necessary 
because they said it was essential to have a detailed and comprehensive understanding of a business 
prior to inspection. The majority (16) of the respondent EHPs in this study, however, appeared to 
have a different understanding of intelligence gathering and took it to imply an alternative 
enforcement strategy involving sending out questionnaires to obtain information from low risk 
food businesses in order to ensure the LA database is kept up to date thereby targeting businesses 
that may not have been inspected for a number of years. The remaining respondents did not offer 
any comments other than whether or not they thought intelligence gathering was an effective 
regulatory intervention.  The respondents viewed this intervention as having little practical use 
because of the low response rates from businesses and the incorrect information received from 
those that complete the questionnaire. This study therefore identified a different perspective of 
intelligence gathering as a regulatory intervention as understood by EHPs. This may have 
implications as to how this regulatory intervention is used since the EHPs in this study have a 
different understanding regarding the concept of intelligence gathering as a regulatory 
intervention. It also has implications of how the law is interpreted and the debate around 
consistency. 
 
7.3 Food Hygiene Rating Scheme  
Objective: To investigate EHP perceptions on the impact of the food hygiene rating scheme as 
a risk strategy tool for enforcement. 
The majority (17) of the respondents thought that the Food Hygiene Rating Scheme (FHRS) had 
a positive effect in assisting EHPs with their work. These respondents indicated that the scheme 
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had brought some improvements to the overall performance of food businesses in terms of 
compliance with the law. There was a belief among the EHPs that food businesses thought that 
potential customers will be positively influenced by a high food hygiene rating score. These results 
support an evaluation carried out by Vegaris (2015) who found that the FHRS had a positive impact 
on the standards of food hygiene amongst food businesses. Those businesses achieving a score of 
3 and above increased by 2% in the first year that the scheme was introduced. Simultaneously, the 
number of business with a score of 0 or 1 decreased by 1.9% in the first year of the scheme 
operating and 1.7% in the second year. Moreover, LAEMS data for 2014/15 showed an increase 
in food businesses that are broadly compliant in England (93.3%) compared to 92.1% in the 
previous year 2013/14. During the interviews some of the EHPs elaborated further to say that the 
FHRS created competition between businesses to get better scores than rivals thus driving up 
standards as FBOs realise that their business will suffer without a decent score and they believed 
that FBOs feared the threat of harsh media coverage. This claim is supported by the work of Choi 
et al (2011) and Vegaris (2015). This implies that the concept of the FHRS is important with 
regards to food law enforcement and compliance with food legislation.  
However, some EHPs presented contrary views about the food hygiene rating scheme in that it is 
very subjective and there is a lack of consistency in the implementation of FHRS nationally. They 
suggested that more guidance may be needed to increase its accuracy so that the score reflects the 
hygienic status of the food business in question, in addition to assisting inexperienced officers. In 
relation to this, a number of issues were identified with regards to the criteria (risk factors) used to 
assess the performance of the food business. This provoked a mixed response from the EHPs. A 
small majority (13) were of the view that these risk factors were satisfactory, whilst others were 
not necessarily critical of the FHRS but pointed out that the risk factors did not represent all food 
safety risks.  A small number of the respondents suggested introducing more risk factors and 
separating them into critical and non-critical contraventions and scoring them accordingly. The 
unique aspect of this finding is that the current literature does not cover improvements that could 
be made to the FHRS. The implication of this is that an improved scheme will better identify the 
food hygiene and safety risks within food businesses.  Examples of additional risk factors include 
healthy eating; previous compliance history and food safety knowledge. 
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 None of the respondents were particularly sure what form the scoring system should take with 
regards to the risk factors, since they did not understand the how the current scores (multiples of 
5) came to light nor were they certain whether these scores reflected the risks within a food 
business. These findings build on the research by da Cunha et al (2016) who concluded from their 
study that different risk categories should have corresponding weighted scores in order to evaluate 
food safety in food businesses. However, they stated that such mathematical scores may be 
ineffective in determining the risks of foodborne disease and therefore being able to identify those 
food businesses that are likely to cause a food poisoning outbreak.  
There were also some cynical comments from a minority of EHPs who stated that the system could 
be prone to abuse in that a score of 4 or 5 could be issued then standards could slip and this would 
probably not be caught until the next inspection and so does not reflect what is happening 
throughout the whole year and customers will be deceived. There was a sense among a small 
majority of EHPs that the FHRS creates inconsistency and believed that other scoring methods 
would enhance the overall accuracy of the evaluating food businesses in relation to their 
compliance with the legislation. Several of the respondents made reference to other scoring 
systems in Scotland and the USA to buttress their arguments. An implication of these views is that 
the FSA may need to review the current FHRS and introduce a scheme that will better capture and 
illustrate the risks within a food business.  
Almost all (19) of the respondents called for food businesses to be inspected more frequently 
because of their belief that there is so much non-compliance. The majority of the respondent EHPs 
believed that frequent inspections would lead to a reduction in the number of contraventions found 
during an inspection. The ideal inspection frequency among the sampled EHPs in this study was 
every three months (about 4 times a year) for premises considered high risk and twice a year for 
low risk premises.  This supports the work of Newbold et al (2008) in which the majority of 
respondents (82%) believed three to four times annually would an ideal number of inspections for 
food businesses.  It further supports a study by Pizzino and Rupp (2013) who showed that an 
increased frequency of inspection did correspond to a reduced number of contraventions found in 
food businesses. These studies were carried out in Canada and the USA respectively. Conversely, 
there is research that refutes these claims, in that less inspections rather, improve compliance 
amongst businesses (Dechenaux and Samuel 2014).  
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All of the respondents argued for the display of food hygiene rating scores to become mandatory 
in England as it is in Wales. They stated that this would improve compliance with the legislation. 
About half of the respondents argued that there should also be on-the-spot fines for those 
businesses who do not display their food hygiene rating since it is only those businesses who 
achieve a score of 4 or 5 that are happy to display their inspection score. This is consistent with a 
study by Vegaris (2015) who revealed that in England the percentage of food businesses displaying 
the score in 2014 was 63% compared to 20% of those food businesses with a rating of 0, 1 or 2.  
These findings support Etienne et al (2015) who provide data to indicate that since introducing the 
mandatory display of rating scores in Wales, the number of food businesses achieving the top score 
of 5 increased from 37% in October 2012 to 45% a year later when it became mandatory for 
businesses to display their rating. Twelve months after this scheme began the percentage of food 
businesses achieving a rating of 5 has increased further to 56% and there has also been a decrease 
in businesses with low ratings: 0, 1 or 2 (13.6% in 2013 to 6.3% in 2014).  Similarly, Spencer and 
Young (2015) conducted a survey of over 1500 businesses in England, Northern Ireland and Wales 
and found that 75% were in favour of mandatory display of inspection scores. This implies that 
the mandatory display of inspection scores is imperative.  
This study further shows that the use of the FHRS may not be the best way to assess food business 
compliance unlike what the current literature says. Some of the EHPs believed that it does not 
provide the desired accuracy to assess compliance. Whilst the benefit might be providing 
motivation to compliance, the desired effect is not achieved. This study reveals that more efficient 
mechanisms/procedures may need to be introduced to complement such a framework in order to 
accurately measure compliance. 
There is a tendency for environmental health to reduce compliance to simple tools but in reality 
more complex and sophisticated systems may have to be utilised. Given the fact that less 
experienced EHPs are spending more time conducting inspections it might be worthwhile looking 
into systems that are more accurate (rather than elaborate) in order not to burden EHPs.  
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7.4 Current Enforcement Toolkit 
Objective: To examine the enforcement sanctions currently available to EHPs and whether (in 
their opinion) alternative enforcement tools would be more appropriate.  
 
7.4.1 Warning Letters 
The opinion of the respondents was mixed about the effectiveness of written warnings in 
increasing standards of compliance among food businesses. Only a minority (7) of the respondents 
thought that warning letters were an effective tool in ensuring compliance. The respondents who 
viewed written warnings as effective stated that the food businesses they encounter generally show 
willingness to comply with the law so warning letters suit these circumstances. One EHP explained 
that warning letters provide a threat of legal action but only effective if food business voluntarily 
comply with the law (i.e. do not need to be coerced). It also emerged from the majority of the other 
respondents that warning letters are not very effective for repeated breaches that are considered 
minor, for example, no antibacterial soap at the wash hand basin. These findings correspond with 
those observed in a study by Bukowski et al (2012) who reported that the respondents had mixed 
feelings about warning letters and also acknowledged that warning letters were not effective for 
those food business operators who are apathetic.  
The LAEMS data indicated that warning letters were issued far more than any other enforcement 
method in England and the UK overall. In 2014/15: 126,929 out of 132,714 of the total 
enforcement actions in England and 160,205 out of a total of 167,338 for the UK were for warning 
letters. From this data it could be assumed that many of the food businesses are voluntarily 
compliant given the vast amount of warning letters that are being issued on an annual basis. 
Moreover, the LAEMS data which showed that the majority of food businesses in England (93.3%) 
are broadly compliant for 2014/15 which means food businesses are exhibiting a good level of 
compliant behaviour and acquiring a food hygiene rating score of 3 or above. However, a 
significant finding of this study revealed that the perception of the sampled EHPs is that food 
businesses do not show such level of compliance as the LAEMS data indicates. Another significant 
finding from this study is that those respondents who regularly used warning letters were non-
white EHPs. Moreover, those EHPs who had previously worked on other units mentioned that they 
rarely issued warning letters because they considered them pointless. For example, one of the 
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respondents who had previously worked on the housing unit of her LA argued that issuing a 
warning letter on an owner of a vacant property that had an overgrown garden and causing 
problems to its neighbouring property that is not vacant, would be futile. She mentioned food 
safety contraventions are not less important so considered warning letters ineffective.  
7.4.2 Hygiene Improvement Notices 
The sampled EHPs were almost unanimous in mentioning that hygiene improvement notices 
(HINs) were an effective way of achieving compliance amongst food businesses albeit time 
consuming to prepare. The Skype interviews also revealed that HINs are a more effective way to 
deal with non-compliance compared with warning letters. A small majority (13) of the respondents 
thought that contraventions of the law can be dealt with more effectively by issuing a hygiene 
improvement notice since failure to comply with an HIN is an offence and can result in 
prosecution. Other respondents offered no thoughts on this issue although a few of them stated that 
voluntary compliance is more likely to be longer lasting than enforced compliance. These results 
are also consistent with the study by Bukowski et al (2012) were it was discovered that this was 
the formal enforcement measure that was commonly used by EHPs. This is also reflected in the 
LAEMS data which shows that after written warnings this type of enforcement is most commonly 
used by EHPs in England in 2014/15 albeit a slight decrease from the previous year. The 
implications for these findings are that hygiene improvement notices are an important aspect of 
food law enforcement. 
 
7.4.3 Hygiene Emergency Prohibition Notices 
The majority (17) of EHPs thought that HEPNs are an effective tool for food law enforcement but 
less than a quarter (3) of the respondents have issued this type of notice. This corresponds with the 
statistics in the LAEMS data which show that HEPNs are issued far less than warning letters and 
hygiene improvement notices. Between 2011/12 and 2013/14, in English local authorities, an 
annual average of 9 out of every 1000 establishments was subject to a HIN. It transpired through 
the interviews that this particular enforcement tool can be fraught with limitations. Some of the 
respondents mentioned that HEPNs are very effective for serious contraventions but there is a very 
complicated procedure with possibilities to make mistakes and risk financial penalties. They 
stressed that prior to issuing this type of notice, there is a need to be confident there is an imminent 
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risk to health and that the Magistrates Court will agree otherwise the local authority will have to 
pay compensation to the food business. No literature currently identifies these 
findings/observations, hence it helps fill the gap in literature. Other significant findings that are 
not found in the literature also emerged from this study. First of all, the more experienced EHPs 
use this enforcement tool more than their less experienced colleagues. Secondly, those EHPs who 
had previously worked in other regulatory areas, for example, health and safety, were the EHPs 
who had regularly used this enforcement tool compared to those EHPs who had not previously 
worked on other environmental health units. This is a contribution that has not been previously 
reported or explored, that is, whether EHPs who had worked on other units have a different 
approach to food law enforcement. The implication is that although HEPNs are beneficial to 
enforcement, the procedure for issuing this notice may need to be reviewed so that they become 
more widely used by EHPs. 
7.4.4 Prosecution  
Prosecution was the enforcement tool that was considered to be most effective in dealing with the 
most serious food hygiene offences by all the sampled EHPs. Nevertheless, only a minority (4) of 
sampled EHPs had been involved in prosecution cases during the last eight years. This is consistent 
with the LAEMS data which indicates that the number of prosecutions decreased in 2014/15 
compared with 2013/14. However, the LAEMS data also reveals that LAs in England are involved 
in the most prosecutions compared with Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The data shows 
that LAs in England undertake more than 4 times as many prosecutions than the other three 
countries put together. This is probably because there are more LAs in England or it could be that 
the prosecution process is different and this could have implications for consistency.   
The EHPs involved in prosecutions in this study were mainly experienced EHPs, who had been 
involved with food law enforcement for 12 years or more, although one of them had only been 
qualified for less than 5 years. It also appeared that male EHPs were more likely to be involved in 
prosecutions than their female colleagues which is a new finding and contribution to the literature. 
This finding provides additional insight of the extent to which a particular gender is predisposed 
to prosecution. Therefore a local authority that is predominately male will likely to undertake more 
prosecutions. The demographic characteristics of a particular LA can shape the extent to which 
people are likely to prosecute. This is an essential insight which the literature does not discuss. 
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From the findings only four EHPs mentioned that they had undertaken a prosecution in the last 
eight years. These four EHPs consisted of one female and three males. Beyond this among those 
who had not been involved in prosecution, the males indicated their likelihood to prosecute more 
than the females. Irrespective of the fact that the sample had more males compared to females 
because higher ratio regarding the tendency to want to prosecute. It is important to understand why 
this pattern occurs, maybe the males are more militant and authoritative than the women and want 
to exert their authority. It appeared that the female EHPs were more willing to give food businesses 
an opportunity for remedial action. This requires further exploration regarding the gender identity 
of the EHP with respect to the propensity to prosecute. 
The reasons given by the EHPs for the infrequent use of prosecution as an enforcement tool was 
because they lacked confidence, lack of legal training, fear of failure and that the fact that it is a 
time consuming process. Nonetheless, prosecution was also seen by the majority of EHPs in this 
study as a way of raising the profile of the LA assuming that it is successful.   
It also transpired that only two LAs employed an officer to specifically deal with legal proceedings. 
The other environmental health departments worked with the local authority legal team to which 
some of the respondent EHPs mentioned had its drawbacks. The problems these EHPs encountered 
were mainly related to communication in that their legal team was based in a different building 
from the environmental health department.    
When asked to evaluate the impact of the fine imposed by the courts, two of the EHPs who had 
been involved in prosecutions were generally satisfied with the punishment given by the courts. 
They stated that the fine reflected the nature of the offence. The other EHPs were not satisfied with 
the outcome of the court cases and felt that the fines did not really have a strong deterrent to prevent 
future contraventions of the law. They also argued that the level of fines is different for similar 
offences across the country and therefore cases are dealt with inconsistently as each court across 
the country is different. These results support a survey by Moran (2005) also found inconsistency 
between different Magistrates' Courts and even between different magistrates in the same court 
with respect to the amount of fine given. However, the study by Moran (2005) was over 10 years 
ago and explored environmental regulations not food regulations. Hence this becomes a significant 
finding since EHPs that enforce food safety regulations are not referred to in this literature. The 
implication of this is that since magistrates play a strategic role in food law enforcement, it is 
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essential that there is a uniformity of policies and procedures in place with respect to dealing with 
food safety and hygiene offences. 
Another significant finding that emerged from the study and not previously found in the literature 
is the views of those who had previously worked on other environmental health units such as health 
and safety, housing and environmental pollution. One of the respondents who had previously 
worked on the housing unit with another LA revealed that she had taken one prosecution whilst 
on housing. She felt that it was much easier to take a prosecution on other units of environmental 
health. The implications of these findings are prosecution is an important enforcement tool but the 
process needs to be less burdensome for EHPs so that they will not be reluctant to take 
prosecutions. 
 
7.4.5 Cautions 
An inspector can issue a formal caution.  A formal caution is a statement by an inspector that says 
that an offence has been committed for which the offender can be prosecuted and convicted. A 
small number (4) of the sampled EHPs indicated that they have used formal cautions. These EHPs 
were the ones who had been involved in prosecutions. These findings do not support the study by 
Bukowski et al (2012) where the respondents expressed an increased use of cautions as an 
alternative to prosecution. The findings of this study is, however, consistent with the LAEMS data 
reveal that the use of cautions as an enforcement tool has been decreasing in the UK over three 
years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15. This implies that unless an EHP will embark on a 
prosecution, cautions have no use.  
Conversely, the remainder of the respondents in this study indicated that cautions are of no use 
and have little effect in preventing a recurrence of offences, or in increasing the level of fines at 
subsequent prosecutions. According to one of them, a caution only achieves short-term compliance 
and does not seem to have any long-term effects to a positive change in behaviour. Not only that, 
in her experience getting the offender to admit the offence can be strained and ethnic food business 
operators fail to understand the significance of the caution. 
The implications of these findings are that cautions are not an essential enforcement tool for EHPs 
given its limited use by this sample. 
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7.4.6 Seizure and Detention 
The study revealed that seizure and detention were occasionally and rarely used respectively by 
the majority of the sampled EHPs These results are consistent with the findings of the study by 
Bukowski et al (2012) in which none of the participants mentioned that they used seizure and 
detention as an enforcement tool. However, this is contrary to the LAEMS data which reveals that 
this enforcement tool was used more than HEPNs and prosecutions in England during 2014/15. 
However, it was perceived to be effective by all the respondents since it involves the removal of 
unsafe food and therefore ensuring public health and well-being. Another benefit given by some 
of the EHPs was that the loss of stock will always hurt businesses financially so this enforcement 
tool acts as extra deterrent with no financial risk involved for the LA.  
Furthermore, just under half (9) of the sampled EHPs believed that this regulatory intervention 
would function better without the need for a magistrate. They explained that a great deal of time 
could be saved if officers avoided the step of having to apply to a magistrate’s court for them to 
decide whether the food in question must be condemned. Other EHPs disagreed and argued that 
there needs to be some involvement of the courts because in some cases it could be classed as food 
crime which is serious and serious offenders must be heavily punished especially in view of the 
horsemeat incident. These findings further add to the discussions on the role of magistrates in food 
law enforcement. The implications of these findings are LAs may need to revisit their policies on 
seizure and detention. 
7.4.7 Remedial Action Notices 
Almost all the sampled EHPs suggested that remedial action notices (RANs) be introduced in food 
premises not subject to approval (these notices are exclusively issued on food businesses who 
operate under Regulation 853/2004 (generally slaughterhouses, cutting plants, and businesses 
processing or manufacturing products of any animal origin). The main factor influencing this 
choice is that RANs require prompt corrective action to be taken by a food business operator 
without the need to go to court. They provided further insight into this issue by saying that this 
enforcement tool is important for food businesses that would not comply with the law voluntarily. 
These results seem consistent with the respondents that took part in a study by Etienne et al (2012) 
who also suggested that RANs be used for all types of food businesses. Furthermore, a more recent 
study by Etienne et al (2015) revealed that since the introduction of RANs in 2012 for Scotland, 
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Wales and Northern Ireland for all types of food businesses, the use of RANs in these countries 
have been increasingly used. This is reflected in the LAEMS data which shows a slight increase 
in 2014/15 compared to the previous years 2012/13 and 2013/14 for all four countries. However, 
none of the sampled EHPs in this study had used remedial action notices in their enforcement 
duties although they are available for approved premises for the prohibition of the use of any 
equipment or any part of the establishment. It is therefore interesting to note that English LAs issue 
the second highest number of RANs from the four countries in the UK (Etienne et al 2015). 
Amendments to the domestic hygiene legislation in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
extended the scope of RANs into non-approved premises, which are registered under Regulation 
852/2004. In England however, it has not been possible to extend the scope of RANs to non-
approved premises and these findings add to the debate on the implementation of RANs for non-
approved premises in England. The implication of these finding is that an enforcement tool is 
needed that could help address a gap in enforcement powers and add the EHP enforcement toolkit. 
The introduction of RANs may ensure compliance for repeat offenders and those that harbour 
complete disregard for the law, without the time consuming involvement of going to court.  
7.4.8 Alternative Enforcement Toolkit: Civil Sanctions 
During the Skype interviews it transpired that the majority (17) of the EHPs did not think that civil 
penalties in general would work for food offences. However, a small majority (12) agreed that 
fixed monetary penalties (FMPs) could work for food offences as it would alleviate time 
consuming court cases. A few respondents cited instances were fixed monetary penalties would 
be useful in food law enforcement, for example, not registering the food business within the 
specified time, no hot water, no food safety management system or inappropriately stored food; 
punish repeat offenders and offences that are minor but need addressing.  
A number of other issues were identified during the Skype interviews. It was agreed that the threat 
of financial penalties could be effective as they can directly affect a business and the threat of 
financial punishment can serve as a heavy deterrent and aid compliance. The EHPs also thought 
that civil sanctions will avoid costly and time consuming court cases was another advantage cited 
by the respondents. These views surfaced mainly because FMPs are seen as a way of imposing a 
penalty for moderate to serious offences where prosecution is not considered to be in the public 
interest. They indicated emphatically that there needs to be clear guidance and consistency in its 
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enforcement before these sanctions are introduced into food regulations. This implies that FMP 
could be a beneficial tool in food law enforcement. The FSA and LAs need to be aware of any 
costs that may be incurred in setting out such policies and strategies.   
All the respondents agreed that the penalty should be high enough for it to be a deterrent and 
prevent unscrupulous businesses from profiting from their non-compliance. There was a question 
of what should be done with the monies generated from the fixed penalties. There was a call for 
monies to be retained by the local authority to help offset the costs of enforcement especially in 
the current economic climate where many LAs have been subject to budget cuts. Other respondents 
commented on the level of the fines, that they should be commensurate with the size of the business 
and linked to first time offence in addition to a discounted amount if the fine is paid early (similar 
to parking fine). This implies that EHPs are campaigning for an alternative, fairer and unbiased 
system to deal with offenders.  
The other three types of civil sanctions (variable monetary penalty, enforcement undertakings and 
stop notices) were met with indecisiveness. Some of the sampled EHPs mentioned in the Skype 
interviews that enforcement undertakings were already being used in the form of warning letters 
and hygiene improvement notices and also stop notices were being used in the form of emergency 
prohibition notices. Therefore these types of civil sanctions would not add to existing powers or 
help to raise levels of compliance. Without knowing exactly what it might entail, the EHPs found 
it difficult to make substantive comments on the use of this sanction. These findings provide new 
contribution to knowledge since there is no literature or existing data on how civil sanctions would 
work for food law enforcement. However, there is no information available in order to compare 
these findings with data for environmental protection which has been using civil sanctions for 
some time. There are various implications for these findings. First of all, the FSA may want to 
pilot civil sanctions within food law enforcement to see how they might be introduced and 
implemented. Secondly, guidance would be required to ensure transparency and accountability in 
their use. 
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7.5 Specialist Court  
Objective: To investigate EHPs perception of whether a specialist court would be required to 
deal with food law offences 
The discussion was taken a step further to investigate the opinion of the sampled EHPs relating to 
the attitudes of magistrates and whether they are fully appreciative of the seriousness of the food 
safety offences. A small majority (14) were of the opinion that magistrates are appreciative of the 
seriousness of food safety offences. Level of experience did not appear to be a significant influence 
here but gender did.  Interestingly, the female EHPs tended to think that magistrates appreciative 
of food safety offences and the male EHPs tend to think that magistrates on the side of the food 
business operator. Those EHPs who had spent time on other units of environmental health were 
the respondents who did not think that magistrates are fully appreciative of food safety offences. 
They cited their own experiences and knowledge of working with colleagues that have taken 
prosecutions. One of the respondents inferred that health and safety offences, for example, were 
considered to have more serious undertones than food hygiene offences. Another respondent EHP 
who had worked on environmental protection for three years prior to joining the food team 
explained that there may be a perception that environmental offences are more of a crime than 
food offences. However, there were some slightly negative comments about the attitudes of the 
magistrates and some of these comments coming from EHPs who had not directly been involved 
in a prosecution case. Concerns were expressed at the inability of magistrates to handle technical 
issues of the law and that they have limited legal knowledge of food hygiene offences. They 
pointed out that some magistrates do not deal with food hygiene offences on a regular basis and 
so do not really know how to handle them. They made reference to fines imposed by the courts as 
not being much of a deterrence unless they are quite substantial. These findings build on literature 
conclusions proposed by Gray and Shimshack (2011); Simpson et al (2013) and Gunningham 
(2015). The implication of these findings is that there needs to be a new approach to regulatory 
offences in the courts. 
The participants were asked whether they thought a specialised court, investigatory board or 
administrative tribunal should be set up to handle environmental health cases in place of the 
criminal court. Interestingly, EHPs who had been enforcing food law for more than fifteen years 
agreed the current system seems to work well and a specialist court was not necessary for the 
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complexity of most cases. They believed that environmental health cases involving food offences 
must be maintained within the criminal court to avoid being “downgraded” to a civil offence. 
Conversely, the newly qualified and those EHPs who had been enforcing food law for less than 
fifteen years were of the view that a court with specialised knowledge and skills will be able to 
handle the environmental health cases more effectively. These findings are new to the debate on 
dealing with food hygiene offences but support the conclusions of an earlier study by Moran 
(2005).  
7.6 EHP Training 
Objective: To investigate EHP views and needs with regards to their working environment in 
relation to the current economic climate 
This section of the thesis reviews data that offers new contribution to knowledge since there is no 
existing and current data on how of EHPs regarding their level of training with respect to carrying 
out their enforcement duties. 
7.6.1 Academic Qualifications  
There were somewhat differing views between less experienced and more experienced EHPs 
regarding the university courses participating in an environmental health program. Those EHPs 
who had been enforcing food law for more than fifteen years held different qualifications than 
those who had been enforcing the law for less than fifteen years. The majority of these EHPs had 
obtained a Diploma in Environmental Health whilst the less experienced EHPs had acquired a 
degree from university. The EHPs with a diploma were of the view that their course was more 
practical than the degree. A small minority (2) of the sampled EHPs held a master’s degree in 
environmental health and it was some of those who had worked on other units of their respective 
environmental health departments that had acquired this qualification. None of the sampled EHPs 
had qualifications above master’s level.  
Half of the respondents were funded by their LA and so did not have to pay for fees out of pocket. 
From the remaining EHPs, two-thirds had received government grants and the remainder (mostly 
newly qualified EHPs) mentioned that they had to apply for student loans. Majority of the 
respondents spent 3 or 4 years at university. Almost all of them had had no problems being placed 
with a LA for their placement year. All the respondents said their courses were run by experienced 
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EHPs and other professionals such as microbiologists and health and safety professionals. And 
were generally satisfied with course content. Those respondents who had been qualified for more 
than twenty years said their courses were more practical. One of them mentioned that lectures on 
housing disrepair, for example, included learning the basics of home plumbing that enabled him 
to install the central heating system in his house! However, a small majority of respondents thought 
that the professional assessment at the end of the undergraduate course could be improved by 
making the portfolio students need to complete less complicated and offering simulated scenarios 
that mimic real life environmental health situations. Some even suggested that this could be used 
as an annual training tool for all EHPs as a consistency exercise.  
7.6.2 Professional and Career Development: Current Economic Climate 
The majority of the sampled EHPs had rather a bleak outlook with regards career development and 
thought that the professional training could be improved. Most of them cited the lack of promotion 
opportunities within their LA and support from their team leader/manager. Furthermore, the 
majority of the participants were not satisfied with their job citing the current economic climate as 
the main reason for their dissatisfaction. Many LAs were experiencing staff losses causing low 
morale among the workforce with having to attain unachievable targets. They lamented that the 
workload is the same irrespective of a reduction in staff leading to more burdens and stress on 
existing staff. A majority of respondents had experienced staff losses within the last 12 months 
and a small majority has had the number of food enforcement officers almost halved in the last 12 
months. This could mean fewer food hygiene inspections could be carried out by LAs resulting in 
a possible food safety risk to the consumer. Some EHPs mentioned that their LA had to employ 
EHPs from an employment agency to help with the backlog of inspections. The majority of LAs 
had reduced their workforce mainly through offering early retirement for eligible officers and were 
no longer recruiting or offering student work experience placements. One of the respondents 
mentioned that he was in the process of acquiring a qualification in another subject area as a 
precaution against redundancies within his local authority. However, a small minority of LAs were 
continuing to recruit staff and/or offer student placements. These findings are consistent with the 
LAEMS data which shows a decrease in the number of full-time staff for 2014/15 compared to the 
previous 2 years. Subsequently, the number of vacant posts have increased during the same time. 
Tombs (2016) also found that there was a reduction in staffing levels from 2010-2015.  
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7.6.3 Future of Environmental Health 
A note of optimism came from the mainly newly qualified EHPs and those who had been enforcing 
food law for less than ten years. They had the view the profession will not die out since there will 
always be food businesses that require inspection. In addition, most of the female EHPs applauded 
the flexible working hours that local authorities offer. A small majority of respondents 
(irrespective of gender and level of experience) indicated that salary is an attractive incentive to 
remain in the job. A small majority of the respondents voiced their concerns about students 
struggling to find work placements and/or permanent employment after graduating from 
university. With regards to the future of environmental health and food law enforcement, the 
majority of respondents were of the view that budget cuts could lead to many EHPs working from 
home to free up office space and therefore local authorities will not have to pay high rental and 
utility costs plus any other overheads that come with renting office space. One of the respondents 
informed this study that this has already happened in part in her LA.  
7.7 Chapter Summary  
In conclusion, the chapter has provided empirical evidence which revealed that the sampled EHPs 
are generally satisfied with the current range of enforcement tools when dealing with food hygiene 
and safety offences. However, the majority of the responses also imply that there is a gap in the 
enforcement powers toolkit that can effectively deal with certain situations when carrying out their 
enforcement duties. There are also underlining factors such as the economic climate that can affect 
the effectiveness of food law enforcement in England. The following chapter forms the basis of 
the contributions of this study as outlined in Chapter One. It also presents the overall conclusions 
and recommendations.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 Introduction 
This research has reviewed Environmental Health Practitioners (EHPs) from Local Authorities 
(LAs) in the Northwest of England with the aim of investigating their perceptions of the 
enforcement regime of food law. It investigated the aspects of enforcement that were significant 
to EHPs and how best to improve the enforcement toolkit in order to assist in their enforcement 
activities. This research utilised an interpretive qualitative method in order to elicit the perspectives 
of twenty-one EHPs from seventeen LAs. This chapter begins outlining the key conclusions of the 
research and how each research objective has been met. Recommendations for EHPs, LAs, the 
FSA and other policymakers that oversee food safety and hygiene enforcement are also discussed 
as well as academic and practitioner contributions. The chapter concludes with the study’s 
limitations, future research and chapter summary. 
8.2 Evaluating the key conclusions of the research 
The aim of this research was to examine Environmental Health Practitioners (EHPs) perceptions 
of the relevancy and effectiveness of current policies, practices and legislative frameworks as they 
relate to enforcing food legislation. The aim has been met by using a constructivist qualitative 
strategy to investigate the perceptions of EHPs with respect to food law enforcement. The 
objectives of this research have been achieved as follows: 
8.2.1 The use of regulatory interventions among EHPs in the Northwest of England  
Conclusion 1: Inspection is the main regulatory intervention used by EHPs  
This conclusion is supported by the FSA LAEMS data which reveals that for the period of 2014/15, 
inspections (and audits) account for two-thirds of the total food hygiene interventions.  It is also 
supported in the primary data of this study in which all of the respondents indicated that they 
always use this regulatory intervention during the course of their enforcement duties. It is also 
reflected in their statements which suggest that if they do not conduct a full inspection then there 
is a chance that the food business they visited would be implicated in a major food poisoning 
outbreak. The implications of this conclusion is that a food hygiene inspection appears to be the 
best method to capture contraventions of the law.   
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Conclusion 2: EHPs are reluctant to use partial inspection as a regulatory intervention and 
their perception of what constitutes a partial inspection differs to that of the FSA  
EHPs are reluctant to use partial inspection as a regulatory intervention. This conclusion is 
supported by the work of Bukowski et al (2012) who stated that food law enforcement officers are 
reluctant to use partial inspection in case they fail to notice important contraventions which could 
result in a food poisoning outbreak. It is also supported from the primary data in this study where 
the majority of respondents considered partial inspections as unnecessary. In addition, some of the 
respondents did not agree with the FSA explanation of what constitutes a partial inspection and 
thought it caused confusion to enforcement protocols. The implication of this conclusion is that if 
partial inspection is to remain a regulatory intervention then it needs to be clearly defined to avoid 
misinterpretation, inconsistency in inspection and subsequently irregularities in activity reports; 
otherwise it should be removed as a regulatory intervention. 
Conclusion 3: There are some regulatory interventions that are effective but financial and 
human resources are a barrier. 
This conclusion is stems from the empirical study where the majority of the EHPs responded that 
regulatory interventions such as sampling, advice/education and training were valuable methods 
of enforcement but the current economic climate prevented them from using these interventions 
productively. For example, LAs do not have the budget to educate and train food handlers neither 
do they have the manpower to spend a great deal of time educating and training food handlers on 
site during an inspection. Furthermore, they do not have the budget to engage in frequent sampling 
activities. The implication of this conclusion is that in as much sampling, training and education 
positively impacts on compliance, budget cuts and having to work to targets prevent EHPs/LAs 
from fully carrying out these services. It could be argued that this could result in an increase in 
non-compliance and food poisoning incidences which can be detrimental to consumer health. 
Conclusion 4: There are some regulatory interventions that EHPs consider ineffective. 
This conclusion is supported by Bukowski et al (2012) who found that EHPs are unwilling to use 
monitoring and verification as individual interventions primarily because EHPs feel that solely 
using these interventions will make them liable if something goes wrong. Moreover, this 
conclusion is also supported by data collected in this study where the majority of EHPs rarely used 
these interventions and considered them ineffectual on their own. The implications of this 
conclusion is that although monitoring and verification are currently classed as official controls 
Chapter 8 Conclusion & Recommendations 
 
150 
 
they are thought of as being part of the inspection process and therefore do not need to be 
considered as separate regulatory interventions. 
Conclusion 5: A national standardised inspection form is required for consistency. 
This conclusion supports the work of Laikko-Roto et al (2015) who stated that standardised 
inspection reports result in greater consistency of inspection. The conclusion is further supported 
by the findings of this study where the majority of EHPs highlighted the need for a national 
standardised inspection form especially since it was revealed that some EHPs mentioned that they 
were not using inspection forms to record their inspection findings or they LA did not provide 
them. This conclusion implies that standardised inspection forms are essential to enhance 
communication and bring about consistency within the environmental health profession. 
 
Conclusion 6: Food hygiene inspections is an important regulatory intervention in capturing 
contraventions of the law. 
In summary, it can be concluded that conclusions 1-6 adequately addressed the first objective of 
this study, which was developed to investigate the importance of food hygiene inspections in 
capturing contraventions of food law from the views of EHPs enforcing food law in the Northwest 
of England. Linking this to the objective of the study, it is therefore accepted that food hygiene 
inspections are important to capture food hygiene contraventions. This implies the importance of 
conducting a full inspection and disposing of those regulatory interventions that are believed to be 
ineffective. This is reflected in suggestions EHPs made to improve the inspection process 
including the implementation of a national standardised inspection form. 
 
8.2.2 The Food Hygiene Rating Scheme (FHRS) is a reliable risk based method to assess 
compliance 
The research objective two which was to investigate EHP perceptions on the impact of the food 
hygiene rating scheme as a risk strategy tool for enforcement will be used as an evaluative tool to 
discuss the conclusions of this study. 
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Conclusion 7: The display of FHRS should be mandatory for all food businesses 
This conclusion is supported by the work of Vegaris (2015) whose study revealed that enforcement 
officers, food business and consumers are in favour of a mandatory display of inspection scores. 
It is further supported by the new draft proposal of the Food Standards Agency (FSA) to make it 
compulsory for food businesses in England to display their food rating score. It is also supported 
by the work of the primary data which revealed that all the respondents were in favour of 
legislation for all food businesses to display the results of their inspection. The implication of this 
conclusion is that it would provide transparency for consumers to make their decisions about where 
they want to purchase/eat food. It could also increase food hygiene compliance since food 
businesses will not want to get a poor food rating score and lose their clientele.  
Conclusion 8:  Additional risk factors are needed in order to accurately assess the compliance 
of a food business 
This conclusion is supported by the findings of this study where the respondents agreed that the 
concept of the FHRS is a positive impact on moving towards improving standards of food hygiene 
amongst food businesses with a hope of increasing compliance with food legislation. However, it 
was thought that the current risk factors identified within the scheme requires improvement. The 
implication of this conclusion is that developing a food hygiene rating scheme that encompasses 
elements to capture all risks within a food business is fundamental in order to reduce the incidence 
of food poisoning. Therefore, the food hygiene rating scheme, although a beneficial to EHPs in 
terms of, for example, prioritising inspections, in its current state is not a reliable risk based 
method. The implications for this conclusion is that the current system needs to be amended in 
order to provide the desired accuracy to assess compliance. This addresses the second objective of 
the study which was to investigate whether the perceptions of EHPs view the food hygiene rating 
scheme as a positive tool for enforcement.  
8.2.3 To examine the enforcement sanctions currently available to EHPs and whether 
alternative enforcement tools would be more appropriate.  
The research objective three stated above will be used as an evaluative tool to discuss the 
conclusions of this study.  
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Conclusion 9: There is a gender disparity towards prosecution. 
This conclusion is supported by the findings of this study which revealed that males are more 
likely to undertake a prosecution compared to their female colleagues. This assertion is further 
supported by the fact that from the four EHPs who had undertaken a prosecution in the last eight 
years, one was female and three were male. The implication of this is that the demographics of a 
particular LA may shape the extent to which EHPs are likely to prosecute. 
 
Conclusion 10:  Non-white EHPs and EHPs who have previously worked on other 
environmental health units have a different outlook towards enforcement and enforcement 
sanctions.  
This conclusion is supported by the findings of this study which revealed that the two non-white 
EHPs seemed to have a different attitude towards enforcement style and associated enforcement 
sanctions compared to their white colleagues. They both mentioned that they did not use formal 
enforcement tools such as improvement notices and prohibition notices and neither had been 
involved in a prosecution. In addition, both were in favour of LAs adopting a more educational 
approach to food enforcement by advocating for officers to spend more time training food handlers 
and/or the employment of an officer(s) to solely deal with food hygiene training. Furthermore, 
those respondents who had previously worked in other environmental health areas had views and 
opinions different to those who had solely worked on the food unit. For example, they thought that 
warning letters were unwarranted since they were inclined to issue formal notices only.  
Conclusion 11: There are alternative enforcement sanctions that could be beneficial to food 
law enforcement. 
This conclusions is supported by the findings of this study in that the majority of EHPs believed 
remedial action notices (RANs) for all types of food businesses, fixed penalty notices (civil 
sanctions), licensing of food businesses as opposed to registration, would enhance the enforcement 
toolkit of EHPs. The implication of this conclusion is that an extended enforcement toolkit could 
benefit EHPs in their enforcement duties and should be introduced into the legislation. It can be 
argued that conclusions 9-11 adequately address the objective 3 of the study which was developed 
to investigate whether alternative enforcement tools would assist EHPs in their enforcement duties. 
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This analysis was carried out by having the EHPs discuss their perspectives of the current 
enforcement toolkit and that of civil sanctions in terms of usage, practicality and effectiveness.  
8.2.4 To investigate EHPs perception of whether a specialist court would be required to deal 
with food law offences 
Conclusion 12: There are barriers that prevent EHPs from taking a prosecution. 
This conclusion is supported by Bukowski et al (2012), May (2013) and Tombs (2016) who stated 
that there is a decreasing use of prosecutions among enforcement officers. It is also supported from 
the primary data in which only four of the respondent EHPs stated that they had been involved in 
prosecutions within the last eight years. The barriers included inadequate legal training, lack of 
confidence, fear of failure and the fact that prosecution is a time consuming process. The 
implication of this conclusion shows that EHPs maybe overlooking relatively serious 
contraventions. 
 
Conclusion 13: The attitude of magistrates’ impact on the penalties given for food hygiene 
offences. 
This conclusion is supported by the findings in this study where a small majority of the respondent 
EHPs revealed that they are generally dissatisfied with the amount of penalties associated with 
food law offences and equated it to the relatively nonchalant attitude of the magistrates and 
inconsistencies within and between magistrates courts dealing with food law cases. The 
implication of this conclusion is that magistrates may be required to train/retrain in regulatory law 
particularly food law and how to deal with food hygiene offences.     
 
Conclusion 14: A specialist court to oversee food law offences would be desirable. 
There is no literature to support this claim for EHPs responsible for food law enforcement. 
However, Moran (2005), Adshead and Andrew (2009) and Macrory (2013) make the case for 
environmental regulations. It is also supported by the primary data in this study which noted that 
the respondents believed a specialist court would be advantageous over magistrates’ court in 
dealing with food law offences/prosecutions. The implication of this conclusion is that the creation 
of a specialist court to oversee food law offences could mean that such cases may be handled more 
effectively, fairly and confidently by personnel who have the technical and legal understanding of 
food safety legislation in its interpretation and application of food law and policy. 
Chapter 8 Conclusion & Recommendations 
 
154 
 
8.2.5 To investigate EHP views regarding their level of training and general working 
environment in relation to the current economic climate. 
The research objective five stated above will be used as an evaluative tool to discuss the 
conclusions of this study. 
Conclusion 14: The current economic climate has had an adverse effect on environmental 
health departments.  
This conclusion is supported by the work of UNISON (2012); NACCHO (2014), CIEH (2015) 
and Tombs (2016) who concluded that budget cuts have resulted in a shrinking workforce and 
local government services. It is also supported by the primary data in this study which revealed 
that staff shortages have resulted in stress, anxiety and unachievable targets. In addition, EHPs 
reported that they are carrying out fewer food hygiene inspections and their respective LAs are no 
longer recruiting new officers or student EHPs. The implication of this conclusion is that many 
LAs will have to adapt to the current economic climate by implementing income generating 
activities that will bring in additional funds to their depleting resources. In addition, fewer 
inspections could increase the likelihood of food poisoning outbreaks. 
Conclusion 15: EHPs are only partly optimistic about the future of environmental health. 
This conclusion is supported by the findings of the primary data where some of the respondent 
EHPs were hopeful that approaches to food law enforcement and environmental health can be 
improved and made suggestions in going forward. Other respondents were exploring avenues of 
alternative employment. The implication of this conclusion is that although environmental health 
is an important service to sustain the health of the population, financial challenges appear to be 
threatening its future. 
8.3 Recommendations  
This study has implications for EHPs who are responsible for enforcing food law as well as the 
FSA and those responsible for food policy implementation. This research provides an 
understanding of the challenges EHPs face and the aspects of the current enforcement toolkit and 
sanctions affect their enforcement duties. Hence this study suggests that policy makers should be 
aware of the issues that affect food law enforcement so that they can develop the appropriate 
Chapter 8 Conclusion & Recommendations 
 
155 
 
strategies. In achieving these statements above, the following recommendations need to be 
considered: 
Recommendation 1: The FSA should identify those regulatory interventions that are 
impractical and ineffective and eliminate them from the range of interventions available to 
EHPs. 
The aim of this recommendation is to inform the FSA that there are some regulatory interventions 
that EHPs find ineffective and do not need to be included in the range of controls available to 
EHPs.  In achieving this recommendation, EHPs may no longer need to differentiate between 
official and non-official controls. The FSA can achieve this aim by setting up consultations with 
LAs to determine which interventions are beneficial to EHPs in their enforcement duties. The cost 
of this recommendation are those associated with the consultation process including preparing a 
consultation document, evaluating responses/feedback and arranging for informational meetings. 
The benefits to be derived from this recommendation will be a more effective and efficient 
enforcement protocols.   
Recommendation 2: The FSA should develop and implement a food hygiene rating scheme 
that is capable of capturing all risks within food businesses.  
The aim of this recommendation is to enable the FSA to develop a food hygiene rating scheme 
(FHRS) that will better achieve the FSA’s goal of the scheme in reducing the incidence of 
foodborne illness in the UK. It can be achieved by bringing together a group of specialists from a 
variety of disciplines such as microbiology, epidemiology, statistics and environmental health to 
create and develop risk factors and scoring systems that will best assess food business compliance. 
This will involve research, several meetings and draft proposals. The final proposal can then be 
piloted in different regions of the UK to test suitability. The cost of this recommendation will be 
those associated with development, implementation, and monitoring of the research/feedback 
including human resources to carry out pilot studies.  Other costs are those associated with 
developing surveys, focus group, training employees and the cost of implementing and monitoring 
the process. The benefits to be derived from this recommendation include standardised inspections 
due to the consistency in scoring methods and subsequently confidence in the whole inspection 
process. Other benefits may include reduced incidence of food poisoning, increased compliance 
and better way of communicating food hygiene issues to food businesses and the public. 
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Recommendation 3: The mandatory display of food hygiene rating scores should be 
introduced into the legislation in England. 
The aim of this recommendation is to increase food hygiene and safety compliance by making it 
compulsory for food businesses to display their inspection score. It can be achieved through 
consultations between the FSA, government, local authorities, food businesses and the general 
public (consumers). The costs of this recommendation will be those associated with introducing 
new legislation and include carrying out an impact assessment to assess the costs and potential 
benefits of introducing the legislation. The benefits to be derived from this recommendation is that 
it will provide transparency about hygiene standards in food businesses. It will improve food 
hygiene standards in that food businesses will not want to ruin their reputation and lose their 
clientele through obtaining a low food hygiene rating score. In addition, adverse publicity may be 
a more effective deterrent than monetary fines. It is also a way of recognising those food businesses 
who are always striving to achieve a high level of compliance with the law. An improvement in 
food hygiene standards may decrease the likelihood of food poisoning incidences. Mandatory 
display of ratings at premises will also create a level playing field for businesses across the four 
countries operating the FHRS.  
Recommendation 4: Local Authorities should consider developing and implementing 
electronic standardised inspection forms. 
The aim of this recommendation is to enable EHPs within LAs, regions or nationally to achieve 
consistency in the inspection process. In achieving this recommendation EHPs (whether on a local, 
or national level) need to agree on how and what contraventions they want to record so that it 
captures the major hazards within a food business. This will form the basis for a predetermined 
inspection checklist. The inspection form could be part of the food hygiene rating in a sense that 
the score will be automatically calculated based on the contraventions found in the business. There 
will need to be regular meetings and workshops for food safety teams as well as training on the 
new system for all EHPs. The costs of this recommendation will include cost for electronic device 
and software, training of EHPs and LAs will need to factor in technical problems such as 
breakdown/repair costs of system. The FSA will also need to carry out a pilot study. The benefits 
that could be derived from this recommendation are consistency within and between LAs and this 
would increase the quality and efficiency of inspections. In addition, the data on the device can be 
a valuable database for EHPs that can be accessed by other EHPs and LAs in order to obtain 
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information about a particular food business. This will potentially offer a comprehensive 
transformation in the inspection process. 
Recommendation 5: The FSA should remove the burden of target related performance from 
local authorities. 
The aim of this recommendation is to enable EHPs to carry out quality inspections without the 
pressure of trying to achieve targets set by the FSA in lieu of an already depleting workforce. In 
achieving this recommendation, EHPs will be able to spend more time with those businesses that 
need the most assistance in complying with food legislation. The cost of this recommendation 
would be negligible. The benefits to be derived from this recommendation less stress and pressure 
on a dwindling workforce. 
Recommendation 6: The FSA should consider extending the enforcement toolkit of LAs to 
include licensing, civil sanctions and remedial action notices for non-approved premises. 
The aim of this recommendation is to extend the EHP enforcement toolkit to ensure food business 
operators cannot trade unless they are knowledgeable in food safety management (licensing); to 
enable EHPs to deal with minor and/or repeated regulatory offences without the need for going to 
court (RANs for non-approved premises and civil sanctions in the form of fixed penalty notices). 
This can be achieved, in the case of RANs, by extending the current legislation to include non-
approved premises. Amendments need to be made to the existing legislation to incorporate 
licensing and civil sanctions as enforcement tools. Guidance and training on how to use the new 
toolkit should be given as well as carrying out initial pilot studies. The costs of this 
recommendation will be those associated with introducing new legislation. The benefits to be 
derived from this recommendation is that EHPs will have more options and greater flexibility in 
their enforcement toolkit. Another benefit would be that LAs will have more control over the 
number of food businesses in their area because food businesses will not be able to trade unless 
they have a license. In addition, EHPs will not have to spend time preparing court cases since there 
would not be the need for court involvement in the majority of cases.  
Recommendation 7: The FSA and the government should consider an alternative ways of 
dealing with food hygiene offences. 
The aim of this recommendation is to enable LAs to have an outlet in which to deal with food 
business operators that should be prosecuted. It can be achieved by designating individuals with 
specialist legal knowledge in food hygiene and safety issues to deal with prosecution cases. The 
Chapter 8 Conclusion & Recommendations 
 
158 
 
costs of this recommendation would be costs associated with setting up any new court, board or 
tribunal. The benefits to be derived from this recommendation would be a more efficient 
prosecution process for food law enforcement. 
Recommendation 8: Local Authorities should concentrate their resources into providing 
EHPs regular and ongoing consistency training.  
The aim of this recommendation is to allow long-term consistency within and between LAs. It can 
be achieved by developing training courses for EHPs such as seminars, workshops and simulated 
environments. The costs of this recommendation will be those associated with training courses. 
The benefits to be derived from this recommendation is that there would be fewer inconsistencies 
throughout the food law enforcement process.  
8.4 Contribution of the study 
This study has highlighted the perceptions of EHPs in relation to the enforcement of food 
legislation. It has particularly taken into account perceptions based factors such as gender, level of 
experience and those EHPs who had previously worked in other areas of environmental health 
such as environmental protection, housing and health and safety. The study highlights a gender 
disparity with regards to prosecution in that males have the tendency to prosecute compared to 
their female counterparts. This provides an additional insight into of the extent to which a particular 
gender is predisposed to prosecution. This is an essential insight which the literature does not 
discuss. It is important to understand why this pattern occurs and so this will require further 
exploration into the gender identity of the EHP with respect to the propensity to prosecute. 
The study also drew the attention to the fact that the more experienced EHPs took less time to 
carry out inspections than their less experienced counterparts. This adds to the literature and is a 
significant contribution since the literature does not include the duration of the inspections. 
In addition, the study highlighted that there is a high probability that EHPs are more likely to be 
white compared with any other ethnic group. This means that food businesses are primarily 
inspected by white EHPs, therefore there may be a cultural disconnection where there is a 
proliferation of ethnic cuisines. This lack of diversity could also impact on the interactions of food 
business operators with EHPs who serve the community. The racial profiling of EHPs is not 
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discussed in the literature and some enforcement sectors such as the police force show how racial 
profile can be an important aspect of enforcement (Delsol 2015; Menifield et al 2019). 
The study revealed the support for the food hygiene rating scheme (FHRS) in terms of the idea 
behind this concept. This major enforcement instrument has flaws which is accentuated by the fact 
that previous studies are inconclusive in associating, for example, a high food rating score with 
food handlers who have been trained in food hygiene and those who have not been trained (Murphy 
et al 2013); and also its ability to detect the likelihood that a food business will be implicated in a 
food poisoning incident (Da Cunha et al 2014). Time and energy is being invested into the use of 
this tool but it does not actually shape the outcomes judging by the views from the respondent 
EHPs. This study reveals, through the views of the respondents, that the use of the FHRS may not 
be the best way to assess food business compliance.  It is perceived not to provide the desired 
accuracy to assess compliance even though the benefit may be providing motivation to 
compliance, the desired effect is not achieved. More efficient mechanisms/procedures may be need 
to be introduced to complement such a protocol/framework in order to accurately measure 
compliance. 
There is a tendency for environmental health to reduce compliance to simple tools but in reality 
more complex/sophisticated systems may have to be utilised. Given the fact that less experienced 
EHPs are spending more time conducting inspections it might be worthwhile looking into systems 
that are more accurate (rather than elaborate) in order not to burden the EHP for example, carry 
out a pilot study using the systems such as those employed in the US. 
The literature does not discuss the previous role of EHPs from other units of the environmental 
health departments. There appears to be a variation into the way they think and process the law 
and communicate the legislation which is not discussed in the literature. 
The study also revealed that several EHPs are seeking other academic qualifications in different 
fields. One would think that they would seek to expand their understanding in the area of 
environmental health but not the case in this study. The majority of the respondents had acquired 
a diploma or undergraduate degree from university. Only two of the respondent EHPs had 
postgraduate degrees and these where the EHPs who had previously worked on other units. None 
of the respondents possessed a PhD. The literature does not discuss the academic background of 
EHPs and the way they process the legislation. This could impact on their confidence to go outside 
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the general remit of their work, for example, contribute to research/studies to understand patterns 
that may be around them. 
8.5 Research Limitations 
While this study has provided valuable insights into the enforcement of food legislation, there are 
some limitations: 
1) This research was conducted with EHPs working with LAs in the Northwest of England. 
This means that the results reflect the practices of EHPs in this region and may not reflect 
EHPs working in other parts of the UK or those employed in the private sector. 
2) This thesis used qualitative research methods in the form of Skype   interviews to collect 
data. It could be argued that other methods could be used to improve the validity of the 
research. The results could be different if the study was conducted with a larger number of 
EHPs. 
3) The study did not include the opinions of food businesses and consumers. This was beyond 
the scope of the study due to the location of the researcher. 
 
8.6 Future Research Recommendations 
This study has offered adequate insights into the enforcement of food law in England. The findings 
of the EHPs in the Northwest of England may be regarded as a snapshot which represents the 
current situation in relation to food law enforcement. To validate the findings of this research LAs 
within other regions in England and the UK can be studied. In addition, comparative studies could 
be made with other countries in the UK, European countries or the USA and Canada to obtain a 
better understanding of this topic and improve validity, reliability and robustness. Such 
comparative studies can also be carried out with other regulatory areas, for example, health and 
safety, environmental protection.  
From the findings of this research other future studies could also include: 
1) Examine whether announced or unannounced inspections are associated with compliance.  
2) Carry out a pilot study for the mandatory display of food hygiene score and observe 
whether it increases compliance and food poisoning incidence.  
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3) The effects of Brexit on food regulation and enforcement. 
4) Pilot the introduction of RANs for non-approved premises in England. 
5) Pilot the introduction of civil sanctions for food law enforcement. 
6) Implement a pilot standardised food inspection form 
7) Compare the different weighted scores and mathematical scoring of risk factors of the food 
hygiene rating schemes. 
8) Introduce additional demographic factors such as racial profiling and further investigate 
the effects of gender identity on prosecution and food law enforcement in general. 
8.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has outlined the research aim and objectives for the study and presented how the 
empirical findings were used to address the objectives. It also presented key conclusions and 
recommendations that address the objectives and contribution of the research (summarised in 
Figure 8.1). The limitations of the study and area for future research were also discussed in this 
chapter. 
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Figure 8.1 Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
 
 
 
 
Regulatory Interventions
Inspections are the main regulatory intervention.
Financial and human resources are barriers to the
effective implementation of some interventions.
Eliminate ineffective interventions.
Develop and implement a standardised
inspection form.
Food Hygiene Rating Scheme
Mandatory display of food rating scores in food
businesses.
Additional risk factors to accurately assess
compliance.
Develop and implement a practical and feasible
FHRS.
Food Hygiene Offences
Several barriers prevent prosecution.
Gender disparity and
Attitudes of magistrates impact penalties given
for food hygiene offences.
Specialist court to oversee food hygiene offences.
Alternative Enforcement Toolkit
The current toolkit is limited in its application.
Alternative enforcement sanctions may be
beneficial.
Civil sanctions may or may not be practical.
Extend current enforcement toolkit.
FOOD LAW ENFORCEMENT
Training and Career Development 
Current economic climate has had an adverse effect 
on EHDs. 
Remove burden of target related performance 
Poor recruitment and retention 
Ongoing and appropriate training crucial 
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